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Abstract 
An emerging requirement for 21st century enterprises is operational flexibility, a 
requirement particularly important for the U. S. Department of Defense (DoD).  To 
achieve flexibility, most practice and research emphasizes process improvement, robust 
collaboration and “flattened” or “networked” organizations.  Lateral alignment has also 
been proposed as a means to enable flexibility.  Missing from these approaches is an 
appreciation and understanding of the role of architecture and hierarchy as well how to 
apply these ideas at the enterprise level of organization. 
The DoD has embraced information technology as one means to achieve flexibility via 
these methods.  Within DoD the Air Force is a uniquely flexible combat arm, but it has 
proven particularly difficult to integrate air power at the level of inter-service (Joint) 
military operations in order to leverage this flexibility.  Kometer (ESD Ph.D., 2005) used 
a complex, large-scale, interconnected, open, socio-technical (CLIOS) systems analysis 
to examine command and control of the Combat Air Operations System (CAOS), 
proposing new command and control concepts to gain flexibility.   
This thesis extends Kometer’s research by using a qualitative architectural analysis to 
explore the twin ideas of hierarchy and laterality in enabling flexibility.  We define lateral 
interactions as those within the same layer of an enterprise hierarchy.  Lateral interactions 
enable formalized collaboration among peer entities, which can enable more operational 
alternatives and make these alternatives executable on more responsive timelines than 
possible with classic hierarchical structures.  We identify previously unexamined trends 
in the operational architecture of combat air operations that are related to flexibility and 
examine the trade-offs between flexibility and other enterprise properties.  We find a 
pattern of increasing enterprise laterality from beginning to end of the case studies and an 
association between upper- and lower-echelon laterality, overall system flexibility and 
strategic coherence.  To enrich the analytical framework, an analogous example of 
flexibility in the New England Patriots football team is developed and presented.  
We find that our architecture framework provides a rich addition to existing empirical 
research on combat air power and addresses difficult socio-technical analysis issues in a 
way that complements other approaches.  We also find that traditional perspectives on 
flexibility, efficiency and effectiveness trade-offs are strongly dependent on hierarchical 
level of analysis.  Our framework lays a foundation for rigorous holistic enterprise design 
efforts in the area of military operations and other socio-technical enterprises such as 
health care, disaster relief and large-scale defense acquisition. 
Thesis supervisor:  Joel Moses 
Title: Institute Professor, Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science 
and Engineering Systems 
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Chapter 1   
Enterprise Flexibility as an Operational Requirement 
1.0 Introduction and motivation:  Why flexibility, why enterprises? 
The end of the Cold War coincided with the commercialization of the Internet and 
World Wide Web to create new operational and technical challenges for the Department 
of Defense (DoD).  Around the same time, there was an emerging awareness of historical 
periods of rapid change in military affairs driven by technological advance, called 
Revolutions in Military Affairs (RMA).  Adjusting to this period of change is the central 
challenge of the Department of Defense in the early 21st century.  Designing flexible 
strategies, systems and enterprises has been proposed as a means to make these 
adjustments and sustain competitive military advantage for the United States in today’s 
environment.1  
The inter-war period between World Wars I and II was the most recent prior 
period of revolutionary change in military technology and society.  It was dominated by 
new, physically large, technical systems such as motorized vehicles, aircraft, and aircraft 
carriers.2  These systems were by no means the complete determinants of 20th century 
military superiority or the sole drivers of social change, but they were the centerpieces; 
the animating forces for the activities and thinking that resulted in fundamental change.   
The early part of the 21st century is different.  This era of change is driven by 
information technology and information-based systems.  In a prescient 1993 memo, Mr. 
Andrew Marshall of the Office of the Secretary of Defense wrote: 
“There may not be any new platforms (e.g., carriers) for innovators 
to rally round and commit themselves to…technologies (information, 
computational, communications) that seem central suffuse everything, the 
same way that small electric motors did several decades ago, changing 
everything but creating no new major system like the automobile or the 
airplane.  New innovation strategies may be required.” (Marshall 1993) 
                                                
1 Rumsfeld Congressional testimony, May 2002; 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review. 
2 We do not ignore the significant contribution made by early information systems such as RADAR and 
radio, during the Inter-War period.  These were key (possibly critical enabling) technologies as well, but 
were not physically or institutionally as central to change as the others. 
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Mr. Marshall hints at twin, intertwined, phenomena.  In analogy to Say’s Law, 
these technologies create their own demand for change and improvement.3  Information 
systems themselves enable organizations to improve and change.  But they also enable 
development of systems that are more sophisticated and the interoperable systems (of 
systems).  The ability to use information technology to design new systems and to insert 
it into existing systems and organizations enables increased efficiency in design, 
production and other operational processes.  It also enables the creation of new processes, 
new systems and new ways of delivering value by increasing and enhancing information 
exchange among systems and organizations.  In military operations, the flexibility 
enabled by information technology produces beneficial effects as well as pathological 
ones.  This factor makes it important to develop a clear understanding of the implications 
of information technology on system performance through its effect on key system 
properties such as flexibility. 
The need for flexibility in the DoD is undeniable.  Since the end of the Cold War, 
and particularly since Sept 11, 2001, the military services have been tasked to conduct a 
wider array of combat and non-combat operations than in the past and to adapt to the new 
threat of global terrorism.  The DoD’s overarching concept of “Network Centric 
Operations” captures a set of principles that have guided some efforts to achieve needed 
flexibility.  The main idea of network-centric operations is that information technology 
enables increased collaboration within and among the combat force.  The NCO concept 
says that increased collaboration can then be leveraged to enable highly decentralized and 
explicitly non-hierarchical command of operational combat forces.  It is claimed that this 
style of operating will result in sustained advantage over adversaries.4  Most efforts to 
                                                
3 “It is worthwhile to remark that a product is no sooner created than it, from that instant, affords a market 
for other products to the full extent of its own value.  When the producer has put the finishing hand to his 
product, he is most anxious to sell it immediately, lest its value should diminish in his hands.  Nor is he less 
anxious to dispose of the money he may get for it; for the value of money is also perishable.  But the only 
way of getting rid of money is in the purchase of some product or other.  Thus the mere circumstance of 
creation of one product immediately opens a vent for other products.”  (J.B. Say, 1803: p.138-9) available 
on line at http://cepa.newschool.edu/het/profiles/say.htm.  
4 This mode of command has been called self-synchronization.  The idea of self-synchronization comes 
from complex adaptive systems research, where it has been observed that large groups executing simple 
behavioral rules, usually only requiring local knowledge, can result in orderly patterns of large scale 
(system level) behavior.  Self-synchronization captures the idea that many complex systems exhibit 
“emergent” behavior that is (a) not centrally coordinated or controlled and (b) not obvious from an 
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understand how network-centric concepts and technology provide competitive advantage 
have focused mainly on tactical level behavior and processes.  Underemphasized is the 
naturally hierarchical character of military operations and the system-level architectural 
aspects as well as system level operational properties that may enable or constrain 
capabilities at different levels of the system.   
1.1 The operational challenge defines the design challenge: enterprise 
architectures 
In the 20th century, military advantage was a function of mass and numbers.  With 
the advent of the information age, this type of advantage is reduced in value. Technology 
has leveled the playing field in many areas of warfare and conflict.  As we end the first 
decade of the 21st century, it has been observed that capabilities of individual systems and 
organizations have improved to the point where advantage now derives from the ability 
to craft innovative combinations of systems and organizations—enterprise architectures.5  
Today competitive advantage accrues to those with the ability to adjust to changing 
circumstances quickly by having multiple alternatives available to accomplish a mission 
or to solve a problem.  
Today, adversaries quickly adapt to technical advantages or they acquire systems 
that provide essential parity in capability.6  The diffusion of information technology and 
the increased global mobility of people enable diffusion of advanced industrial processes, 
practices and technology through a global marketplace.  This has leveled the playing field 
in physical systems and changed the main operational problem of military competition.  
Overwhelming force on the battlefield is no longer the dominant source of advantage.7  In 
this environment, competitors must learn how to generate “overmatching power” against 
                                                                                                                                            
examination of the components of the system.  Examples are swarming bees, market panics, riots, schools 
of fish and flocking birds. 
5 Watts, B., “US Combat Training, Operational Art, and Strategic Competence:  Problems and 
Opportunities”, briefing dated 21 Aug. 2008.  The 9-11 attacks, the emergence of the Insurgency and the 
Improvised Explosive Device (IED) campaign in Iraq are examples of the diminishing power of 
overwhelming force and the increased effectiveness of innovative combinations of systems and 
organizations. 
6 We will see later that the Serbian army learned the lessons of Desert Storm:  if you stand still, the US Air 
Force can hit you.  Their response was to increase mobility of potential targets and to use decoys, deception 
and civilian shields to negate our advantage in sensing and precision targeting.  A similar evolution can be 
seen in the recent conflicts between Israel and the terrorist groups Hamas and Hezbollah. 
7 Watts describes it as “moving up the food chain.” 
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adversaries (Rumsfeld 2003).8  But we have little in the way of concrete knowledge with 
which to support the design of architectures that can generate this needed overmatching 
power.  
Flexibility is an enabler toward this goal.  In the past flexibility in operations has 
often been “discovered” or developed ad hoc, usually driven by necessity and often in 
spite of existing organizational structures.  In today’s environment, flexibility must have 
a more prominent place in our thinking; our enterprise architectures must enable greater 
strategic, operational and tactical flexibility.  We define flexibility as the ability to 
respond with relative ease to internal and external changes by having multiple 
alternatives with which to deliver value on operationally responsive timelines.  In the 
1990s Garlan and Shaw observed that future value in software development was going to 
come from architecture—that the critical development tasks were how software elements 
were put together (Garlan and Shaw 1993): 
As the size and complexity of software systems increases, the 
design problem goes beyond the algorithms and data structures of the 
computation:  designing and specifying the overall system structure 
emerges as a new kind of problem.  Structural issues include gross 
organization and global control structure; protocols for communication, 
synchronization, and data access; assignment of functionality to design 
elements; physical distribution; composition of design elements; scaling 
and performance; and selection among design alternatives.  
We must think about military architectures and systems similarly.  Today, the 
ability to put together teams of people and to develop complex systems, while difficult, 
represents only one component of a larger-scale design challenge.  In systems design, a 
traditional approach is that the architecture is either given at the beginning (iterative 
design) or it “emerges” as the design process proceeds (clean sheet design) (Ulrich and 
                                                
8 “Overmatching power” was described by SecDef Rumsfeld in July 9, 2003 Congressional testimony to 
contrast Iraq-II operations with classic massed force operations:  “In the past, under the doctrine of 
overwhelming force, force tended to be measured in terms of mass—the number of troops that were 
committed to a particular conflict.  In the 21st century, mass may no longer be the best measure of power in 
a conflict.  After all, when Baghdad fell, there were just over 100,000 American forces on the ground. 
General Franks overwhelmed the enemy not with the typical three to one advantage in mass, but by 
overmatching the enemy with advanced capabilities, and using those capabilities in innovative and 
unexpected ways.”(Rumsfeld 2003) 
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Eppinger 1995).9  In military operations, we have historically relied on innovative people, 
judicious disregard of process and procedures as well as other ways of responding to 
uncertainty as a primary means to overcome inadequacies in our organization designs, 
processes and relationships.10  In the past, task accomplishment was often confined to a 
single unit (aircraft, ground unit), missions were usually self-contained and there were a 
limited number of options for execution of them.11  In our operations today, we connect 
organizations and systems across the globe to accomplish tasks and missions; system 
level function can be delivered in many different ways.  This places a premium on 
attention to design of our operational architectures, rather than to the use of existing 
architectures or the undirected evolution of our operational architectures as the output 
(byproduct) of an existing process (Whitney 1990; Moses 2006a).12 
Concurrent with the need to think about design of architectures and to increase 
emphasis on flexibility in them, there is an increasing trend toward operating with 
multiple organizations—enterprises (Agranoff and McGuire 1998; Stanke 2006).  Even 
though multiple organizations have always interacted to achieve common goals, today’s 
situation is different.13  In the past, expertise inside an organization’s boundaries ensured 
success—both for individuals and for the organization; inter- and intra-organizational 
relationships were usually highly formalized and were generally a secondary 
consideration in operations.  In today’s environment, this model is less relevant.  As 
systems and operational problems become more complex—due to more intricate physical 
                                                
9 Recent work in strategic engineering, real options analysis and multi-disciplinary system design 
optimization are examples of new approaches in technical systems, where architectures are considered, to 
some extent, before the system design process begins. 
10 This has also been noted in non-military organizations (Chisholm 1989) 
11 Analogous to the development of code modules and algorithms separately from the development of an 
overall software architecture as described by Garlan and Shaw. 
12 In Chapter 2, we will see that this is an indirect conclusion of Kometer’s research (Kometer 2005, p. 188 
and 243).  He casts the challenge as the need to think clearly and ahead of time about command 
relationships with specific attention to the rules by which command authority in combat is delegated to 
lower command levels.  Kometer’s recommendations specify a design method; we aim to move toward the 
ability to define design goals (system level properties) at the enterprise level.  
13 For example, Boeing, Electric Boat, General Motors and other large system designers have always relied 
on supplier networks.  However, today these networks require richer information interactions and closer 
relationships in order to sustain competitiveness.  The attempt by Boeing in its 787 program to develop 
these types of relationships is an example of the need for explicit attention to enterprise architecture; its 
public failures are an example of our lack of understanding about how to design these enterprise 
architectures as well as to make them work. 
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system interdependencies, wider social concerns or more stakeholders—more 
organizations become involved in either design or operations.  Whether in the execution 
of public governance, military operations or system development, intra- and inter-
organizational relationships are becoming more dynamic at the same time as there is a 
rising demand for coherent action.  This represents early evidence of the existence of 
enterprises (Agranoff and McGuire 1998; Allen et al. 2004; Stanke 2006a; Dodge 2008). 
1.2 Flexibility in enterprises: Research Questions 
The importance of architecture, the existence of enterprises, our poor 
understanding of them and the need to make them perform well in dynamic and uncertain 
situations generates our central research questions:   
• “How do we design flexible enterprises?” 
• “What is the relationship between architecture and flexibility in complex 
enterprise systems?” 
Answering these questions requires inquiry at multiple levels.  The construct of 
“enterprise” is new, and the application of architectural thinking to enterprises is also 
new; so, we have little in the way of theory to guide conceptualization and investigation.  
Our initial step will be to examine existing research literature and synthesize theory to 
guide our investigation—to connect architecture and flexibility and apply them to 
enterprises.  This will guide development of a framework for analyzing and modeling 
enterprise architectures.  Theory will also guide development of a simple model to 
investigate the relationship of architecture to flexibility and to other system properties.  
We will connect these two lines of investigation by extending the work of LCol Michael 
Kometer, USAF (ESD, Ph.D.) (Kometer 2005).  His study, titled “Command in Air War:  
Centralized and Decentralized Control of Air Power,” was a systems-level investigation 
of complex combat air operations.  He examined how multiple organizations interacted in 
the process of transforming policy and strategy into combat actions, specifically, how 
those interactions gave rise to overall system performance (outcomes). 
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Kometer’s research focused on process, using a CLIOS framework to develop his 
model.14  Our goal is to enrich and complement his work with an architectural 
perspective and to connect it more closely to a theoretical framework that can support 
design of flexibility in enterprises and other large-scale systems.  We propose to examine 
the proposition that lateral interactions at multiple hierarchical levels are related to the 
system level property of flexibility. 
1.2.1 Case study background and boundaries 
In Chapter 2 we will briefly discuss the origins of air power command and control 
doctrine that were the motivating force for Kometer’s research.  He was interested in 
addressing long standing tensions and perceived ambiguities in the doctrine of command 
and control of air power.  As such, he focused inside the air force on how to resolve 
internal tensions created by a desire for control and efficiency with a recurring 
operational need for innovation and empowerment in combat.  This investigation 
necessarily took him to look at air-ground operations, but the explicit structure of Army 
(ground forces) and Air Force relationships was not his focus.  As we look at these cases 
architecturally, we will be naturally steered toward a more explicit focus on Army-Air 
Force interactions at multiple levels.  This is both a slight expansion and a narrowing of 
Kometer’s analytical lens.  Also, Kometer focuses on empowering lower levels of 
hierarchy as a way of arguing for faster time responsiveness at the system level, while 
maintaining the accountability required in military operations.  But as we will see, he 
does not bring the time issue to the forefront of his analysis because his system level 
model does not address the time dimension very well.   
We will see in our case studies that many ad hoc modifications to enterprise 
structure created interactions that were closer to lateral (peer-to-peer, collaborative) than 
they were vertical (senior-to-subordinate, directive).  Taking an architectural perspective 
opens the door for us to discuss these lateral interactions as a way to overcome extended 
feedback loops (which generally consume too much time) that arise when you have to go 
                                                
14 CLIOS:  Complex, Large-scale, Integrated, Open Socio-technical system.  CLIOS is an analytical 
framework developed by Dr. Joseph Sussman at MIT.  Its aim is to aid researchers and policy makers in 
addressing the many complex interdependencies that exist in the development and operation of complex 
technical systems and their interaction with the many policy, organizational and institutional factors that 
influence their development (Sussman 2000; Mostashari and Sussman 2009). 
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up and down a hierarchy for both decisions and information access.  However, we will 
see that some of the lateral connections at lower levels of hierarchy were in tension with 
concerns for accountability and coherence of the overall air campaign strategy.  Chain of 
accountability and strategic coherence are central concerns in military operations and 
Kometer is meticulous in ensuring this issue remains clear in his concepts.  From this 
perspective, there is never a lateral structure—somebody or some group is always 
‘above’ or ‘in charge’ when decisions are made.  There is always a tree hierarchy, which 
is true in virtually every decision-making context, something Kenneth Arrow showed us 
many years ago (Arrow 1950).15 
1.3 Complex systems:  An architectural approach 
There are numerous ways to approach the study of complex systems.  As we 
noted above, Kometer uses the CLIOS framework, using it to emphasize the dynamic 
behavior aspects of combat air operations.  Others approaches are to look at the system 
from multiple perspectives, or views (Kruchten 1995; Nightingale and Rhodes 2004),  
Network-theoretic approaches have also been a source of many new insights.  Our 
approach to the research is grounded in the computer science concept of architecture and 
the mathematical concept of abstraction.  In computer science and mathematics, levels of 
abstraction are a central concept, enabling the simplification and solution of complex 
problems by ignoring certain details and allowing concentration on only a few (hopefully 
the most essential) details.  Abstraction allows computer scientists to separate cleanly key 
system design and implementation considerations.16  In operational situations, abstraction 
enables us to separate different degrees of problem complexity, treat them differently 
within different levels, and to control interactions across levels in ways that enables a 
balance between control and flexibility.  Properly applied, the tool of abstraction can 
                                                
15 We know from Arrow’s General Possibility Theorem that there is always a “dictator” or “decider” upon 
whom the ultimate decision depends, whether the situation is collaborative or directive (Arrow 1963).  The 
potential consequences of this theorem for autonomous machines (software driven collaboration) has been 
explored as well (Meyer and Brown 1998).  By accepting this phenomenon and viewing the problem from 
a layered hierarchical perspective, we open the door to another way of understanding the operation of 
complex systems.  We don’t consider the micro-scale dynamics of the situation, but only the overall 
flexibility in the system.  Also, see the discussion of lateral connections in Chapter 3. 
16 This is similar to, but different than, modularity as a design concept and different than the more widely 
used concept of scale in complex systems. 
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enable us to design flexibility in to our enterprise architectures rather than rely on 
unstructured evolution and ad hoc interactions.   
1.3.1 Hierarchy and laterality 
The concept of abstraction leads us naturally to hierarchy.  Hierarchy is a 
decomposition of a system into subsystems according to some criteria or scheme (each of 
which may also be further decomposed into smaller subsystems) (Simon 1962; Simon 
1996; Allen 2006).  In technical systems, hierarchy is usually viewed from the 
perspective of decomposition of a physical system into more specialized physical parts or 
sets of parts in order to manage complexity of development, assembly or understanding.  
More generally, a hierarchy is an asymmetrical ordering of the parts of a system into 
according to some chosen criteria where, at each stage (or level) of the ordering, the parts 
share some a common set of attributes.  Also, following Simon, the meaning of hierarchy 
is generally assumed to be a tree-like structure, where interactions across branches of the 
decomposition are minimized as much as possible.  We will take this meaning when we 
speak generally about “hierarchy,” unless it is specifically noted otherwise with a 
modifier, such as “layered” or “lateral”.  Simon’s seminal contribution on hierarchy 
generalizes the social system concept of hierarchy (organizations) to apply the idea to 
complex physical, biological and other systems (Simon 1996, p. 186). Simon assumes 
strong boundaries (minimal interaction) across branches of a social hierarchy (Simon 
1996, p. 200-201).17  Simon does not explicitly account for status or rank-based structure 
and the operational implications that it can have for the types of interactions that can be 
designed into an organization. 
In organizations, hierarchies are sometimes contrasted with “networks”, which are 
generally considered to be the antithesis of hierarchies and, hence, are assumed to be 
more flexible and “flat” (Powell 1990; Romanelli 1991).18  A simple visual comparison 
of a hierarchy and a network is in Figure 1.  In enterprises and organizations, the term 
                                                
17 This restriction on cross boundary interactions is an analytical tool to make problems tractable.  Cross 
boundary interactions create increased complexity, both in quantitative analysis as well as in operation. 
18 Networks are also considered more complex and more difficult to control than hierarchies. 
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 Network Hierarchy  
Figure 1:  Simple representation of hierarchy and network 
hierarchy represents a distinction in the level of problem complexity or difficulty (above 
the level of technical systems) that typically (but not always) corresponds with authority, 
rank, or status differences.  Hierarchies can have several levels, depending on the size of 
the overall organization (Sloan 1972; Chandler 1990).  In organizational contexts, then, 
we can also use the tree decomposition to identify hierarchical differences from top to 
bottom (usually with the highest level or authority at the top), as in Figure 2.  Within 
hierarchical forms, Galbraith has proposed lateral interactions as a means to achieve  
Level 0
Level 1
Level 2
Level 3  
Figure 2:  Hierarchy with four levels 
flexibility (Galbraith 1993).  Galbraith’s model aims to create formal interactions across 
the hierarchically defined boundaries of an organization, ideally at the level where the 
best expertise for a given problem resides, as indicated by the green connections in 
Figure 3.  Moses has offered still another type of framework, the layered architecture.  In 
this structure, nodes at one layer can connect to more than just its immediately 
subordinate nodes at the next lower layer, as indicated by the blue connections in Figure 
3 (in direct contrast to the classic tree hierarchy) (Moses 2006b).  Though these types of 
cross layer and lateral connections happen all the time in real organizations, they are not 
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generally recognized as part of a formal structure and are not usually considered 
important when developing formal designs or processes.19  So, for us, architecture is 
more than “hierarchies vs. networks” or “markets vs. hierarchies.”  Lateral connections 
can be important to flexibility in organization systems; classic hierarchical systems (i.e., 
tree-structured hierarchies) help to manage complexity in problems that must be solved as 
well as to manage workload (information, cognitive load of people and groups).  If we 
consider layered structures and lateral interactions within layers, we may be able to 
design, ex ante, hierarchical structures that enable greater flexibility while balancing the 
need to limit complexity as they act to deliver value in dynamic and uncertain operational 
environments. 
1.3.2 Layers and laterality 
As a system is decomposed and the hierarchy developed, each stage or level of 
decomposition is defined as a level.  Connections can be made within levels of the 
decomposition and we define these as lateral interactions (Figure 3). Most organizations 
exhibit  
Level 0
Level 1
Level 2
Level 3
 
Figure 3:  Lateral and layered connections in a hierarchy 
 
 
                                                
19 It is also very important to note that layered connections as defined by Moses are not part of a 
“Simonian” hierarchical construct, where these interactions are to be minimized.  This also applies to many 
aspects of technical system design, especially matter-energy intensive systems, where these types of 
interactions can impact the ability to deliver required functions and/or performance.  We amplify this point 
in Chapter 3.  Dr. Kirk Bozdogan and Dr. Joel Moses have both pointed out the significance of this 
distinction and the need to make this point clearer in this thesis. 
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some form of hierarchical structure.  We define hierarchy in an enterprise context as an 
ordering by rank, responsibility and abstractness, with higher ranks generally associated 
with levels that have greater responsibility and more complex and longer time horizon—
more abstract—problems.  It is widely accepted that hierarchies in organizations exist to 
manage the natural complexity of coordinating humans in collective work.  It is also 
widely acknowledged that non-hierarchical (usually described as “informal” or non-
authorized) connections also exist, developed to address problems that cannot be solved 
by the formal hierarchy (Chisholm 1989).  We marry these ideas to the view of an 
organization as a problem-solving device, or an input-output information processing 
system (Thompson 1967; Tushman and Nadler 1978; Moldoveanu and Bauer 2004).  
This view enables us to combine levels of abstraction from computer science with lateral 
interactions at different levels of organization to examine architecture and flexibility.  
This is different from technical systems where, in general, we do not usually have lateral 
interactions, because we usually do not have many layers of abstraction, sometimes only 
one. 
Military operations are usually divided into three levels of abstraction:  strategic, 
operational and tactical (The Joint Staff 2001).  These levels correspond to the overall 
complexity of problems handled and to the space and time horizon of those problems.  
Strategic level problems are the most abstract, most complex and have the longest time 
horizon, usually months to years.  Operational level problems are less complex, less 
abstract, than strategic, with a shorter time horizon, usually days to weeks.  Tactical level 
problems generally involve less uncertainty and fewer variables, so are relatively less 
complex than operational and strategic problems; they also occur on relatively short time 
scales, sometimes on the order of seconds and minutes.  At each level the interactions, the 
qualitative nature of information and the complexity of issues are different.  The ultimate 
architectural challenge is to design the interactions within each layer and across layers so 
that desirable outcomes are achieved.  Our goal is to understand better the implications of 
architecture for system level properties. 
1.3.3 Architecture and flexibility 
In technical systems, design flexibility is generally a difficult and costly property 
to implement in terms of time, money, and performance.  The increased application of 
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multi-attribute trade-space and multi-dimensional optimization methods in the design of 
complex technical systems is evidence of an increasing need to examine carefully the 
many system trade-offs in light of increased uncertainty and dynamics in future 
requirements.  As we noted in section 1.3.1, many organizational approaches to flexibility 
usually assume two main alternatives:  a hierarchy or a network, formal or informal 
interactions and integration or differentiation in function.  Often, these views do not 
address the deeper issue of hierarchy in enterprises very well and create at least two 
problems:  (a) a lack of control when flexibility is necessary (informal, uncontrolled or 
unmonitored interactions can cause problems, whether in an organization or a technical 
system) and (b) a difficulty in responding to changes in requirements on appropriate time 
scales.  Here we begin address these problems by taking an architectural view of 
enterprise operations that leverages the concepts of layers of abstraction and lateral 
connections to start working on how to design flexibility into the enterprise architecture 
up front. 
1.3.4 Trade-off analysis 
There are significant differences between mechanical physical systems and 
informational physical systems, differences that are significant from a design standpoint.  
The transfer of matter and/or energy dominates mechanical system characteristics, while 
information systems are dominated by low power interactions that transfer information 
(usually in the form of low voltage electrical signals).  Since design is about balancing 
conflicting constraints while seeking a performance goal, the type of system under 
consideration dominates the nature of the trade-offs that must be considered.  
Specifically, efficiency-flexibility trade-offs are qualitatively different in information-
intensive systems (organizations, enterprises, IT systems) compared to matter-energy 
intensive technical systems and particularly in organizational systems.  It is well 
understood that designing alternatives into information systems is easier than in matter-
energy intensive systems (Whitney 1996; Whitney 2004).  This observation extends to 
making changes and/or designing flexibility into organizations.  When we combine the 
relative ease of designing more alternatives into information-intensive systems with 
hierarchical levels of abstraction, we get a view of trade-offs among flexibility and 
efficiency that are different in character from those in physical systems.  In an enterprise 
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or an organization, each layer or each branch of a tree can be considered a discrete entity, 
often able to deliver function separately from the enterprise as a whole.  This means each 
layer or branch can be evaluated in terms of flexibility, efficiency and effectiveness on its 
own, as well as a part of the enterprise. 
Because the parts of an enterprise can deliver function and value on their own, 
separate from the enterprise, evaluation of the trade-off between efficiency and 
effectiveness becomes more complex.  Recall that we can increase flexibility by adding 
connections across layers of the enterprise and by adding lateral connections within 
layers (Figure 3).  Adding these connections increases the complexity of the structure—
there are more interactions to be managed or monitored, more considerations in design.  
In enterprises, we find a fundamental question is not the trade-off between flexibility and 
efficiency but between flexibility and the degree of increased complexity necessary to 
achieve it in the context of the performance demands of the operational problem 
(environment).  At this level of discussion, we find that traditional distinctions between 
efficiency and flexibility, which can often be examined (traded) on the basis of a 
commensurate quantity such as cost, become highly dependent upon the overall strategy 
and other constraints on the system (such as specific outcome requirements or external 
political and regulatory constraints). 
1.3.5 Summary 
Leveraging the computer science concept of architecture and the mathematical 
concept of abstraction offers a way to begin examining large-scale enterprise systems in a 
new way.  Multiple levels of abstraction naturally extend to a hierarchical organizational 
approach, where higher levels deal with more general problems than lower levels and 
where levels generally correspond both to rank and responsibility differences.  There are 
various forms of hierarchical structures, such as pure tree structures and layered 
structures.  Other forms, such as lateral and networked architectures have been observed, 
but have not been placed in an integrated hierarchical frame of reference. 
In organizational contexts, we can use decomposition to identify hierarchical 
differences between top and bottom (usually with the highest level or authority at the top) 
and where levels of hierarchy represent distinctions in problem complexity or difficulty.  
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From this perspective, enterprises usually have several levels, depending on the scale, 
scope and complexity of operations.  Within hierarchical forms, lateral interactions at the 
most appropriate level of organization have been proposed as a means to achieve 
flexibility (Galbraith 1993).  In layered hierarchies, flexibility can be gained by allowing 
certain subsystems at one level connect to more than one subsystem at a lower level (in 
contrast to classic tree structures) (Moses 2006b).  Though these types of connections 
(outside of formal tree structures) happen all the time in real organizations, they are not 
generally recognized as part of a formal structure and are not usually considered when 
developing formal designs or processes.  Lateral connections in organizations can be 
important to flexibility in solving problems, processing information and accomplishing 
tasks in changing or uncertain environments.  While classic tree-structured hierarchies 
help to manage complexity in problem solving and in workload (information processing 
and cognitive load of people and groups), considering layered hierarchical structures and 
lateral interactions within layers may enable us to design-in flexibility while balancing 
the increased cost and complexity of these added interactions. 
Key considerations in designing flexibility into enterprises are the tradeoffs that 
must be made to achieve it.  Because of the multi-layer and multi-organizational aspects 
of enterprises, these tradeoffs are often difficult to assess and can be highly dependent on 
the level at which the trade-off is considered.  
1.4 Research approach and method 
While the term enterprise is an old one, it is increasingly used in new and varied 
ways to describe new forms of organization and new types of organizational relationships 
(Castells 2000; Murman 2002; Allen et al. 2004; Rouse 2005; Stanke 2006a).  For some, 
enterprises represent a new level of organization analysis, for some it is a way of thinking 
about organizational relationships and still others use it to describe the need to integrate 
multiple organizations and their stakeholders in the development of complex products or 
services.  Here, we treat enterprises as new organizational forms.  In general, the idea of 
enterprises comes to us with little in the way of concrete theory or analytical frameworks 
to guide our desire to design their architectures to have specific properties—to behave as 
goal-directed, managed, entities.  Complex systems research is a natural place to search 
for applicable tools, but many of these research approaches address only certain aspects 
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of the emerging nature of enterprises.  For example, network-theoretic approaches have 
provided many interesting insights into the structure and dynamics of complex systems; 
operations research methods have enabled managers and process designers to optimize a 
wide variety of systems.  But each tool leaves important parts of needed understanding of 
complex systems unaddressed.  In order to start filling this gap, we must use a 
combination of approaches.  As discussed in the previous section, our approach will be 
architectural.  We have introduced our architectural concepts, drawing on from computer 
science and mathematics.  Later we will continue our development, leveraging these 
concepts to use organization and complex systems theory to develop a literature-based 
framework for analysis and theory of enterprise architecture flexibility.  
In Chapter 4, our literature review develops the ideas of hierarchy, laterality and 
flexibility discussed briefly in the last section.  Using this foundation, we take a case 
study approach to begin examining our ideas (Eisenhardt 1989; Yin 2003).  Our cases are 
drawn from previous analysis of combat air operations conducted by LCol. Michael 
Kometer, USAF (ESD Ph.D., 2005).  Kometer’s analysis looked at each case from five 
different perspectives, as shown in Figure 4.  We will review his approach in more detail 
in Chapter 3.  His analysis provided new insights about command and control of air 
power, focusing mainly on processes and behaviors in the system.   
 
Figure 4:  Kometer's approach 
To extend his research, we conduct a meta-analysis, integrating Kometer’s five 
lenses by conducting an architectural analysis of each of his cases, focusing specifically 
on flexibility.  We treat the relationships among various entities and organizations in the 
cases as a systemic whole, without distinguishing interactions as technical or 
organizational.  This allows us to examine the enterprise holistically, as a complete socio-
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technical system.  A depiction of our framework is in Figure 5.  In contrast to examining 
different aspects of several cases of combat air operations to develop a better 
understanding of command and control techniques, we aim to understand the overall 
enterprise architecture and how it relates to the system level property of flexibility.  Our 
analytical goal is two fold: 
1. To provide a complementary interpretation of Kometer’s presentation of air 
power and combat operations command and control; 
2. To test new theoretical propositions about the relationship between architecture 
and flexibility in complex socio-technical systems—specifically focusing on the 
role of multi-level interactions in enabling enterprise level flexibility. 
 
Figure 5:  Approach of this thesis 
The research design is a multiple case study meta-analysis, interpreting previous 
historical research and analyses through the lens of a hierarchical architecture framework 
to expose aspects of the existing case research that have not been clearly addressed up to 
now (Eisenhardt 1989; Yin 2003).  Most examples of multiple case study research aim to 
generalize a theoretical proposition.  Our goal is exploratory in this regard.  We propose 
to examine the theoretical proposition that lateral interactions within multiple hierarchical 
layers are related to the system level property of flexibility.  Our analysis is descriptive 
and qualitative and we use a wide variety of research reports, theses, analysis and data 
sources with the aim of capturing a diverse analytical perspective on the subject matter 
and passing this data through our architectural filter.  We choose the case study method 
because military operations are non-repeatable natural experiments that cannot be re-
created in a laboratory setting.  They are subject to high uncertainty that results from 
dense interdependencies both within the military enterprise and between the military 
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enterprise and its environment (to include the enemy).20  Every military operation is a 
separate natural experiment, each one unique, but also driven by a common set of 
fundamental forces and mechanisms.  By examining multiple cases and multiple 
analyses, we reduce the possibility of getting a skewed perspective of the campaigns.  To 
further understand the generalizability of the framework and the analysis, we apply the 
architecture perspective to a case from an unrelated field, the New England Patriots 
football team.  An architectural analysis of the Patriots further explores the role of 
flexibility via the use of multi-skilled players, the interactions during game play that are 
enabled by them and the overall team and game-play architecture (analogous to enterprise 
architecture).  In this context, hierarchical relationships are spatial (on the field—the 
depth of the defense) and at different competitive levels of the game that correspond to 
military contexts:  strategy (season), operations (game) and tactics (plays). 
Our framework, , highlights hierarchical relationships and their connection to 
flexibility and is shown in Figure 5.  This approach has the virtue of bringing a new 
perspective to enterprise architecture.  Unlike other methods that emphasize multiple and 
more detailed views, and that often separate technical from organizational issues, our 
single, integrated, view aims to get the “big picture” right, so that more detailed analysis 
efforts can be placed in an enterprise-level context.   
1.5 Findings and contributions 
Our analysis reveals several interesting findings about enterprises: 
1. Enterprise architectures with lateral interactions at multiple levels of 
hierarchy are more flexible than strict tree structured hierarchies. 
a. ad hoc lateral interactions at tactical (low) levels of organization enable 
flexibility but can contribute to loss of coherence; 
b. Interactions (usually commands) from higher levels that skip 
intermediate levels can result in unintended outcomes. 
                                                
20 This idea is captured in two famous quotes from military practitioners:  “The plan is nothing, to plan is 
everything” (Eisenhower) and “No plan survives first contact with the enemy” (von Moltke the Elder). 
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2. Lateral interactions at higher levels of the enterprise are important to 
maintaining strategic coherence 
a. Where lateral interactions at high levels failed, did not exist, or were 
by-passed, either operational problems developed or tactical and/or 
operational level flexibility was inhibited. 
3. Lateral interactions at lower hierarchical levels are required to gain 
flexibility in uncertain and fast-moving operations. 
4. Our architectural framework enables system level comparative analysis of 
flexibility across the variety of enterprise architectures, some of which were 
briefly discussed in section 1.3. 
5. Layered hierarchical approaches to enterprises may prove to be a powerful 
design tool for operational architecture design and represent a potentially 
rich source of insight to many challenging enterprise problems. 
We also find that an architectural approach is complementary to approaches that 
emphasize processes and feedback loops in systems.  It provides us with a rich and 
general understanding of complex socio-technical systems without separating of social 
and technical aspects of the systems.  Architecture analysis enables examination of high-
level properties that are relevant to senior level decision makers (enterprise architects) 
without becoming overly burdened with extraneous details. 
1.6 Chapter summary 
Military operations in the 21st century are marked by a demand for flexibility in 
order to remain effective in an uncertain and dynamic global environment.  Past military 
operations and long-term military competitions hinged on mass and efficient logistics.  
The advent of global information networks and ability to make many physical systems21 
interoperable requires us to focus on architectures, which we define as the holistic 
articulation of the relationships among organizations and the technical system they 
operate which create a set of capabilities.  This research leverages computer science and 
                                                
21 By this, we mean both physical information systems as well as individual platforms, such as aircraft, 
tanks, ships and even individual weapons and the people that use them. 
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mathematical concepts of architecture and abstraction to bring a multi-level hierarchical 
perspective to enterprise architecture.  We examine Kometer’s research of command and 
control of combat air power through this architectural lens.  We aim to complement his 
process-oriented research and highlight the impact of multiple levels of interaction on 
enterprise level properties. 
1.7 Outline of the thesis 
Chapter 2 presents a very brief overview of the evolution of air power command 
and control.  It emphasizes fundamental physical differences between air and ground 
combat that give rise to differences in priority regarding use of air power and is one of 
the root causes of the need to address the enterprise architecture of command and control.  
Chapter 3 provides a review of Kometer’s thesis, “Command in Air War”, and the 
origins of the main architectural issue regarding inter-service organizational structures.  It 
establishes the orientation of his work and highlights how it can be extended with an 
architectural perspective.  Chapter 4 reviews the literature and develops the architectural 
framework that supports analytical interpretation and extension in Chapter 5.  Chapter 5 
presents an architectural analysis of Kometer’s air power cases.  Chapter 6 contains a 
trade-off analysis, where we examine the classic efficiency-flexibility-effectiveness 
trade-off perspective and highlight how the traditional paradigm is altered in cases of 
information-intensive systems such as enterprises.  Chapter 7 is a flexibility analysis of 
the New England Patriots football team that applies the concepts developed in Chapters 5 
and 6.  Chapter 8 provides a discussion of the strengths and limitations of this work, 
future work necessary to enhance the framework, to further develop the initial theoretical 
extensions presented here.  It also discusses applications to other problems such as 
disaster relief operations, health care operations and acquisition program management. 
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Chapter 2  
Air Force Concepts of Flexibility: 
The Roots of Centralized Control, Decentralized Execution22 
2.0 Introduction 
The roots of difficulty in attaining the U.S. Defense Department’s goal of 
operational flexibility by capturing synergies across the military services run deep and 
span combat, peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance operations as well as business 
and acquisition operations.  The case of command and control of air operations provides 
a useful example with which to begin examining how an architectural approach may help 
address this challenge.  A perennial debate among professional military personnel (and 
many civilians) is how best to command and control military forces.  Especially since the 
advent of combat aircraft during WW-I, there has been a running debate over how best to 
employ and command the combat power that aircraft bring to military operations.  This 
debate generally centers on how to leverage the natural flexibility of airborne technology 
to achieve political goals via combat operations.  These debates usually evolve to 
differences of opinion about priorities among different missions.  Since there are 
differences of opinion about how best to use aircraft, there are also differences of opinion 
on how to command them (allocation to missions, control of mission changes and 
execution of missions). 
The development and evolution of air power command and control is described in 
many historical accounts of the Air Force as a service and of the use of air power in 
combat during and since World War II.  A detailed analysis of these events and their 
causal forces is beyond the scope of this study.  To meet our needs, we will provide a 
brief overview and general discussion of air power in operations to set the stage for 
analysis.  Current enterprise level challenges in command and control of air power can be 
traced to early air power theory and theorists.  Original thinking on air power, found in 
the writings of early theorists and advocates such as Giulio Douhet and BGen. Billy 
Mitchell claimed that future wars would be won by air power alone, obviating the need 
for a repetition of the carnage of trench warfare of World War I.  This strongly 
                                                
22 My thanks go to Dr. Dan Whitney for pointing out the need for this discussion as a way to establish the 
context and emphasize the importance of our chosen problem and the utility of our approach. 
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deterministic view is in contrast to the observed indeterminacy of war (Watts 2004; 
Mattis 2008).  The tension between the Air Force view and observed realities of war and 
combat has generated a cyclic debate within the Air Force and resulted in a cyclic degree 
of cooperation between the Air Force and the Army over time.  Our objective is to expose 
the tensions that generate operational problems and doctrinal ambiguities regarding 
command of air power that an architectural perspective can help clarify.   
In his research, Kometer examined control of air operations across the strategic, 
operational and tactical levels of war.  He specifically highlighted air-ground operations 
(close air support and air interdiction, the coordination necessary between ground and air 
operations in parts of the battlefield where air and ground forces operate in close 
proximity) as well interfaces across multiple organizations.  He concluded that the core 
doctrine of the air force, “centralized control and decentralized execution” was valid, but 
vaguely articulated.  Kometer then discussed how centralized and decentralized 
command and control of air power can be brought into balance by a systemic approach, 
but he addressed architectural issues only indirectly.  Our architectural examination will 
take a closer look at hierarchical aspects of inter-organizational interactions that involve 
control of air power, mainly those between Army and Air Force and mainly in the context 
of air-ground operations. 
We will provide a brief review of the origins and evolution of the air power 
theory of war.  Then we will move to a discussion of how this theory differs from the 
theory of war held by ground forces.  This background will provide valuable insight on 
the issues of enterprise flexibility in military operations—why it is a challenge to develop 
the ability for different military services to collaborate in the application of military force. 
2.1 Air Power Theory and Command and Control—History 
In Douhet’s Command of the Air, he claims that air power is a necessary and 
sufficient condition for adequate national defense, that it can achieve quick and certain 
victory, and that air forces should be resourced in preference to both naval and ground 
forces (Wylie 1989; Douhet and Ferrari 1998).  Mitchell, considered by some the 
grandfather of the Air Force, was a follower of Douhet and an ardent advocate of a 
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separate air combat arm in the 1920s.23  Following the thinking of Douhet, air power 
theorists and practitioners through the 1920s and 1930s came to view strategic 
bombing—bombing enemy populations, leadership and industrial centers so that political 
leaders would capitulate—as the sole viable war winning approach to armed conflicts of 
the future. 
The co-equal ideas of establishing air superiority and of airmen alone having 
adequate knowledge and skill required for effective employment of aircraft in war 
animated the efforts of airmen seeking to apply air power theory in operations.  The 
organizational and doctrinal solutions derived from these two premises were: 
1. there should be only one air commander, an airman, controlling all air 
resources; 
2. this airman should work for the overall theater commander. 
This arrangement would enable the full power and flexibility inherent in the 
technology of aircraft to be leveraged toward the strategic aims of the war and avoid 
unnecessary diversion and dilution of air power to less important tasks, such as attacking 
the enemy’s army.24  The fundamental view of air power theorists is that the most 
important dimension of flexibility in air power is spatial—the ability to range across the 
depth and breath of a theater of war, massing aerial fire power at the time and place of the 
commander’s choosing.  The corollary to this is, as we stated at the beginning of this 
paragraph, that the most effective use of air power is against enemy strategic targets; all 
other missions are of lesser importance.  The other prominent dimension of flexibility, 
the ability to operate across the levels of war from strategic to operational to tactical, is of 
secondary importance.  Though this position has been moderated over time, it remains a 
pervasive and strong preference in current doctrine (U. S. Air Force 2000; U. S. Air 
Force 2003).25   
                                                
23 He was court-martialed in 1925 for insubordination over this issue. 
24 The explicit presumptions are that (a) wars can be won without massive bloodshed if targets are properly 
chosen and (b) that air power is the only combat arm capable of addressing this class of target. 
25 The historical roots of this priority are found in Douhet.  The evolution of thinking and technological 
development through the 1920s and 30s can be found in other works such as (Greer 1985; Futrell 1989; 
Murray and Millet 1996; Biddle 2002) 
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Uses of air power below the strategic level, while viewed as legitimate, were and 
remain of secondary importance.26  These missions are interdiction of enemy army’s 
support structure (opposing airfields and aircraft, supply lines, etc.), direct interdiction of 
enemy army elements that are beyond the range of organic army artillery fires and close 
air support of elements of our army in close contact with the enemy.27 
2.2 Ground Force Theory—RADM. J. C. Wylie’s analysis 
RADM J. C. Wylie’s Military strategy: A General Theory of Power Control is a 
seminal but underappreciated synthesis of different theories of war (Wylie 1989).  
Wylie’s early writing on Maritime Strategy and influences on the thinking of naval 
officers was published in the Proceedings of the Naval Institute in the 1950s.  He 
expanded his thinking in the 1960s and published Military Strategy in 1967.  We will 
lean heavily on his work, specifically Chapter 5, in this section.  In Chapter 5, Wylie 
discusses four specific theories of military strategy:  maritime, air, continental and 
guerrilla.  We will maintain our focus to the “continental” or ground theory in the 
discussion that follows.28   
The first issue is that the physical environment combined with technology drives 
the fundamental outlook of each branch of service.  Ground forces (soldiers) are 
primarily concerned with geography and terrain by virtue of the nature of ground combat.  
Airmen do not consider geography except to fly over and across wide expanses of it.  As 
Wylie notes, for soldiers terrain “is everything.”  Because of this physical limitation, 
soldiers are constrained in their view of operations.  They think of operations in terms of 
a limited geographic area, with directly observable and tangible outcomes of 
engagements.  Wylie points out a second difference between airmen and soldiers:  the 
nature of their combat.  Soldiers aim to engage the enemy, maintain that engagement 
until the enemy is defeated, and then hold and occupy his territory.  Airmen (and sailors 
as well) aim to engage the enemy in a series of separate encounters, moving more freely 
                                                
26 The current Air Force leadership is attempting to change this view, based on statements and strategic 
intentions of the new Chief of Staff of the Air Force, Gen. Norton Schwartz (Dudney 2009). 
27 This preference order of missions runs through several current Air Force doctrine publications and is 
mentioned again in Chapter 5. 
28 As fascinating as a detailed discussion of the four strategies and their architectural implications would be, 
including the guerrilla strategy, we will not dive into this subject here. 
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around the battlespace looking to find weak points that, when attacked, will cause the 
enemy to quit suddenly.  Wylie’s third point, derived from the first two, is that soldiers 
hold as their objective destruction of the enemy’s armed forces as a means to victory.  
Wylie goes on to explain that these three factors drive the soldier’s view that 
naval and air forces exist to support him in his quest, to “transport [him] to the scene of 
action and support him after he gets there.”  It logically follows that the soldier should 
want to control those forces that support him.  We have already seen that this is markedly 
different than the airman’s view, which explicitly seeks to avoid engagement with the 
enemy army, instead seeking to influence the political leadership of enemy through 
strategic attack and, as a secondary function, to isolate the enemy army from its support 
structures.29 
2.3 Lingering disagreements create chronic problems 
Armies and air forces approach armed conflict with different technical systems, 
which, in combination with their operational medium, provide them different physical 
perspectives of conflict.  As we have seen, they reach different conclusions about 
priorities for force employment and methods of command and control.  For the U.S. 
Army and the U.S. Air Force, these priorities are particularly contentious and long-
standing (Schlight 2003). 
Armies seek to support achievement of political objectives by defeating opposing 
armies, seizing and holding territory.  In World War-II, this meant using aircraft’s 
superior position and mobility to enhance their own mobility, provide reconnaissance of 
enemy positions and movements and to complement or supplement artillery with airborne 
offensive firepower.  This desire conflicted with a strong community of airmen in WW-II 
who thought that strategic bombardment of enemy industrial centers was the path to 
victory, bypassing any need to engage an enemy army.  These tensions were not 
sufficient to cause serious operational difficulties during the war—the Army Air Force 
was young and there were still a wide variety of opinions about the “best” use of air 
power.   
                                                
29 This view is also consistent with Clausewitz’s On War and the idea of a center of gravity that, if 
disrupted or attacked can have a significant effect on the enemy’s collective will to fight. 
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Before and during WW-II, there were two competing views of the value of air 
power, the strategic bombing view and the support of ground forces view.  Immediately 
following WW-II, the Air Force became independent of the Army, and the strategic 
bombing coalition won bureaucratic control of the new service.  The story of Air Force 
support of Army needs in battle over the next thirty years is complex but can be boiled 
down to a simple statement:  the Air Force’s primary concerns were strategic nuclear 
warfare and preservation of its status as an independent service.30, 31 Virtually all other 
considerations were secondary.  In the late 1970s and early 80s, strategic nuclear warfare 
was displaced by a focus on deep interdiction and support of the Army in Central Europe 
(Winton 1996).  In the late 80s and since, the strategic focus saw a resurgence, with an 
emphasis on non-nuclear strikes on critical infrastructures and leadership targets of an 
enemy (Warden 1988; Warden III 1995). 
In Korea, close air support and interdiction were particularly difficult and 
contentious.  During Vietnam, though there were recurring issues with command and 
control of air power, at the tactical level close air support methods were worked out that 
enabled particularly effective support (ref).  Because of the persistent low priority of 
close air support and interdiction during the post-war period, over time the Army 
addressed its concerns regarding longer-range battlefield challenges with it’s own 
solutions.  It acquired it’s own observation aircraft, attack helicopters and eventually 
long-range precision missiles.  
The post-Vietnam recovery of the Army saw an intense focus on Europe and the 
Soviet Army with a dedicated program to address Army doctrinal deficiencies identified 
by Vietnam.  The Army realized that deep interdiction was going to be necessary that it 
would require the Air Force’s help, and made it a priority to establish a partnership 
(Winton 1996).  This led to the AirLand Battle doctrine of the late 1970s and early 80s.  
                                                
30 A comprehensive demographic history of Air Force leadership since WW-II can be found in (Worden 
1998), good histories of close air support are (Schlight 2003) and (Cooling 1990). 
31 The story of the institutional evolution of air forces (not just in the US) is one that deserves careful study 
that cannot be addressed here.  The UK had a similar tension in the proper use and employment of aircraft, 
tested during the Battle of Britain.  It is notable that the commander of the Battle of Britain (Dowding) was 
effectively ousted, along with his closest and most effective squadron commander (Park), while the worst 
performing squadron commander (Leigh-Mallory) was promoted. 
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This effort gave rise to numerous joint Army-Air Force programs, exercises and common 
doctrine for air interdiction and command and control.  The partnership on AirLand 
Battle doctrine endured into the 1980s and coincided with the rise of “The Fighter 
Generals” to leadership of the Air Force (Worden 1998).   
The partnership lasted through the late 1980s, about the time that then LCol. John 
Warden published The Air Campaign:  Planning for Combat (Warden 1988).  This work 
represented a return to strategic attack theories of air power, advocating the primacy of 
air power alone in achieving war aims.  The Army-Air Force partnership began to wane 
at this point, as the Air Force began to emphasize once again, strategic attack in 
preference to support of ground forces.  This preference found tangible expression in 
1990 as Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait and the U.S. and its allies responded with 
Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm.  The air campaign developed for Desert 
Storm was architected by Col. Warden and his strategy and concepts staff in the 
Pentagon, named “Checkmate”.  This emphasis on an air-dominated campaign coupled 
with the disintegrated partnership of the AirLand Battle, combined to create tension and 
distrust among the ground forces of the Air Force. 
Whatever the reasons for the difficulty of cooperation between the Army and the 
Air Force, and there are many on both sides of the institutional boundary, the 
fundamental facts are (Schlight 2003): 
1. The Army does not think the Air Force places a high enough priority on 
support of its operations, despite Air Force protestations to the contrary; 
2. The Air Force has been institutionally unwilling to relinquish any degree of 
control over air assets in battle, has actively sought and, until very recently, 
succeeded in gaining control over all service air assets in a theater;32 
3. as a result, the Army invested in technologies that have given it the ability to 
influence the battlespace at increasing distances from the front lines, creating 
coordination issues with the Air Force that need to be addressed; 
                                                
32 The employment of unmanned air vehicles in post Major Combat Operations Iraq has not been centrally 
managed (Odierno et al. 2008). 
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4. Air Force doctrinal priorities regarding missions have not fundamentally 
changed since at least 1943 (Futrell 1989). 
A careful review of Army and Air Force relations regarding air support might show a 
cyclic pattern, where there are periods of partnership, such as World War II and the late 
1970s-early 1980s, and periods of tension, such as post-World War II and from Operation 
Desert Storm to the present.  As we stated earlier, the fundamental issue is that different 
theories of war and physical realities of combat create differing priorities for missions 
and the need for different control methods.  The Air Force, in its doctrine, specifically 
deemphasizes the need to coordinate with other services over the allocation of resources, 
and to allocate assets in support of missions that are not strategically focused.  The 
relationship between the air component and other forces regarding prioritization of 
missions is shown in Figure 6.  As we will see in Chapter 2, Kometer seeks a means to be 
able to leverage the full range of flexibility in air power—to capture simultaneously its 
geographic and mission flexibility as a way to address these operational tensions. 
 
Figure 6:  Architectural representation of air-ground command relationships 
2.4 General Battlefield geometry and geography 
Armies are labor and capital-intensive organizations.  They are difficult to move 
from place to place and require long logistics trains to ensure sustenance.  With respect to 
offense, this means that long-range weapons such as aircraft could be used to attack 
enemy army’s supply lines and other support structures.  These types of missions are 
classified as interdiction. 
43 
Since armies win based on their ability to control physical territory, an army 
commander naturally wants to control as much territory as possible.  This gives him 
maneuvering room as well as control.  So, an army commander, or the army as an 
institution, is going to seek means to control large areas of land.  This means long-range 
weapons.  But also, the army is limited by the amount of weapons it can carry.  So it is 
likely to be unable to attack all of the targets it wants to attack.  This is what requires 
closer support than interdiction, what has sometimes been called battlefield air 
interdiction.  The battlefield air interdiction mission is not as long range as interdiction 
and not so close to friendly forces that very high coordination is required.  But some 
coordination is required.  This generated the need for a “fire support coordination line”.  
At distances short of this line, Army and Air Force must coordinate so that the fires are 
synergized and don’t conflict with each other (Figure 7).  Close air support is the mission 
requiring closest coordination between air and ground forces and is required when in 
direct contact with the enemy. 
 
Figure 7:  Fire support coordination line 
2.5 Army and Air Force Today 
Throughout the inter-war period, the Army Air Corps held that the most effective 
use of air power was to bomb strategically important targets of the enemy, causing him to 
give up without ever having to engage with the opposing army or navy.  The primacy of 
this view attained full force following World War II with the Cold War and strategic 
deterrence as centerpieces of national strategy.  Following the end of the Cold War, this 
view remains embedded in Air Force doctrine, though without nuclear weapons as the 
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means to exert strategic coercion.33  Ground forces see the need to directly engage the 
enemy, and see air power as a key tool in aiding their effectiveness toward that goal.  
Ground forces also seek to control and influence as much territory as possible as they 
seek to defeat the enemy.   
The empirical reality of conflicts since World War-II provide strong evidence that 
the theoretical ideal of strategic bombing as a bloodless way to win wars may never come 
to pass (Pape 1996; Cooper 2001).  In the post-Vietnam era, strategic attack was replaced 
by deep interdiction as the stand-off with the Soviet Union became the centerpiece of 
national strategy (Winton 1996).  In this period, air-ground coordination became more 
important in doctrine, practice and procurement.  However, it fell in importance with the 
resurgence of strategic air theory in the late 1980s, aided by the serendipitous invasion of 
Iraq by Saddam Hussein.  The air campaign strategy employed by Gen. Schwarzkopf and 
LGen.  Horner was drawn from a modern treatise on air power theory by Col John 
Warden (Warden 1988).  In any case, today’s technology is eliminating many of the 
impediments to close air-ground coordination that have served as arguments for a “status 
quo” approach to command and control of air power (Stein and Fjellstedt 2006).  These 
changes, as we will note in later chapters, are blurring the distinction between classically 
delineated air missions of strategic attack, deep interdiction and close air support.   
The emergence of precision weapons, global positioning, two-way air-ground 
voiced-video and data links, all conspire to make any application of weapons from the air 
identical in process.  Technology has changed the performance discriminator in air-
ground operations from “hitting the right spot” to “getting the weapon to the right spot 
fast enough”, no matter where that spot might be.   
Aircraft can range the depth and breadth of the battlespace and conduct any 
mission with little difference in cost or difficulty.  The key is developing a command 
structure that can make aircraft available on appropriate timelines.  Kometer provided a 
start at this examination.  He placed air power in context of larger strategic issues, not 
just the “operational level of war” and not limited to the somewhat narrow air power 
                                                
33 We discuss elsewhere that Air Force doctrine specifically articulates command relationships that ensure 
it holds the last word on how air power is allocated to various missions. 
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strategic view, which is often implicitly and improperly extrapolated to a general view of 
strategy. 
2.6 Summary 
While the Air Force claims flexibility as a core capability, a perennial complaint 
of ground forces is the lack of flexibility in the use of air power to support ground 
operations.  This tension is aggravated by the increasing ubiquity and capability of 
information technology that enables ground and air forces to collaborate much more 
easily (especially at the tactical level) and that has improved the operational depth to 
which the Army can influence the battlefield (Daily 2006).  In addition, improved 
technical capability has begun to blur the lines between traditional air power missions of 
strategic attack, air interdiction and close air support (Kometer 2005; Pirnie 2005).  
In practice, operational military organizations are rarely designed ex ante.  
Though the military is a rare institution in that it documents its organization in doctrine, 
these structures are usually codified battle experience—documentation of “what 
worked”—as well as reflective of legal, regulatory, fiscal and cultural differences of the 
military services.  Most military practioners focus on organic modification of existing 
organizations in response to emergent needs, usually without considering systemic 
impact or potential unintended consequences (Mandeles et al. 1996).  Though 
organizational structure has always had strategic implications, as information 
connectivity across technical and social systems increases and improves, organizational 
architecture has emerged as a fundamental source of competitive advantage (Hax and 
Majulf 1981; Hammond 1995; Moses 2004a; Mandeles 2005).  Architecture has become 
a key enabler (or inhibitor) of success and failure.  Architecture defines the space of 
operational alternatives in processing information from the environment and the range of 
possible coordinated actions by determining the number of possible alternative sequences 
(paths) through the system to respond to changing circumstances.   
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Chapter 3  
Review and Architectural Interpretation of “Command in Air War” 
3.0 Introduction 
This chapter reviews the analysis and findings of Kometer’s study of air power 
command and control, titled “Command in Air War.”  We interpret his process and 
behavior-focused analysis using an architectural model and identify research extensions 
that enrich and amplify his conclusions.  Understanding the nature of enterprises so that 
we might be better able to operate and design them is methodologically challenging.  We 
must find a level of abstraction that provides accurate understanding of the principal 
characteristics of the enterprise as a holistic system while at the same time avoiding detail 
that can obscure architectural features and properties.  Many modeling tools and 
approaches in use today assume or require a great deal of detail.  In addition, many 
approaches aim at predicting specific outcomes with the (sometimes implied) objective of 
controlling them.  Achieving these goals has proven elusive.   
For these reasons, early analyses of enterprise level phenomena have been 
approached by extending models and frameworks aimed at other problems and by using 
grounded theory and historical case studies (Kometer 2005; McKenna 2006; Stanke 
2006a).  Where modeling is attempted at the enterprise level, it is often supported by 
approaches analogous to models of physical systems, where micro-scale activities within 
the enterprise are modeled with the intent of precision prediction of events and outcomes.  
There have been some attempts at multi-level and hybrid modeling, creating a system 
level model by coupling detailed models built at different scales (Mathieu et al. 2007).  
Again, the implied or explicit objective of this modeling approach is to increase 
prediction precision and ultimately precise control of the system. 
Many approaches to design of organizations or enterprises aim at the goal of 
finding an “optimal” design that will lead to predictable outputs and micro-scale 
controllability that minimize uncertainty.  Here we are taking a different approach.  The 
goal of our enterprise-level analysis is to gain an understanding of enterprise architecture 
that can help design flexible enterprises.  We are interested in flexibility at the enterprise 
level because, as noted in Chapters 1 and 2, the operational environment in the early 21st 
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Century demands it.  In the area of combat air operations, the challenge is particularly 
acute.  The evolution of operations in Iraq has been toward missions that the Air Force 
has traditionally (since WW-II) deemphasized:  close air support.  In addition, these 
support missions have been increasingly located in or near urban environments.  These 
missions and environments are characterized by higher rates of change and higher 
degrees of uncertainty than the traditional interdiction or deep attack missions that are 
more central in Air Force doctrine.   
Our approach to enterprise modeling and analysis aims at supporting the creation 
of structures that enable flexibility, so that effective outcomes are achieved in a changing 
environment, rather than attempting to predict or control behavior precisely with the aim 
of delivering well-known (and precise) outputs.  To do this we need to connect 
architecture to flexibility. 
To accomplish this task, we take an existing set of case studies performed in a 
systems-level framework and interpret them through an architectural-structural 
framework.  Our starting point is “Command in Air War”, Kometer’s analysis of 
command and control of air power (Kometer 2005).34  To guide interpretation and 
modeling of this analysis, we will concentrate on system level properties relevant to 
design and management of flexibility.  Specific focus is on interactions among the 
hierarchy of organizations and systems discussed in “Command in Air War”.35 
This chapter summarizes Kometer’s research, focusing on hierarchical structures 
and how these relate to or enable flexibility.  Our approach is in line with his basic 
premise, which posits that an emerging source of competitive advantage in the 21st 
century is the management and design of relationships among systems and organizations 
(p. 19).36 
3.1 Overview of Kometer’s thesis and recommendations 
                                                
34 Where page numbers are used as citations in this chapter, they refer to Kometer’s Ph.D. thesis. 
35 Our focus on the structure of interactions, with less emphasis on explicit properties of individual nodes, 
is consistent with Kometer’s emphasis on command relationships—the interactions among different 
organizations along the command hierarchy. 
36 Page number citations in this chapter refer to Kometer’s thesis. 
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Kometer’s thesis, “Command in Air War:  Centralized vs. Decentralized Control 
of Combat Air Power” is a system-level analysis of an enterprise.  His analysis is 
conducted at multiple levels of command hierarchy and across multiple dimensions of 
operational performance.  He examines events from multiple perspectives across a variety 
of conflicts and distills them to develop an overall assessment of causal relationships that 
drive enterprise level behavior.37   
Kometer focuses on a key aspect of the air power enterprise that we claim is the 
source of advantage to any enterprise in the information age:  relationships among 
people, organizations and systems.  Based on his causal analysis of four air campaigns 
from 1990-2003, he synthesizes two recommendations for addressing the tension that has 
challenged commanders of air power through history:  control vs. empowerment.  
Indirectly, he also focuses on a key attribute of enterprise architecture that we are 
interested in:  flexibility. 
His first recommendation is what he calls the “general formula for command and 
control.”  In the general formula, Kometer recommends that commanders at each level of 
organizational hierarchy delegate responsibility for the plan to the next lower level and 
then conduct a robust debate of the operational plan (cross-layer interactions) as it is 
developed.  As part of this debate, the commander should ensure that, where coordination 
among subordinates is necessary, it is provided (lateral interactions).  His second 
recommendation is that, as part of implementing the general formula, commanders 
should strive to achieve “depth of command.”  Depth of command is his term to describe 
the ability to shift decision-making to lower levels of command hierarchy in response to 
shifting external conditions.  Depth is achieved by focusing on establishing relationships 
between elements of the organization that will need to interact in the course of the 
planned military campaign.  Provision for depth should be made because of the process 
of implementing the general formula  (p. 240). 
                                                
37 Kometer’s main interest is in behavior:  how system interactions give rise to either good or bad behavior 
when viewed in the context of constraints and desired outcomes.  Behavior is not performance, nor is it a 
system property.  We are interested in a specific system property: flexibility.  Performance is a subjective 
matter, highly contingent on the evaluator’s perspective and perception of what constitutes “good.” 
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Kometer’s attention is not specifically on flexibility, but on developing (in our 
framework, designing) a capability to respond effectively to the dynamics and 
uncertainties of combat while maintaining a level of control that manages risk and 
achieves favorable outcomes.  His aim is to provide a means to balance control—detailed 
management of systems, people and events—with empowerment—the need to innovate 
at critical times when the environment does not respond as predicted.  The process of 
planning and of command that Kometer recommends is clearly aimed at building 
(designing the architecture of) a flexible enterprise.  Analysis later in this review will 
make this connection clearer.  For now, we say that balancing control and empowerment 
is enabled by flexibility; the structural effect of implementing depth of command as a 
principle of enterprise architecture is to create the ability (in real time) to change the 
configuration of the Combat Air Operations System (CAOS) in response to changing 
requirements of the environment. 
3.2 Intersection of this research with Kometer 
Kometer focuses on causal relationships that drive command and control of air 
power and, ultimately, its effectiveness in battle.  We intend to focus on architectures of 
the enterprises that conduct command and control.  His two recommendations, the 
general formula for command and control and depth of command, aim to at balance the 
contradictory demands of effective operations in risky and uncertain operations:  
management of the risk of bad outcomes and the need to respond quickly to unforeseen 
circumstances.  These are methods to achieve flexibility by building different enterprise 
architectures.  For example, Kometer discusses using depth of command to empower 
low-level entities to allocate resources, define, assign and direct tasks to accomplish a 
mission—changing the structure of operational decision-making, increasing the number 
of possible force combinations and making them available on operationally relevant time 
scales.  From an architectural perspective, the net effect of implementing his general 
formula and achieving depth of command is to change the structure of the enterprise.   
Our thesis aims at two complementary goals: (1) developing knowledge to 
support architecture design in complex enterprises such as military operations and (2) a 
model to help understand trade-offs between different possible enterprise architectures 
that could be implemented. 
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While Kometer focuses on patterns of interactions and behaviors, we are 
interested in architectures for operational command and control.38  We aim to provide 
diagnostic tools that can help commanders employing Kometer’s recommendations 
understand how to match better their enterprise architecture to policy constraints and 
operational situations as well as to show them whether they are achieving or moving 
toward their desired architectural goals. 
We aim to understand the structures defined by the patterns of interaction that 
Kometer describes and to understand and model how these structures inhibit or enable 
flexible response to dynamic and uncertain environments.  
3.3 Summary review of Kometer’s research and recommendations 
Kometer’s thesis investigates how political strategy and policy is transformed into 
combat air power.  He begins with an examination of historical foundations for current 
doctrines and practices governing command and control of air power.  This historical 
analysis identifies patterns and trends in the employment and control of air power and the 
influence of technology on these trends and patterns.  Following his historical review, he 
conducts a CLIOS analysis to obtain a system level perspective.39  CLIOS diagrams 
visualize causal relationships and feedback loops between policy and combat 
organizations, activities and systems.  Done well, a CLIOS analysis should enable 
prediction of system-level behaviors.   
Kometer’s CLIOS diagrams identify significant interactions that drive system 
level performance.  The main body of the thesis is an examination of these interactions in 
through four historical case studies of combat air power employment over the 1990s:   
• Desert Shield/Desert Storm (1990) 
• Operation Allied Force against Slobodan Milosevic in Kosovo (1999) 
                                                
38 The term “command and control” has become synonymous with technical systems such as 
communications networks and, more recently, other information systems that support operation and 
command of military forces.  We use the term much more inclusively, encompassing doctrines, methods, 
organization structures and relationships—all of which are bound together by information systems. 
39 CLIOS:  Complex, Large-scale, Integrated, Open System.  CLIOS is an analytical framework developed 
by Prof. Joseph Sussman to support analysis of how policy impacts complex collections of physical 
systems. 
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• Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan (2001-2002)  
• Operation Iraqi Freedom (major combat operations through May 2003) 
He examines each case from six different perspectives as shown in Figure 8, using these  
 
Figure 8:  Kometer’s analytical lenses 
views to identify common features and causal relationships in the system.  Using these 
insights he develops the two core recommendations to improve command of combat air 
power:  (1) a general formula for command and control and (2) a design concept called 
depth of command.  As a pair, these concepts aim at providing senior civilian and 
military decision-makers the ability to balance risk management in combat operations 
with the imperative to enable innovation in the battlespace.  These recommendations 
represent two unique contributions:   
1.  An extension of classic civil-military command relationship thinking to 
all levels of the air combat enterprise; 
2.  A more explicit connection between command and control approaches 
and the ability to respond effectively to a wide array of operational 
demands and risk profiles. 
3.4 Connecting Kometer’s recommendations to enterprise architecture 
flexibility concepts and framework 
Kometer’s recommendations aim to address long-standing tensions between 
control and empowerment in command of air power.  These tensions result from a strong 
institutional desire to validate air power theory, recurring disagreements with policy 
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makers and other services over proper use and employment of air power in military 
operations and the need to have different control modes for different air combat missions 
(Kometer 2005) (p. 26 and 34).  His case analysis is conducted over a period of rapid 
technological change, so the analysis also addresses impact of technology on trends in 
control and on the changing preferences of policy makers regarding employment and 
control of air power.  This approach makes his recommendations generally applicable to 
almost all cases where air power might be employed  
First, Kometer’s general formula says that commanders should establish a 
thorough debate up and down the chain of command during the planning process—that 
the plan should be communicated across multiple levels of command and discussed in a 
“back and forth” mode.  This requires flexibility at the enterprise level, by having multi-
level interaction (information flow) paths through the organizations that make up the 
enterprise.  Every planning process unearths coordination problems, unforeseen 
information needs, and new perspectives on the overall approach to the organization’s 
objective.  As new information and knowledge is gained through the planning process, 
the general formula tells commanders to ensure their enterprise is able to establish new 
interactions to ensure coordination, to ensure that uncertainties are exposed and resolved 
as best possible and that disagreements over the plan are resolved.40  At the organization 
level, member organizations of the enterprise must have flexibility, which can be as 
simple as having the ability to have shift priorities among missions or resource 
allocations or as complex as having multiple alternatives for processing information.   
Second, depth of command is the capability of the enterprise to shift command 
locations up and down the depth of the enterprise hierarchy during operations.  Depth of 
command enables flexibility within a tree-like (pure) hierarchical architecture, the ability 
to have alternative decision flow paths through the organization in response to changing 
external requirements and internal risk management profiles. 
                                                
40 Kometer’s general formula is about much more than information flow.  It is implicitly about generating 
and sharing knowledge, reducing uncertainty, minimizing chances of error and developing a team.  It is 
also about creating depth of command and effective responses to uncertainty as it unfolds.  But at the risk 
of reading the general formula too closely and semantically, it is mostly about coordination, planning and 
direction; there is very little explicit or even implied collaboration in the concept (a word count of 
Kometer’s thesis reveals 8 uses of collaborate/collaboration and 186 uses of coordinate/coordination). 
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Kometer’s two recommendations for command and control represent architecture 
design rules.  They represent tools that commanders can use to implement high-level 
guidance by mapping organizations and technical systems to implemented configurations.  
Further, as we noted Kometer strives for flexibility inside a tree hierarchy by creating 
depth of command as an enterprise capability.  This thesis extends that concept by 
examining the role of lateral connections at multiple layers of hierarchy, connections 
which we view as necessary to enabling flexibility while simultaneously balancing the 
need for control and accountability that depth of command aims to retain. 
3.5 Detailed summary of Kometer with an architectural interpretation 
This section presents a chapter-by-chapter summary of Kometer’s thesis. 
3.5.1 Scholarship and historical foundations 
The significant growth of the Internet coincided with the end of the Cold War to 
create an imperative to develop new operational concepts, new organization structures 
and new technical systems.  In fact, the imperative was for more than this.  With post 
Cold War fiscal constraints, it became important to capture synergies among the different 
branches of military service.  With this came the requirement to make each service’s 
systems interoperable, not just within service boundaries but also across them.  The 
institutional embodiment of these forces came in the concept of Network Centric Warfare 
(NCW).  Kometer briefly reviews the NCW concept and its argument for decentralized 
control.  He also highlights the confusion that has developed because of recent empirical 
evidence indicating a tendency toward centralization of control in practice, both within 
the military as well as at the political level. 
To establish a clearer perspective on military command, Kometer reviews seminal 
works on command of military forces by Samuel P. Huntington (The Soldier and the 
State), Eliot Cohen (Supreme Command:  Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in 
Wartime) and Martin van Creveld (Command in War).  Huntington and Cohen address 
the relationship between political leaders and the military, van Creveld deals with 
command on the military side only.  Kometer creates the motivational force for his 
research by noting that Huntington and Cohen separately are incomplete but together 
provide a useful framework for command—robust debate of ways, means and ends, with 
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political leaders exercising control over the military.  He takes van Creveld’s approach to 
military command, which advocates that the commander gather information from the 
battlespace to inform his decisions, but craft an organization that can operate without 
detailed direction and under conditions of uncertainty.  Kometer combines these two 
approaches and extends them to the total military enterprise:  the Huntington-Cohen 
command-debate method should be extended to lower military echelons and van 
Creveld’s military command approach should be extended to the political level (oversee, 
but don’t micromanage; create organizations that can operate without detailed direction).  
He also notes that these works do not directly address the unique technology and 
operational capability of air power, van Creveld’s in particular.41 
To lay the foundation for his analysis, Kometer reviews the history of command 
of air power since World War II.  He reviews: 
1. The various ways that political and military commanders have managed, 
controlled and employed air power;  
2. Tensions between air and ground commanders over the balance between 
giving priority to strategic attack of enemy political leadership and civil-
military infrastructure or to more direct support of ground operations 
against an enemy’s military force; 
3. The impact of centralized vs. decentralized control methods on 
effectiveness of air power;  
4. The influence of technology on command and control; 
Kometer observes that the engagement of policy makers in the command of air 
power over the years varies with the situation and political forces driving the specific 
conflict.  The main factors that have combined to influence the overall trends of this 
political engagement are:  
1. Increased media feedback loops that can bring tactical level events to 
strategic and political level importance (e.g., collateral damage); 
                                                
41 Kometer notes that Cohen addressed some situations that included air power (p. 24). 
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2. Increasing precision in weaponry the promises the ability to exert 
precise control or influence over adversaries (though the promise 
remains unfulfilled). 
Consequently, politicians have sometimes placed tight constraints on the use and 
employment of air power and have sometimes “micromanaged” it. 
Looking inside the military organization, he finds the Air Force has never 
wavered from its World War II lesson learned of centralized control of air power.42  In 
Korea and Vietnam achieving central control was elusive.  However, although the 
services were never able to agree on this point at the beginning, by the end of each 
conflict it was clear that a single manager for air power was a necessary ingredient for 
success.  This is where Kometer begins to identify command relationships as a core issue.  
In each conflict, differences of opinion between ground and air commanders (and 
sometimes between air commanders) generated friction that more often than not 
precluded single point control of air power.  Even more fundamental in control of air 
power than command relationships are mission priorities and who gets to establish and 
enforce them.  The Air Force, because of the capability at its disposal, provides high-
level command with longer and wider combat reach than land forces.  But land force 
effectiveness can be improved tremendously with air support and it seems reasonable that 
ground commanders want to have some measure of control over air assets aimed at 
supporting their objectives.  Kometer addresses command relationships as a driver of 
combat outcomes; command relationships are also a key driver of the ability to adjust 
mission priorities, to achieve flexibility in adjusting air power mission priorities43   
At the tactical level, the Air Force has had to repeatedly re-learn and reinvent 
procedures for supporting ground forces.  Air power theory holds as a central belief that 
air power can dramatically affect the will of an enemy to continue in battle in such a way 
as to make air power the sole determinant of a war’s outcome (Mitchell 1925, 1988; 
Warden 1988; Douhet and Ferrari 1998).  Though this belief has been challenged on both 
                                                
42 The codification of a single commander for air power was a result of lessons learned from the Battle of 
Kasserine Pass, the first major engagement of U.S. Forces in the European theater in World War II. 
43A deeper discussion of these differences can be found in RADM. J. C. Wylie’s Military Strategy:  A 
General Theory of Power Control (Wylie 1989) 
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empirical and theoretical grounds, it holds tremendous influence over the Air Force as an 
institution (Wylie 1989; Pape 1996; Watts 1997).  Kometer points out that for a combat 
arm that can deliver multiple capabilities to high levels of command, different modes of 
control are appropriate for each type of mission (p. 55). 
In summary, there are four main insights developed from Kometer’s review of air 
power history, some internalized by the Air Force, some not.  First, history shows that in 
every conflict since WW-II, without a single commander to coordinate air power, the air 
efforts of different branches of military service were fragmented and often uncoordinated.  
The claim of air proponents is that this prevented full utilization of the potential of air 
power and a loss of strategic focus in these campaigns.44  Therefore, there must be a 
single commander for all air assets to ensure optimal employment.  Second, the Air Force 
had to re-learn in each conflict since WW-II that control modes effective for deep strike 
and air interdiction missions are not effective for ground support missions.  Therefore, 
because of the diversity of mission capabilities brought by air power, multiple modes of 
control are necessary.  Third, political leaders have learned to pay close attention to the 
employment of air power, since connection between tactical level events and strategic 
level considerations has increased as real-time media connectivity diffuses globally.  This 
trend has paralleled the tendency for political leaders to use air power more frequently 
and for non-vital national interests, motivated in part by the increasing ability of the Air 
Force to engage targets with precision weaponry, which offers the promise of low risk 
manipulation of enemy political behavior.  Lastly, the Air Force continually invests in 
technology that improves the ability of headquarters organizations to gather and process 
information about the battlespace as well as to more precisely engage targets and to 
predict the impact of targets on the overall behavior of the enemy from a systems 
perspective.45 
                                                
44 The general claim of air power advocates that air power was “suboptimized” is debatable.  A case has 
been made that air power in every case was employed as the national leadership wished (Cooper 2001).  
Regardless of this evaluation, what the record does show is that lack of a unified command structure for air 
resources resulted in ad hoc mission assignments, confused relationships and many distractions for the 
theater commander, starting with the Battle of Normandy.  A succinct summary can be found in Appendix 
2 of Volume 1, Part 2 of the Gulf War Air Power Survey (Cohen 1993). 
45 For a discussion of viewing the enemy as a system, see (Warden 1995; Warden 1997). 
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3.5.2 CLIOS analysis.   
To get a handle on these factors and how they influence each other, Kometer 
conducts a CLIOS analysis.  CLIOS is a two level analytical framework for exposing 
feedback effects among policy and complex technical systems.  The goal of a CLIOS 
analysis is to improve overall system understanding regarding the impact of policy 
actions on technical systems.  Kometer’s CLIOS analysis of the Combat Air Operation 
System (CAOS) identified the following key dynamics (p. 83-84):  
1. Command relationships:  High-level policy constraints cascade to lower 
levels and how the nature of these constraints affects outcomes.  When 
high-level military command is constrained by political considerations, 
control tends to become centralized.  This can limit the ability of the 
CAOS to respond to uncertainty. 
2. Longer term interaction of policy constraints and technical capabilities:  
Technical capabilities change the “art of the possible” in terms of combat 
air power.  Politicians modify their employment based on these changes.  
In turn, the Air Force, with its desire to conform to its doctrine, chooses 
to invest in new technologies that both further the doctrine as well as 
address shortcomings in exposed through operations.  These dynamics 
create changing relationships between combat situations and the methods 
of control necessary to achieve desired outcomes. 
3. The impact of political constraints on how command relationships in the 
CAOS are formed and the nature of those relationships. 
4. The ability of the Air Operations Center (AOC) (and other decision 
making organizations) to gather information, generate accurate 
representations of the world in order to make decisions about how to 
command air power and, when necessary, control it.  The AOC has been 
continuously improving its ability to gather and process information.  It 
has attained the ability to directly sense and direct tactical level actions 
from afar.  But it has had recurring difficulty in gathering information 
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the enables adequate (accurate) battle damage assessment from those 
tactical actions. 
5. The need for and ability of the AOC to balance precision in employment 
(achieve specific outcomes) with the need for increased speed of 
response.  Specific outcomes generally imply a central direction and 
control mode, which can take longer than locally directed action.  
Locally directed action generally runs the risk of an error (at least from 
the perspective of higher headquarters with a different information 
picture and different risk management priorities).46 
These key dynamics are the foundation for the analytic focal points of Kometer’s thesis. 
3.5.3 Strategic level and evolution of air power control   
Kometer begins his case analyses at the strategic level.  In this section, he reviews 
how policy makers either did or did not constrain the use of air power over the four cases.  
Kometer’s examination illustrates how differing levels of constraints as well as different 
levels of attention to political-military differences over goals and objectives shape the 
employment and effectiveness of air power.  He exposes the long-term impact of the use 
of constraints by politicians on evolution of command and control systems and processes 
implemented by the Air Force.  He also highlights that the short-term impact of 
constraints is on the nature of command relationships (depth) that are developed within 
the CAOS during a specific campaign.   
In general, the increasing use of air power for limited scale conflicts creates 
motivation for politicians to tightly constrain its employment.  This has driven the Air 
Force to invest in technology and systems that enable central direction and the processing 
of ever more detailed information about battlespace operations.  As a result, the AOC has 
become a hub of information and control activity—an integrator of intelligence, 
surveillance and reconnaissance information.  This integration has led the AOC toward 
                                                
46 This is a complex trade-off, which is highly dependent on the specific situation.  There are cases where 
control from the top can be both precise and fast as well as cases where local control can lead to inaccurate 
and slow response. 
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real-time direction of combat aircraft, an activity consciously avoided in the first conflict 
in the study, Desert Storm (Mandeles et al.).   
Kometer also identifies in his cases the fact that as constraints increase, the ability 
to innovate at lower levels decreases.  While in tightly controlled and politically sensitive 
situations this style of command is appropriate, he discovered that it is difficult to shift to 
an innovative mode of control when it becomes necessary to loosen constraints.  This 
phenomenon is one factor driving his depth of command concept. 
3.5.4 System level command relationships   
Next, Kometer examines command relationships in the context of constraints, 
empowerment and technology, an effort that yields several insights.  First, when 
politicians tightly constrain the use of force, military commanders generally do not 
empower their subordinates.  This leads to a tendency to control from the top and 
inability of the operational level headquarters (AOC) to adjust effectively to dynamic 
battlespace conditions.  Conversely, when politicians impose fewer constraints, 
empowerment “trickles down” to lower levels, enabling rapid response to demands for 
shifting control modes.  However, in some cases, technical limitations can constrain the 
ability to fully empower down to tactical level forces. 
A second factor Kometer identified in this chapter was evolution in the 
employment of air power and the types of missions for which it is employed.  The 
emergence of Time Sensitive Targeting (TST) as a mission (both driven and enabled by 
the advance of precision targeting and information processing technology) blurs the lines 
between traditional air force missions of strike, interdiction and close air support (p. 139).  
Traditional control modes, roles and relationships that rely on visual cues, extensive 
voice coordination and rigid rules regarding weapons release authority between ground 
and air forces, as well as relationships between aircrews and headquarters (AOC) 
personnel are increasingly inappropriate or suboptimal as these mission lines blur.  
Command, especially in a TST mission, must be based on good information, so the 
location of the command function within the hierarchy is constrained by where the best 
situational awareness can be provided.  Kometer ends this chapter by stating that shifting 
62 
control from ground to air forces in specific tactical situations requires “a command 
presence with total situational awareness” (p.140). 
The architectural perspective on this chapter is that top down control creates 
fewer potential interactions that can be leveraged when it becomes necessary.  Tight 
constraints in the overall architecture create fewer alternatives (options).  Concurrent with 
this observation is an evolution in employment of air power that demands development of 
new control modes.  Evolving missions do not fit existing control architectures very well.  
Kometer implies that only technical issues (information processing and access) limit the 
development of more appropriate control modes.  This conclusion may be overly 
conservative—there may be other ways to adjust enterprise architecture than purely 
technical ones. 
3.5.5 Information processing in the CAOS 
This chapter reviews the use of information technology to bring battlespace 
information to headquarters organizations and to share information among organizations.  
Kometer finds dramatic improvement across the 1990s in the ability to share information 
digitally within and among organizations.  In Desert Storm it was unusual for the air 
headquarters to have a complete air picture of the battlespace (Cohen 1993, p. 74).  By 
the time of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, a consistent, real time picture of 
the battlespace was the norm (p.153). 
Kometer identifies a common fallacy of many advanced military operational 
concepts:  the “common operational picture”.  His analysis showed that, even with good 
information, it is still difficult to assess precisely and in totality conditions in the 
battlespace and progress toward political goals.  He points out that data and information 
aggregation and interpretation is still largely an individual process and that people differ 
in perceptual capabilities.47  This fact makes attaining a common strategic assessment of 
ongoing progress in a campaign difficult.  
The bottom line of this chapter is a tension.  First, lower levels of command are 
still “information poor”, creating an impetus to make decisions in a central headquarters 
                                                
47 Different people can reach different conclusions when presented with the same information. 
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that could (or should) be decentralized.  But on the other hand, even if lower levels could 
have (will have) better information that could enable decentralized decision-making, 
errors of judgment and perception will still be committed.  He identifies the nascent 
indication of potential decentralization:  the routine establishment of a “time critical 
targeting” (TCT) cell in the AOC.  In every campaign, a new organizational team (cell) 
had to be created to deal with time-sensitive tasking.  In Desert Storm, it was the ATO 
Change Cell; in Kosovo, it was a loosely coupled team of three different cells.  By the 
time of Afghanistan, it was a formally established TCT Cell (p.153).  Over the course of 
the four campaigns, this functional decentralization (even though physically located in 
the AOC headquarters) had become necessary in order to shorten the response time for 
TSTs and to leverage the inherent flexibility of the air arm.48 
3.5.6 Time-sensitive targeting (TST)—AOC decision making 
Next, Kometer examines the evolution of the AOC’s insertion into real-time 
targeting decisions.  He notes that in Desert Storm processes were developed to push real 
time target decision making to lower echelon control nodes, including pilots, through 
techniques called “Push CAS” and “Killbox Interdiction”.  These techniques were aimed 
at placing decision-making where the best information existed as well as to make the 
CAOS more responsive to real time developments in the ground campaign.  These 
procedures were driven by a mixture of the inability of the AOC to gather the requisite 
information to direct real time targeting and by the command philosophy of the air 
commander, LGen. Horner. 
However, in Kosovo there was no ground force to help guide the aircraft toward 
targets and target areas.  Couple this with increased political risk and the AOC was forced 
to inject itself into the targeting process.  To accomplish this task it created a set of 
separate cells (teams) to gather, process and pass information to aircrews over Kosovo.  
This organization and process was only moderately successful and stimulated technical 
                                                
48 It is also possible for currently decentralized decisions to move up the command hierarchy as well.  With 
improved access to imagery databases, close air support (CAS) that previously had to be conducted by 
Forward Air Controllers (FACs) can be conducted by higher echelon units, as related by Capt Harold 
Qualkinbush in a U.S. Marine Corps Oral history interview dated April 5, 2003 (Lowrey 2005). 
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investments and process changes that increased information gathering and processing 
capabilities for the AOC. 
Architecturally speaking, the TCT cell is what we term a ‘lateral organization’.  It 
connects peer organizations in gathering, processing and commanding air assets in the 
prosecution of time critical targets.49  Its reason for existence is to enable (leverage) the 
inherent flexibility of air power.  Kometer notes, however, that flexibility can be 
hampered if the headquarters is too involved in real time decisions because the 
subordinate levels lack empowerment (real and perceived), hence tend not to leverage all 
of their capabilities.  He also observes (as he did in the previous chapter) that it is still not 
possible (may not ever be possible) to pass enough information to lower levels for 
effective decision-making in all possible cases. 
A key observation related to the architectural focus of my research is the second 
to last paragraph of this chapter (p. 188).   
“Prophets of Network Centric Warfare envision a time when all in the 
system will have the ability to access the same information.  If this occurs, 
there will then be a necessity to make conscious decisions about who 
should make decisions.  Gen. Franks made a move in this direction when 
he established the matrix for TSTs in Iraqi Freedom.  This will have to be 
done in a way that affirms and emphasizes the command relationships…” 
The overall insight from this observation and this chapter is that, as information access 
diffuses across the enterprise, competitive advantage shifts toward architecture and 
architecture design.  “Decisions about who should make decisions” is an architecture 
design issue.    
Some circumstances drive the AOC and other higher headquarters to become 
involved in real time decisions in the battlespace.  There are also conditions where it is 
                                                
49Note that the term “time critical target” and the term “time sensitive target” are almost synonymous and 
that both are unclear.  As recently as Operation Enduring Freedom, the term “time sensitive target” had two 
meanings depending on the level of command and the interests of the commander.  For General Franks, 
these were time sensitive targets; for the AOC they were time sensitive targets.  This created friction in the 
prosecution of many strategically sensitive and fleeting targets (LaVella 2003).  The confusion of 
terminology highlights the evolving nature of classic divisions among target types. 
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necessary to ensure lower levels have decision-making authority.  As information access 
diffuses to lower and lower levels of organization, enterprise architecture design 
decisions need to be made such that response to the environment is dynamically 
optimized.  The dimensions of decision on control vs. empowerment hinge upon the 
following factors: risk (manifested as political constraints on operations), operational 
philosophy, information needs and information gathering capability. 
3.5.7 “Distributed Cognition”:  Fragmentation and dispersion of 
function chains 
The last part of Chapter 7 opens the door to enterprise architecture analysis, 
alludes to the subject of Chapter 8 and is directly related to the issue of enterprise 
flexibility.  Chapter 8 deals with the impact of distributed information and dispersed 
decision-making on enterprise performance.  It chronicles the transition of the CAOS to a 
true enterprise—multiple organizations with intersecting (but not always aligned) 
interests working toward a common goal.  What Kometer describes as distributed 
cognition is the physical distribution of functions in the kill chain to a set of globally 
dispersed organizations.  This distribution and dispersion creates complexity and alters 
traditional roles of these organizations.  Kometer argues that this change places a 
premium on understanding and paying attention to command relationships.  We take this 
one step further and argue that we must have a deeper understanding of architectures on 
system level properties, specifically the impact of hierarchy and multiple layers of 
abstraction.   
For enterprises to be effective (for distributed cognition to work), they must have 
the ability to shift control dynamically among units of the enterprise.  This need for 
dynamic control requires that aircrews and other participants acquire new skills as well as 
limiting employment or use of other skills, something Kometer defines as “latent excess 
capability” (p. 227).  Latent capability is equivalent to an embedded but not always 
exercised option to execute a function or establish an interaction among members of the 
enterprise when it becomes necessary.  This latent potential increases flexibility but also 
increases risk that organizations (specifically aircrews) acting autonomously will 
inadvertently cause accidents.  Kometer addresses this issue in Chapter 9. 
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From an architectural perspective, this latent capability is represented by 
structural interactions designed into a network graph.  These interactions represent 
potential alternatives that can be used when necessary.  Observations of patterns of 
interaction while the enterprise is operating can tell us actual flexibility or the nature of 
control in use at any point in time.  They represent Kometer’s depth of command and the 
interactions necessary to implement the general formula.   
3.5.8 Failure issues in distributed operations of complex 
organizations 
Chapter 9 focuses on system accidents, a feature of complex systems where, 
despite the best efforts to prevent them, failures occur.  Bombing incorrect targets, 
friendly fire incidents or casualties to non-combatants are the focus of this chapter.  
When ‘kill chain’ tasks are distributed through many organizations, both an increase in 
responsiveness as well as increased potential for mistakes is enabled.  Flexibility in the 
form of latent beneficial connections among systems, people and organizations can 
enable pathological sequences as well.   
Kometer addresses this issue by reviewing cases of overly tight and restrictive 
procedures that eventually came to be ignored because they did not match the risk profile 
or efficiency demands of day-to-day operations, resulting in a loose set of relationships 
among the parts of the air operations system.  In these situations, problems arise when the 
restrictive procedures that have come to be ignored, must be invoked because of changed 
requirements.  Kometer describes these as shifts from loosely coupled situations to tightly 
coupled ones.  Once a situation becomes tightly coupled, accidents are more likely 
because operators cannot shift from their evolved mode of loose control quickly enough, 
or the need to shift modes is not perceived until an accident occurs (p. 221). 
In the context of architecture design, Chapter 9 presents a discussion of a cost of 
what might be called “ad hoc flexibility”:  increased chance of unintended consequences 
(cascading failures and pathological event sequences) as well as the cost of measures 
intended to minimize chances of these types of failures.  Kometer’s general formula and 
depth of command concept are intended to mitigate (but not eliminate) this pathological 
feature of complex systems. 
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3.5.9 Conclusions:  General formula and depth of command. 
Kometer’s final chapter ties together the observations from his four case studies 
through five different analytical lenses.  Though stated and reinforced throughout the 
thesis, his recommendations for a general formula for command and control and the 
‘depth of command’ concept are discussed in detail here.   
The general formula for command and control is synthesized from the three 
seminal studies of military command reviewed in Chapter 2 as supported by the case 
analysis.  My architectural interpretation of the general formula is that the commanders at 
each layer of hierarchy should engage in a vigorous, two-way vertical dialog with 
subordinates.  Where subordinates within a layer need to collaborate, the commander 
should ensure that this collaboration occurs (two-way lateral connections at a given 
layer in the hierarchy).  Viewed this way, Kometer’s “general formula” becomes a 
recommendation to create (design) a layered hierarchical organization so that the ‘nearly 
decomposable’ problem of air power command and control can be ‘solved’ as much as 
possible prior to ‘run time’ (Simon 1996; Clark et al. 2005).  Kometer’s general formula 
is about information processing:  the commander (political leader) injects tasking at the 
top of the organization, information flows among the component parts, and then back to 
the commander.  The commander decides when the process has provided an adequate 
solution to the tasking.  This is much like an iterative product development process, 
where work is processed among project teams, where feedback causes re-work (iteration) 
and, when certain criteria are met, an output from the process is generated (Arrow 1974; 
Yassine et al. 2003; Huberman and Wilkinson 2005).  We are not as interested in this as 
we are in the ability to have multiple alternatives for information to flow among different 
parts of the enterprise, as it is discovered and as it becomes necessary in the process of 
solving the problem.  This objective is separate from the issue of ensuring the likelihood 
of a “good” decision.  Organizations (especially military ones) make large investments in 
ensuring that its members are able to make “good” decisions, often under pressure and 
uncertainty.  But often, there are heavy structural barriers to implementation of these 
decisions.   
Depth of command aims to achieve the ability to shift command authority up and 
down the hierarchy in response to changing operational needs for centralized or 
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decentralized control.  Through the course of implementing the general formula—
engaging in a vigorous debate over the strategy and operational plan and the development 
of detailed missions (tactical implementation of the plan)—commanders should be able 
to identify where and under what circumstances different components must interact and 
where local decision-making will likely need to occur.  By pre-defining these situations 
and providing information access at the locations where they are likely to arise, 
commanders can “design-in” flexibility to the enterprise.50 
3.6 Extending Kometer’s research: Motivation and a modeling approach  
My motivation for extending Kometer’s research is two fold.  First, military 
operations are the typical complex system.  There are few areas where technology and 
organization are so densely intertwined and applied to a problem as dynamic and 
uncertain as combat operations.  In peacetime, different services are essentially 
autonomous organizations, nearly decomposable in the Simon sense.  But when combat 
operations commence, they come together with a common and compelling interest, 
conforming to the definition of an enterprise, requiring initiative and flexibility within the 
multiple levels of organization and stronger interactions among the decomposed parts 
than Simon implied in his work (Simon 1996).51 This implies that a hierarchical view of 
structure might yield insight to the properties of complex military operations that are not 
accessible otherwise. 
Second, Kometer approaches his analysis from the perspective of the emerging 
key source of advantage in the information age:  interactions and relationships among 
distinct, often stand-alone systems and organizations. 
                                                
50 There are many methods involved in gaining this knowledge, such as a formal iterative planning process, 
training exercises, wargames and test and evaluation of new technical systems.  Each of these is appropriate 
to different aspects of developing depth of command. 
51 Note that peacetime exercises are increasingly frequently conducted with multi-service participation.  
This trend began in earnest in the late 1990s, with the first truly multi-service (Joint) exercise/experiment 
conducted in 2000 (Millennium Challenge-00) by the United States Joint Forces Command.  These 
exercises are aimed at improving inter-service coordination and cooperation, as well as testing new 
equipment and procedures against (hopefully) likely future operational scenarios.  This trend may be an 
implicit recognition of the loss of an extensive “learning period” in future conflicts.  Though a learning 
curve in combat and military operations will always exists, the U.S. has been actively seeking ways to 
minimize this phenomenon. 
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Kometer specifies a system for creating architectures and structures.52  The recent 
explosion of network theoretic research shows us that structural analysis can reveal 
important characteristics of a complex system not accessible via other methods (Braha 
and Bar-Yam 2007).  My claim here is that structural analysis and a model built upon 
Kometer’s concepts can help move toward better insights to the properties of complex 
military operational enterprise systems. 
Kometer specifies how to do things:  how to develop a plan more effectively and 
how to achieve a balance between risk and innovation.  His work is silent on how to 
know whether what is created corresponds to a commanders’ intent.  Indeed, Kometer 
provides no way to concretely assess whether the structure created by his method (or that 
evolves over time as operations are executed) matches well the intended operational 
context.  Knowledge of properties of different structures is necessary in order to 
understand how to match them to operational problems and contexts.  This is a problem 
of design.  We also need to know if the structures we are creating are the ones intended.  
This is the management problem.   
A model of structure that illuminates the system property of flexibility is our 
starting point.  Kometer addresses behavior and cause-effect.  I intend to address 
structure and certain properties of structures—this is a more abstract and general view, 
which should be applicable outside the air combat problem.53  Complementing the 
challenge of structural analysis, we also need to understand how architecture maps to 
structure:  how do the high-level design rules create complex enterprise structures? 
To restate, our core modeling hypotheses are: 
1. Architecture drives the creation and evolution of relationships in an 
enterprise—its structure. 
                                                
52 As discussed earlier, I make a conceptual distinction between architecture and structure.  Many use the 
terms interchangeably.  Structure is a narrow term used to describe the specific hierarchical (or non-
hierarchical) relationships between (arrangements of) parts of a system.  Architecture is a more abstract 
term that includes discussion of overall system goals, properties and general rules that govern interactions. 
53 Specifically, I am interested in how this can be applied to institutional transformation and system 
acquisition and architecture. 
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2. Lateral structures and layered hierarchies are more flexible than strictly 
tree-like hierarchical structures and are more controllable than fully 
connected (flat) networks. 
Therefore, our modeling focus is on the structural representation of interactions and 
relationships in an enterprise—the edges along which information, coordination, 
collaboration and control occur.  It is these patterns of interactions that constitute the 
structure in which we are interested.  As with many organizations, hierarchy is a critical 
feature.  Kometer describes the intersection of control and hierarchy, and the implications 
of violations of hierarchy (for example, what we call level skipping) for system behavior 
and outcomes.  It is obvious that different levels of war correspond to different levels of 
organization and on the nature of functions performed at each, which is one reason for the 
unintended or suboptimal outcomes he describes in the cases of tightly constrained 
campaigns.  Hierarchical differences between levels also make interaction across levels 
difficult, yet another reason for concentrating our focus on interactions—especially ones 
that cross layers of hierarchy 
Kometer’s analysis highlights these hierarchical differences among levels.  A 
central point of his research is that, in all but a very few cases, detailed (top-down) 
specification of the actions of and relationships among people and organizations can 
often lead to “incorrect answers” to the problem (Landau 1969; Chisholm 1989; Simon 
1996; Bar-Yam 2002).54  From a complex system perspective we say that there are 
differences in the way problems are efficiently presented and handled at different levels 
of hierarchy, usually described as a difference in scale (Meyer 2000; Bar-Yam 2003).  
Because of the difficulty of specifying ahead of time both decisions to be made and the 
appropriate level where decisions should be made, Kometer developed the depth of 
command concept.  Depth of command is aimed at providing the ability to locate (or 
enable) decision-making to the most appropriate level in the enterprise when the 
sequence and timing of events is unpredictable.  The goal of creating depth is to increase 
effectiveness by locating decisions at the lowest level possible, contingent on the 
                                                
54 An extreme example of top-down specification of actions and relationships is the command and control 
structure for strategic nuclear weapons.  Very precise and well-understood control mechanisms must exist 
for these massively destructive weapons that are reserved for use in the most extreme circumstances. 
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commander’s risk level.  Exceptions can be made to this idea of avoiding top-down 
(level-skipping) decisions when issues of risk or time definiteness are more critical than 
the problems (potential confusion or ineffectiveness) generated by skipping layers.  A 
useful model of enterprise architecture can help decision makers and enterprise architects 
understand better when and how these situations can be effectively mapped to structures. 
From a modeling perspective, the main recommendation of Kometer’s research is 
to concentrate on specifying relationships among nodes, not specifying the detailed 
characteristics of nodes nor specifying detailed, specific arrangements of nodes for every 
possible situation.  His thinking is that, by paying attention to relationships (edges 
between nodes) and their character, the operating rules of the nodes can be defined so that 
the interactions (edges) can be activated when demanded by operational requirements.55 
This is similar to the approach of “programming” decision alternatives discussed in  
3.7 Modeling approach and philosophy 
A theme that is repeated throughout Kometer’s research is the difficulty that 
arises when commanders and operators attempt to reach across layers of hierarchy to 
attempt precise control over lower level events, especially when they stretch beyond 
adjacent levels of (i.e., when they try to skip an intermediate level (or commander) and 
go directly to the (a) point of action).  The nature of war and combat creates the chronic 
inability to achieve the precise outcomes sometimes desired by political and military 
leaders and that drives the desire to skip levels of hierarchy in operations (Watts 2004).56  
The difficulty of attaining precision when dealing with complex systems drives the 
approach taken by many complex systems architects and designers of specifying less and 
less precisely the details of the system.  Instead, architects prefer to craft a minimal 
specification of the system, usually discussing only the types of entities that can make up 
the system and the specifications of how they interact.  We will discuss this approach in 
more detail in Chapter 4.  A key in this approach to designing, modeling or analyzing 
complex systems and processes is to uncover these essential aspects of the system while 
                                                
55 Of course, Kometer’s Chapter 9 is devoted to the issue of nodal characteristics and the implications of 
developing these characteristics and then embedding these nodes in a system that may or may not make full 
use of them. 
56 Related to this is the enduring goal of some theorists to achieve precise manipulation of the enemy 
system to achieve political ends. 
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avoiding unnecessary details.  This is similar to Einstein’s “as simple as possible but no 
simpler” principle for scientific theories.  In my experience, many issues surrounding 
complex military operations suffer from either willful or passive ignorance of this 
principle, so a quick review/overview of an effective approach is in order.57 
In the classic Methods of Operations Research, Morse and Kimball tell us to 
“ruthlessly strip away details” in order to identify the “broad approximate constants” of 
the operation. 58  By examining the relationships among these constants to each other and 
to theoretical optimums, it may be possible to identify areas for operational improvement.  
We are interested in a slightly different version of this type of problem:  we are interested 
in architecture trade-offs.   
Many complex system modelers strip away much detail in their models.  This has 
enabled statistical physics approaches to yield bountiful insights into certain fundamental 
properties of these systems.  However, some claims of universality of these properties 
(e.g. power law behavior) have been shown to be incomplete (Li et al. 2004a).  As a 
result, others have called for more rigorous and detailed approaches to these types of 
models (Mitzenmacher 2005).  These researchers argue that the addition of detail (usually 
in the form of domain specific information) is needed in order to move toward more 
effective engineering and design capability for these systems (Li et al. 2004b) (Carlson 
and Doyle 2002). 
There are other points of view toward modeling complex systems, similar and 
consistent with those just cited.  Again, the key is to identify the basic features and 
mechanisms that describe the most important aspects of the system.  Once the 
fundamental dynamics or features of the system are understood, additional detail can be 
added to address contextually specific issues (Lloyd and Pagels 1988) (Wolfram 2002).  
Also with complex systems, it is important to operate and analyze at the appropriate 
                                                
57 A similar observation has been made by Dr. Barry Watts regarding the pervasiveness of friction in war.  
His observation is that many thinkers on future war through the 1990s tended to discount the effects of 
friction, assuming that technology would remove it from combat operations.(Watts 2009) 
58 A version of this approach was recently highlighted in an MIT news story about Prof. Richard Larson, 
where he calls this approach “simplify, simplify, simplify”.  This is something that has taken this researcher 
an inordinately long time to learn and do. 
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scale, to identify and attempt to control and design attributes that can be measured and 
managed (Meyer and Brown 1998) (Bar-Yam 1997). 
Kometer’s CAOS is a complex system.  Our modeling approach is aimed at 
avoiding the problem of too much detail; to theorize, conceptualize, analyze and model at 
a scale that captures essential aspects of the system while avoiding details that can 
confuse and obscure fundamental insights.  Kometer’s CLIOS analysis and qualitative 
case studies of air power command and control takes a step in this direction.  Our goal is 
to bring greater precision to his description through architecture analysis. 
3.8 Modeling interpretation of Kometer’s concepts  
Kometer’s thesis is a system level, process oriented, view of an enterprise.  I am 
interested in architecture.  I want to develop a model that captures the relationship 
between architecture and flexibility.  Though flexibility is not a term used frequently in 
his research, I argue that the main performance attribute Kometer seeks is flexibility and 
the method he implicitly advocates to achieve it is by layered hierarchical structures. 
In this section, I will make explicit connections between the central concepts of 
this research and the systems analysis presented by Kometer.  This mapping will allow a 
clearer and more general discussion of Kometer and will hopefully help us to develop a 
layered hierarchical model of complex military operations. 
Here are our terms and concepts presented with their analog in Kometer’s 
research: 
a. Enterprise system: multiple independent organizations working together toward a 
common goal, sometimes with diverging interests.  This is a more formal and 
general term for the Combat Air Operations System (CAOS), Kometer’s holistic 
conceptualization of the technical systems and organizations that comprise and 
employ air power.  CAOS is considered an enterprise. 
b. Focus on structure over process.  Kometer focused on process, specifically on how 
processes as well as strategic or policy intent influence system interactions that 
create behaviors, which generate outcomes.  Our focus is on structure—the paths on 
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which processes “ride” as they are executed or enacted by people and organizations 
of the enterprise. 
c. Architecture:  a minimal statement of the enterprise purpose and goals, its members, 
their relationships with each other and the environment.  Guidance for 
establishment, disestablishment and modification of relationships as well as 
additions to or deletion of members are part of an architectural statement. 
i. Kometer does not discuss architecture.  The closest thing to an architecture 
discussion he provides is inclusion of policy constraints and the degree of 
“management of details” and how these impact performance outcomes.  
ii. The definition provided here is an addition to his discussion of the CAOS.  It 
provides conceptual support and grounding for understanding the impact of 
policy constraints and risk management processes in the CAOS.  
iii. A central point of Kometer’s thesis is that detailed specifications of 
arrangements among systems and organizations can lead to “incorrect 
answers” to the problem.  More specifically, if details are too tightly specified 
or controlled, they create an inability to adjust effectively when the 
environment changes.  This points to the need for more general guidance and 
descriptions of enterprise relationships, which is closer to our definition of 
architecture.  Our concept of architecture, with its relationship to specific 
implementations (structures) provides a theoretical foundation for his analysis 
and may help connect his research to other complex systems analysis. 
iv. Kometer’s normative recommendation is that commanders concentrate on 
specifying relationships between nodes, not specifying the detailed 
arrangement of or the detailed nature of the relationships between nodes in all 
situations, for the reason cited in (iii).  Again, this is clearly an architectural 
philosophy statement consistent with our definition of architecture. 
v. Kometer does not address node characteristics in more than a general way.  
He addresses node characteristics changing over time, by referring to Air 
Force investments in making the AOC a hub of information processing and 
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dissemination.  He also addresses the fact that, as kill chain functions are 
distributed and dispersed among various elements inside and outside the 
CAOS, that certain node capabilities will be used to varying degrees over 
time.  This, he points out, can lead to system accidents. 
d. Hierarchy:  complex systems (including organizations) can be decomposed from 
large parts to interrelated subsystems of parts that are themselves composed of more 
finely divided subsets of parts (Simon 1962); efficient modeling of complex 
systems requires models matched to the appropriate level of hierarchy (Meyer 
2000).  Hierarchy is also defined as a set of authority relations or conceptual 
abstractions, and is the meaning usually taken in operational contexts—a set of 
superior-subordinate relationships. Figure 9 shows an example hierarchical 
representation of a military operational structure.  This representation carries the 
multiple meanings of hierarchy as just defined.  It represents the system according 
to level of focus (strategic, operational, tactical), which generally corresponds to 
time scale of interest, degree of information aggregation and complexity of 
operational activities.  This hierarchy also represents senior-subordinate 
relationships, as the person in charge of strategy is senior to those who carry it out  
 
Figure 9:  Multi-level tree hierarchy 
at the operational and tactical levels.  It also represents a decomposition of the system 
into subsets of systems that can be further subdivided.  A major focus of Kometer’s 
analysis is the impact of hierarchical (senior-subordinate/level of abstraction) 
interactions on system behavior and outcomes.  The major focus of our work is on the 
impact of interactions within and across layers of hierarchy.  We define a layer within 
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a hierarchy as the level of decomposition where all nodes or entities share the same 
general properties or attributes (this is discussed in more detail in Chapter 4). 
i. A multi-level tree hierarchy minimizes connections between nodes at different 
layers of the system, usually by restricting a node to having only one parent 
node, as shown in Figure 9.  
ii. In a more complex hierarchy, allowing nodes to connect across levels to more 
than one subordinate node creates more flexible layered structures as shown in 
Figure 10 (Moses 2006a).  In these cases, organizational interactions across 
layers may be more difficult or less efficient than interactions within layers.  
This problem develops because what is important or clearly understood at one 
level is often less important and/or less clearly understood at another level, 
whether we are looking up or down the hierarchy.  It is also possible that 
lateral interactions (interactions within layers) can be more difficult to 
implement than cross-layer interactions.  For example, a lateral interaction 
 
Figure 10:  Layered structure 
between nodes 2 and 3 might be more difficult to implement than a cross-layer 
interaction between nodes 4 and 11.  Nodes 2 and 3 define two separate branches 
of the tree (e.g., Air Force and Army in a military structure).  If node 2 is an Air 
Force node and node 3 is an Army node, each with strongly held priorities, or a 
lack of understanding of the practical issues surrounding each other’s tasks, 
establishing this connection can be hard.  By contrast, nodes 4 and 11 fall within 
the same branch of the hierarchical tree.  In an organizational setting, it is more 
likely that these two nodes will share a common framework or set of concepts 
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about relevant problems and solutions, making interaction easier, even in the face 
of hierarchical differences.   
iii. Hierarchy is described throughout the Kometer’s thesis as a feature of the 
CAOS, but it is usually addressed from a behavioral perspective, not a 
structural one.  A key hierarchical issue he highlights is that it is sometimes 
better for decision nodes to be at intermediate or low levels of hierarchy.  This 
is because information at different layers can be interpreted differently—noise 
or other factors can distort information as it travels up and down a hierarchy.  
Despite the increasing ubiquity of information, there may still be information 
asymmetry across levels—better information may be available locally than is 
available either higher up or lower down the hierarchy.  Also, higher 
information update rates may be available at lower levels than higher.59  A 
third (and possibly important) consideration is that information may be 
interpreted differently at different levels based on different priorities or 
preferences.  While these problems can also exist within layers (across 
branches of a hierarchical tree structure), because nodes at the same level are 
operating at a consistent level of abstraction, resolution of differences is likely 
to be easier, in principle.  In practice, establishing these types of lateral 
interactions can be difficult.  We will discuss this issue in more detail in 
Chapter 5.   
iv. Kometer explicitly highlights hierarchical effects within the confines 
framework of an existing tree-like hierarchical architecture, he does not 
conceptualize the problem from the perspective of alternative structures and 
their potential impact on system properties.  His example notes confusion is 
generated because the AOC today operates at two different levels (p.187-188): 
“It can be confusing that the AOC plays two different roles in the CAOS.  
It is simultaneously the air component’s portion of the Plans subsystem 
                                                
59 This statement about information update rates is very general and is meant to capture the observation that 
strategic level information update rates are by nature slower than more tactical information as well as the 
general nature of strategic information sources (sensors) which have historically had slower update (or 
revisit) rates than tactical sensors.  There are exceptions to these general observations. 
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and the lead agent in the Adjustment subsystem.  In the last three conflicts, 
its Plans role was to allocate resources and give guidance to the 
Adjustment subsystem [specifying] fewer and fewer of the details prior to 
the missions.  The TCT Cell and others in Combat Operations then used 
those resources…to prosecute the war as it occurred—with a shorter 
OODA (Observe-Orient-Decide-Act) Loop than the full ATO (Air 
Tasking Order) cycle.60  The reason this confuses many observers is 
that…it is not currently possible to delegate the role of information 
gathering and distribution much lower than the AOC…the TCT Cell can 
be looked at as an entity that could be moved an echelon down from the 
AOC if it were possible to either distribute the information…or gather the 
information somewhere else…This would be a big step towards the kind 
of depth of command relationships for which we are searching.” 
v. Kometer’s general formula for command and control describes two-way, 
hierarchical problem decomposition and aggregation (composition) when 
developing a plan.  This aims at two things: 
1. Building relationships for use during operations 
2. Reducing uncertainties as much as possible 
The general formula can be seen as a means to create latent structure—
interactions that can be used in the future when needed to respond to unforeseen 
circumstances. 
e. Flexibility is the ability to have alternatives, or options, that can be chosen or 
exercised with relative ease in response to certain types of changes in operational 
demands.61  These alternatives can be in the form of changed relationships among 
systems and organizations, altered system configurations, or other means of 
changing function delivered by the system short of redesign.  I think this is both a 
more precise and more general term for what is necessary at the system level in 
military operations than Kometer’s (and others’) more narrow discussion of 
innovation and empowerment.  Depth of command is Kometer’s means to achieve 
                                                
60 OODA:  Observe-Orient-Decide-Act.  The OODA loop is a concept developed by Col John Boyd, USAF 
to help understand air-to-air combat and how good pilots achieve success.  It has been applied widely as a 
metaphor and concept at other levels of analysis and to other operational situations, such as commercial 
business. 
61 We have kept our discussion of the types of changes that can be accommodated by an architecture very 
general.  Flexibility is dependent on the architecture—it is a design choice, so for different purposes and 
different contexts, the types of changes that are relatively easy to make will most likely be different. 
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innovation via situational empowerment—what we term flexibility.  For Kometer, 
innovation is the ability to coordinate and direct different system functions 
(represented by operational systems and organizations) on short notice—to have 
alternative means to achieve military objectives or accomplish tasks in response 
to changes, whether internal or external.  Empowerment is the delegation of 
command authority (decision location) to lower levels of hierarchy.  Both involve 
changing the pattern (or path) of interactions within (through) the enterprise.   
i. Architecturally speaking, for Kometer flexibility is a system attribute created 
by implementing the depth of command concept:  the ability to have 
alternative control modes when coupling changes from loose to tight or vice 
versa.  By paying attention to relationships (the edges between nodes), the 
character of the edges and the operating rules of the nodes can be managed 
and structured so that alternative relationships are available when external 
circumstances change. 
ii. A diagram depicting added flexibility is in Figure 11.  In this example, the 
system can be thought of as an input-output system with input coming in near 
the top (not necessarily the root node) and moving through a sequence of  
 
Figure 11:  Interactions across layers of a tree structure 
choices or steps leading to an output at the bottom.  If we refer back to Figure 
9 (the base tree hierarchy), we can see that there are only four alternatives 
from node 2 to any output at the bottom of the hierarchy—those through the 
children of node 2.  If we look at Figure 11 we can see that two additional 
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connections have been added (colored green), allowing access to the 
alternatives that flow from nodes 6 and 7.  Additionally, the added links from 
nodes 4 and 5 provide even more alternatives, starting from node 2. 
iii. We illustrate how input can start at node 2 (colored white) can flow along any 
one of eight possible paths to an output at the bottom of the structure in Figure 
12.  
 
Figure 12:  Paths from node 2 in a layered structure 
f. Lateral interactions:  Lateral interactions in a hierarchical structure are 
interactions between nodes at the same level of decomposition in the system as  
 
Figure 13:  Lateral interactions 
represented in Figure 13.  Organization theory tells us that lateral interactions 
enable flexibility (Galbraith 1993; Joyce et al. 1997).  Peer interactions, trust, 
information asymmetry across levels of hierarchy as well as other factors can 
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make lateral interactions easier to manage than vertical ones, though there is some 
possibility of disagreement and confusion in these interactions.62 
i. Though Kometer does not address laterality explicitly, his case studies 
describe situations where lateral collaboration:63 
1. reduced time to gather, process and transmit information 
2. created ability to respond effectively to changes in internal or external 
circumstances 
ii. He also describes circumstances where poor lateral interactions (lack of radio 
communications), in combination with other factors, were the cause of system 
accidents. 
iii. The depth of command concept ensures that there is always a clear 
hierarchical relationship in terms of control and accountability for action.  
Viewed from a  
 
Figure 14:  Architectural representation of depth of command 
higher level of analysis, depth of command allows movement of decision 
authority to lower levels of the command structure, to a level of organization 
                                                
62 In practice, the development of trust, experience, training and other factors usually outweigh the potential 
negative effect of lateral interactions.  We do not mean to imply that these interactions or the required trust 
levels are easy to develop, only that the potential benefits in an uncertain operational environment warrant 
serious consideration when developing an enterprise architecture. 
63 There are examples from other sources as well. 
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most appropriate to the situation.  It enables lateral interactions.  Figure 14 
shows both depth and laterality by indicating white colored nodes as 
command/decision nodes and black colored nodes as taking direction.  Nodes 
4-15 are at the same level (tactical), so we say that interactions among them 
are lateral (green) when observed at the system level.  If we were to consider 
only the interactions at the tactical level, however.  Some of the lateral 
interactions are classified as vertical (red) as shown in Figure 15.  
 
Figure 15:  Lateral and vertical interactions at the tactical level 
iv. The general formula for command and control implicitly calls for lateral 
information exchange in addition to hierarchical debate as discussed in section 
3.5.9 by specifying the following (Kometer, p.240):  
1. ensuring coordination among components where necessary; 
2. collaboration at multiple levels of hierarchy in order to 
generate the foundation for depth of command. 
g. Architecture design:  Architecture design takes the perspective of developing 
abstract statements of the fundamental aspects of a system.  A motivation64 for 
Kometer’s research is to make the case that in the information age commanders 
need to focus attention on “decisions about who can make decisions” (p. 188, 
253).  Since one of the explicit observations in his research is that it is difficult 
(impossible) to completely specify how strategic level considerations and 
constraints map to tactical situations, Kometer advocates commanders provide 
                                                
64 Perhaps it is an insight he gained in the course of his research. 
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guidance and identify relationships that need to be developed “just in case.”  
These are operational design decisions.  A military plan in execution, where 
relationships are established and disestablished as demanded by the environment, 
represents the operation of the system—the system in use—exercising the built-in 
options of the enterprise architecture. 
3.9 Research Extensions 
Kometer’s research, like most research in military operations, is solidly empirical 
and necessarily case-based (Eisenhardt 1989).  From an engineering systems perspective, 
two things can enhance its utility and lead to a useful model: 
1. Connecting it to a theory-based architecture design framework 
2. Interpreting Kometer’s research and conclusions through an 
architectural lens, emphasizing hierarchy to understand better the 
relationship between structure and system level properties, with a 
special focus on flexibility. 
For example, Kometer’s description of the need to have, at different times and 
places both a centralized and a decentralized operational mode is similar to Lawrence and 
Lorsch’s integration and differentiation contingency-theoretic model of organization 
(Lawrence and Lorsch 1967).  His discussion of the creation of time-sensitive targeting 
cells and the development of the depth of command concept both aim to move decision 
making lower in hierarchy as well as to connect all relevant expertise at the level in 
organization where it resides as in Galbraith’s “flexible lateral organization” (Galbraith 
1993).  In addition, the insights gained from both Galbraith and Lawrence and Lorsch can 
be enhanced by a more explicit examination of the role of hierarchy in enabling 
flexibility. 
From our perspective, Kometer’s analysis is fundamentally architectural.  He 
analyzes interactions among entities that compose the system as well as the schemas that 
drive their interactions.65  Where Kometer emphasizes behavior and process, we intend to 
                                                
65 However, he spends little time focusing directly on schemas; most of his attention is on the consequences 
of them. 
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concentrate on structure and system properties, specifically on hierarchical and lateral 
structures.  By applying enterprise level theory to enrich and extend Kometer’s analysis, I 
hope to be able to (a) support a more generalizable theoretical perspective on enterprises 
and (b) develop a model of flexibility at the enterprise level that can provide decision 
support, evaluation and diagnosis of enterprise transformation and change efforts.  I hope 
that this effort will enhance theory and practice of enterprise architecting by providing a 
foundation that allows an engineering approach. 
As we will discuss in Chapter 4, layered structures, hierarchy and network 
concepts provide a theoretical foundation for architectural analysis of Kometer’s 
research.  By examining the role of lateral connections and hierarchical layers as enablers 
of flexibility, I hope to be able to develop a simple model that can move us toward the 
larger goal of designing flexible military enterprises. 
3.10 Summary 
Kometer’s systems analysis of the Combat Air Operations System (CAOS) 
provides us with an objective look at the fundamental tension in employment and 
command of air power since 1943:  centralized vs. decentralized control.  In this chapter, 
we reviewed his presentation of air power command and control, highlighting the 
differences between a process-based and an architecture-based approach.  We also noted 
that there is a richer theoretical basis for Kometer's prescriptive recommendations about 
air power, which we well review in more detail in Chapter 4.  We highlighted the 
importance of hierarchy, a factor that Kometer addresses in passing, as he emphasizes the 
behavior and performance aspects of hierarchical interactions in the system.   
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Chapter 4  
Enterprise Architecture Definitions, Framework and Structural Model 
“The Beginning of wisdom is the definition of terms”—Socrates 
4.0 Introduction 
This chapter defines our terms in more detail than in Chapters 1 and 3.  We use 
these terms to build a framework and structural model of flexibility in enterprises. 
As we discussed in Chapter 2, while the Air Force claims flexibility as a core 
capability, a perennial complaint of ground forces is the lack of flexibility in the use of 
air power to support ground operations.  This tension is aggravated by the increasing 
ubiquity and capability of information technology that enables ground and air forces to 
collaborate much more easily (especially at the tactical level) and that has improved the 
operational depth to which the Army can influence the battlefield (Winton 1996; Daily 
2006).  In addition, improved technical capability has begun to blur the lines between 
traditional air power missions of strategic attack, air interdiction and close air support 
(Kometer 2005; Pirnie 2005).  Kometer’s concepts of depth of command and a general 
formula for command and control offer a way to reconcile these tensions.  As we saw in 
Chapter 3 he seeks to use depth of command as a method to achieve a balance between 
system-level flexibility and appropriate degrees of control—the ability to alter quickly 
the arrangements of forces against an enemy while limiting chances of accidents and 
maintaining coherence across levels of command.   
The fundamental purpose of any military operational organization is to translate 
political goals into positive outcomes by gathering and processing information from the 
environment and from its constituent parts (both human and technical), then translating 
this information into actions that exert control over the enemy.  Control is usually 
attained by being able to process information effectively and by being able to arrange 
force combinations in time and space such that the enemy is unable to operate (often 
because of physical destruction). 
To develop an architectural perspective on enterprise flexibility this chapter 
defines terms, concepts and levels of analysis.  We will briefly review current views on 
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flexibility as a system property and follow with a review of architecture concepts, 
connecting them to the literature on organization design.  This discussion lays a 
foundation for the development of a model of flexibility in enterprise architectures.  The 
model will be applied to the specific case of military combat operations and will be used 
in Chapter 5 on Kometer’s cases.  
4.1 Flexibility 
There are two main aspects of flexibility:  design and operation.  Moses has 
addressed both aspects:  flexibility as “the ability of a system to be modified relatively 
easily in certain classes of situations” (design) as well as the ability to have multiple 
alternatives in response to changing operational requirements (operation) (Moses 2003).  
As a definition of a system property, these capture the essence of what most practitioners 
would accept as an adequate definition. 
The economic implications of manufacturing flexibility were pointed out in the 
mid-20th century (Stigler 1939).  There are two issues here.  First, until the 1980s 
efficiency considerations dominated economic decisions in manufacturing.  Flexibility 
only gained momentum as companies responded to lean production systems in Japan, and 
to the fragmentation and globalization of markets (Piore and Sabel 1984).  The emphasis 
on lean production in the 1990s prompted increased attention to efficiency and flexibility 
on the shop floor (Womack et al. 1991; Adler et al. 1999).  Second, most attention to 
flexibility surrounded relatively slow-to-change situations, where uncertainties were low 
and trade-offs between high capital costs and economic returns to flexibility were 
amenable to detailed analysis.  Today, uncertainties are higher.  This has generated 
interest in strategic perspectives on flexibility.  Recent efforts in strategic engineering 
have gained attention as a way to cope with design of complex, high cost, hard-to-change 
and long-lived product systems where uncertainty about future requirements clashes with 
near-term engineering and economic concerns (de Weck et al. 2004; Silver and de Weck 
2006; Ross et al. 2008).   
Understanding flexibility becomes more challenging when we move to 
organizations that operate in higher rate of change situations.  Until shortly after World 
War II, hierarchical bureaucracies aimed at maximizing efficiency were the dominant 
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paradigm (March and Simon 1958).  Studies conducted in the immediate post World War 
II years led to contingency theory—the view that the structure of an organization should 
match its environment (Burns and Stalker 1961; Lawrence and Lorsch 1967).  But since 
the environment changes, a new tension developed:  how to balance the efficiency 
required to survive in the existing environment with the flexibility (change, innovation) 
necessary to maintain an adequate “fit” with the environment.  This tension was captured 
by frameworks that attempted to buffer a stable core from the external environment or 
that identified either integrated or differentiated substructures that could be used to match 
structure to different environmental demands (Lawrence and Lorsch 1967; Thompson 
1967).  More recently, evolutionary concepts have been applied to address this tension 
(Volberda and Lewin 2003).  But overall, addressing the challenge of organizational 
flexibility has been difficult, both in practice and in theory. 
The result is that flexibility as an overall system property lacks a unifying 
framework, theory or models.  An overview of the literature shows us that the 
conceptualization of flexibility is fragmented, with multi-dimensional and multi-scale 
definitions and measures (Sethi and Sethi 1990b; Suárez et al. 1991; Gerwin 1993; 
Volberda 1998; Koste and Malhotra 1999; Moses 2003; Whitney et al. 2004; Brusoni and 
Prencipe 2006).  Most research views flexibility as expensive to implement and therefore 
sees its value as being highly contingent on the system, the expected operational 
environment and level of analysis.  In addition, although operations researchers have 
been effective at optimizing flexibility at the shop floor level (machines and processes), it 
has been difficult to optimize processes when uncertainty rises and becomes pervasive at 
ever-shorter time scales, such as those experienced in military operations.  This problem 
becomes especially acute, as operations are characterized by ever higher rates of change 
(Cebrowski and Garstka 1998; Kometer 2005).  As a complementary development, 
diffusion of information systems is lowering the cost of flexibility, thus making it even 
more important to understand how flexibility can be designed as an architectural property 
of organizations and enterprises. 
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In general, the approach to flexibility in systems66 ranges from ex ante design of a 
limited amount of flexibility into products or manufacturing systems, to assuming the 
emergence of ad hoc flexibility in operational organizations or enterprises.  Considering 
the various ways in which flexibility is conceived and implemented across various types 
of systems, it can be posited that flexibility is a multi-dimensional, multi-level concept 
without a clear overarching framework or model to guide design efforts for large-scale 
system architectures. 
4.2 Architecture 
One way to move toward a more general understanding of flexibility is to 
examine a feature common to many systems: architecture.  With origins in building 
architecture and civil construction, the concept of architecture has increased in 
importance in the engineering domain, and is especially important in computer science.  
Architecture is receiving increased attention in many engineering disciplines and is 
capturing attention in organization studies (Nadler and Tushman 1999; Jacobides 2006; 
Magee et al. 2006; de Weck 2007).  Like flexibility, architecture definitions vary with 
discipline.  But, in contrast to flexibility, most definitions of architecture share a common 
conceptual foundation.  In this section, we will review and synthesize a definition of 
architecture to help us capture the richness of flexibility in an enterprise context. 
Architecture is often used as a synonym for structure, which becomes confusing 
as systems become more complex.  As we work through the various definitions of 
architecture, we will see that a large part of architecture is about structure and 
arrangements within systems.  As noted in Chapter 3 and section 4.1, flexibility means 
having many alternatives available for the system or enterprise to deliver value in the face 
of change.  As we continue our review and analysis, we will find that, if we represent the 
system as an input-output system, we can define a path as a sequence of nodes through 
the system that, at its output, delivers value.  Using this construct, the number of 
alternative ways (or paths) to generate a relevant output that exist in a system can be used 
                                                
66 We intend a very general meaning for the term systems here, focusing on man-made systems from 
product systems as discussed in Ulrich and Eppinger, to complex space systems as analyzed by de Weck 
and his collaborators, to computer systems (software, networks), to systems of systems, organizations and 
enterprises. 
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as a general measure of flexibility.  This establishes a theoretical connection between 
architecture and flexibility. 
We will start our investigation of architecture with product systems, which are 
mainly matter-energy intensive systems.67  We then move quickly to information systems 
and discuss the concept of architecture here, highlighting differences with matter-energy 
systems.  We will briefly address systems of systems, highlighting their similarity with 
information systems and how they can serve as a bridge to enterprises. 
4.2.1 Engineering Systems 
4.2.1.1 Systems 
Since we are interested in the architecture of large scale technically oriented and 
enabled enterprises, we need to say something about how we view them as systems.  The 
core system that we are examining, the military combat operations enterprise, from the 
operational level of war down to the tactical level, is fundamentally an information 
processing system.68  It takes in information from the environment, processes that 
information, makes decisions on what to do  (action to take), then executes that action.  It 
then repeats the process, attempting to understand how it is effecting the environment 
(which almost always includes an enemy or competitive adversary).  This overall process 
involves many different sub-processes, which include information processing, decision 
making, information passing and many others.   
The entities involved in these operational processes include individuals, teams, 
groups and organizations as well as technical systems operated by individuals, teams, and 
groups, which are themselves sometimes directed by other organizations.  The combined 
action of these diverse and interacting systems and organizations acts on the 
environment.  We will discuss later the concept of organizations as information 
                                                
67 Information-intensive systems such as software, computers certainly qualify as product systems, but the 
general use of the architecture definition for product systems is for matter-energy (mechanically oriented) 
systems (Ulrich and Eppinger 1995). 
68 Kometer’s focus was the CAOS.  By necessity, he discussed interfaces with ground forces where issues 
of control were relevant.  Though we intend to extend his perspective by looking at structure, we are also 
looking at multi-level issues that are relevant to flexibility.  This brings into focus for us the need to address 
air-ground interactions at multiple levels of command hierarchy, a slight extension of the analytical 
boundary beyond the CAOS. 
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processors and of the emerging concept of “system of systems” as an information 
processor.  The need for these systems to be responsive to uncertainty and external 
change gives rise to the demand for flexibility.  It is the ability to process information in 
different ways, recombine or re-sequence processes composed of both technical systems 
and organizations that enable flexibility. 
4.2.1.2 Product Systems  
A practice-based definition of product system architecture is Ulrich and 
Eppinger’s: “the scheme by which the functional elements of the product are arranged 
into physical chunks and by which the chunks interact” (Ulrich and Eppinger 1995).  It 
provides a description of architecture, but no guidance on how to craft one to have 
specific properties.  This definition becomes limiting when factors such as life cycle 
cost, acquisition cost and long-term uncertainties in requirements become design 
considerations.  When these types of considerations become important, we need to 
understand the implications of the original “scheme” and the limitations it places on the 
flexibility of the system by form-function mapping and physical arrangements of the 
design.  These issues point out a fundamental difference from mechanical systems, 
where there is a close correspondence between form and function, generally tight and 
sometimes difficult to learn (expose) interdependencies between physical parts.  We 
will see later that, as information intensiveness in a system increases, these issues 
become less constraining.69 
Product platforming has emerged as a way to address some of these difficult 
issues in mechanical systems.  Platforming uses different subsystems on a common 
infrastructure to produce variants of a product at lower overall cost to add design 
flexibility (Meyer and Lehnerd 1997; de Weck et al. 2003).  A product platform serves 
as a layer upon which different alternatives can be designed.  Product platforms 
increase the number of combinations (product alternatives) as well as the number and 
type of design considerations.  This economizes on design effort, manufacturing 
                                                
69 As Dr. Whitney points out “this relaxation doesn’t make the system any easier to understand or design.”  
It may actually be quite the opposite, design of information intensive systems may be more difficult in 
certain ways because of this relaxation and the many more degrees of freedom that are possible (Brooks 
1987a). 
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systems investment and production process complexity.  It also manages product 
complexity by standardizing certain interfaces and placing complex interactions in 
well-bounded areas.  Platforming represents a use of hierarchy in architecture as a 
means to manage complexity and to enable flexibility.  This practice (platforming) and 
the increasing complexity of system architectures have begun to change the language 
of system architectures.  More frequently, system architectures are discussed as 
abstractions of physical relationships in the system rather than detailed function-form 
mappings (Chao and Ishii ; Rebentisch et al. 2005).   
Choosing the “right” platform architecture has significant long-term 
consequences for the effectiveness of the systems being built on the platform and, 
consequently, for the enterprise that develops it (Ulrich 1995; Silver and de Weck 
2006).  Physical (hardware) systems, are usually designed with a limited number of 
configurations, and changes to the system are generally difficult unless careful 
decisions are made early in the development of the system.  This makes development 
of product platform architectures to achieve flexibility a tough design challenge.  
Information-intensive systems are physically able to accommodate more flexibility in 
design than matter-energy systems.  Even so, information-intensive systems, too, can 
be hard to change if the change is not in a class of which the system was designed to 
handle.  But in general, flexibility in information systems is much higher than in 
matter-energy systems, especially if the design of its architecture is well chosen (Moses 
2004b; Whitney 2004).  In general, the long term impact of architectures on system 
viability make architecture decisions important and, as Moses has pointed out, 
developing a good architecture is challenging (Moses 2004b). 
4.2.1.3 Information systems 
Abstraction is a key principle in software engineering (Fielding 2000).  For 
computer scientists, architecture is the overall concept that drives the choice of system 
parts, the specification of interfaces between parts and the constraints on performance 
of parts and the system.  This approach enables easier adjustment of a design as 
technology improves or as performance requirements change (Gifford and Spector 
1987b; Perry and Wolf 1992). 
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 Software architecture has been defined as the organization of the overall 
system, represented by a graph, where nodes are software modules and edges are 
function calls and other relevant interactions between nodes (Garlan and Shaw 1993). 
Kruchten describes architecture as “the design and implementation of the high-level 
structure of the software” (Kruchten 1995). For Perry and Wolff, “software architecture 
deals with abstraction, with decomposition and composition, with style and esthetics.” 
(Perry and Wolf 1992).  The common theme among these concepts is a higher degree 
of freedom in creating specific system implementations.  This freedom is enabled by 
the relative ease of rearranging elements of a software or information system and is a 
key differentiator between information-intensive systems and matter-energy intensive 
systems (Whitney 1996).  In practice, the ability to create layers of abstraction in 
information systems increases this design freedom even more (Moses 2006a). 
Computer network designers describe architecture as the overarching 
description of purpose, the set of abstract principles that define how a system is 
decomposed into parts and the interface specifications among the parts (Braden et al. 
2000; Clark et al. 2004).  Others have amplified the idea of interface definition, adding 
that interface specifications impose “both constraint and freedom” (Clark et al. 2004).  
This additional idea opens the concept of architecture to more explicit recognition of 
the inability to foresee all possible issues that might arise once a system is fielded; 
people act to alter the system as needs change and the nature of information systems 
allows a larger degree of freedom for changes after the system is fielded than is 
possible with matter-energy systems.70  This is a key observation about computer 
network architectures:  the architecture defines the terms of evolution and the long-
lived system properties—structure changes over time but is constrained by the 
architecture.  “There is no ‘final outcome’ of these interactions, no stable point, and no 
acquiescence to a static architectural model” (Clark et al. 2005).  But there are certain 
                                                
70 These statements are true of any system, and any organization.  The important point to note is that 
computer system architecture concepts recognize this issue more explicitly and the technology of 
information systems enables designers to craft architectures that can better account for their effects.  That 
we should be able to achieve similar capabilities for enterprises is a motivating force for this research. 
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properties that can be assumed to remain valid over longer time scales and an overall 
high-level structure that can be observed. 
Computer science provides us with more abstract concepts of architecture, 
focusing on relationships, their effect on system level function and on evolution in the 
face of external or internal changes.  Though more abstract and dynamic than product 
system concepts, information system concepts of architecture are still more limiting 
than what we observe in organizations and enterprises.  They are practice-based 
definitions with little that helps us map architecture to desired system properties.  
Technical issues are dominant constraints, as evidenced by efforts to craft a new set of 
architectural principles for the next generation internet (Clark et al. 2004). 
4.2.1.4 Systems of Systems  
Individual product systems are now being connected together into systems of 
systems (SoS).  Architecture concepts for this class of system are immature and most 
approaches emphasize traditional tree-like decomposition.  Maier has proposed a more 
computer science-like view, defining architecture for these systems as “a framework 
for systems that can evolve and adapt through a distributed process of individual 
decisions…defined as much by standards and regulations as by technical components” 
(Maier 1997).  In a further development of this idea, he states that “design and 
engineering should shift…to higher layer standards…much greater attention must be 
paid to how components develop and maintain collaborative relationships.” (Maier 
1998).  Maier’s perspective echoes internet-based ideas cited above, where the system 
continually evolves based on the interface standards as they are implemented into 
specific systems and as standards are altered over time. 
4.2.1.5 Summary 
As we consider technical system architecture concepts for application to 
enterprise architectures, patterns emerge that can help us extend them to more complex 
systems and enterprises.  First, almost all discussion of technical system flexibility is 
from the perspective of system design—ease of changing physical and functional aspects 
of systems.  Second, for product systems, flexibility is usually a difficult property to 
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implement and, when implemented, is usually limited in scope.71 The practice of product 
platforming increases flexibility by making certain changes to a system design easier to 
implement.  Innovative methodologies have enhanced the ability to create flexible 
product systems, often by taking a strategic approach to system design by examining a 
wider array of system designs, usually during the conceptual design phase of 
development (de Neufville 2003; de Weck and Jones 2004).  However, these efforts 
focus on design of systems, not on architectures that govern how individual systems are 
designed.  They also concentrate on knowing performance requirements with a certain 
degree of fidelity ahead of time, something that is difficult in a combat environment (as 
well as almost any operationally oriented environment). 
Architecture concepts can become more abstract as systems become more 
information intensive, include stand-alone systems as part of a larger functioning system 
and as the focus moves from design of an artifact to design of operations conducted by 
and with multiple artifacts and organizations.  Structures are more easily altered and 
architecture discussions hinge on the multiple potential ways to achieve a desired 
outcome or deliver a required function.  Structure becomes a dynamic concept, based on 
patterns of interaction among the member entities.  Correspondingly, definitions of 
architecture move away from concrete specification of arrangements to statements of 
interface requirements, interaction patterns and desired outcomes.  In computer network 
engineering, architecture discussions are almost completely about system level properties 
(Maier 1998; Clark 2004; Clark et al. 2004). 
As we move up in scale from individual product systems through information 
systems to systems of systems, organizations and ensembles of organizations, our 
concept of flexibility shifts in focus.  The “system” is no longer a static object of design, 
something that is delivered then operated.  It becomes animated, operating within and on 
an external environment with some purpose or goal; the number of alternatives that can 
be designed into the system increases dramatically.  So, for enterprises, our focus shifts 
away from design of individual systems and single organizations to the design of an 
                                                
71 I am mainly thinking about matter-energy intensive systems, but the same situation applies to 
information intensive systems, only with different trade-offs.  A good example is provided in (Ross 2006) 
and another example, using word processing software, is discussed in Chapter 6. 
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architecture within which systems and organizations can be re-arranged during operation 
in response to internal and external changes (Garlan and Shaw 1993).  Flexibility in this 
context takes on a different character and requires a corresponding new approach toward 
architecture.  In these systems, a high degree of flexibility can be achieved if the 
architecture is properly designed—if there are alternative ways to deliver value or to 
accomplish tasks—alternative paths from input stimulus to output function of the overall 
system. 
Using this logic, an architecture concept appropriate for enterprises means we are 
dealing with information-intensive systems, which require abstraction to manage 
complexity.  They must operate at multiple levels.  But we still lack a theoretical 
foundation that can help us design a complex architecture to deliver desired properties—
flexibility in our case.  We still have no clear understanding of how arrangements can 
deliver system level properties, so do not know what arrangements we should want. 
4.2.2 Enterprises and architecture 
4.2.2.1 Organizations and design 
Organizations are complex artificial systems (Simon 1996).  They are made up of 
individual parts (individuals, groups, teams, committees, etc.) that, together, exhibit 
aggregate properties that are different from the properties of the individual components of 
the system as viewed separately (people, teams and technical systems bound together 
with information technology).  People craft organizations to achieve specific goals.  Once 
crafted (analogous to fielding of a technical system) organizations become subject to 
natural and man-made influences, both internal and external.  Untangling the implications 
of these interactions for organizational performance has been the subject of decades of 
organizational, sociological and economics research.  (Katz and Kahn 1966; Arrow 1974; 
Ranson et al. 1980). 
Organizations have been considered objects of design activity for some time now.  
Recently organization theory and organization design research have migrated toward 
concepts of architecture and architecting as a way to address the challenges of keeping 
organizations viable in ever-changing environments (Nadler and Tushman 1997) 
(Sanchez and Mahoney 1996) (Schilling and Steensma 2001). 
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4.2.2.2 Sociology, Organization Design, Structure and Change 
Research in organization design continues a trend toward abstraction where 
computer science leaves off.  Following the work of Burns and Stalker, early work by 
Thompson, Lawrence and Lorsch, Katz and Kahn, and others aimed to help management 
understand how interactions both within an organization and between the organization 
and its environment impacted overall organizational performance.  The abstraction of 
organizations as resource or information processors—systems that interact internally and 
with the environment externally is well known and connects to our goal of applying 
technical architecture concepts to enterprises (Galbraith 1969; Arrow 1974; Tushman and 
Nadler 1978; Moldoveanu and Bauer 2004).  In an examination of the sociological 
aspects of organizations Ranson, et al., described the interplay of multiple factors in both 
enabling and inhibiting change.  They specifically address the impact of human agency, 
self-interest and coalitions on the overall patterns of interaction (which they define as 
structure) and its ability to remain viable in a changing environment (Ranson et al. 1980).  
This view of organizations is architecturally analogous to the Internet architecture:  
“[It]…is shaped by controlled tussle, regulated not just by technical 
mechanism but by mechanisms such as laws, judges, societal opinion, 
shared values…There is no “final outcome” of these interactions, no stable 
point, and no acquiescence to a static architectural model.  Today, the 
Internet is more and more defined by these tussles.” (Clark et al. 2005)  
Ranson et al. developed a rich synthesis of sociological theories of organizational 
structure, behavior and change dynamics.  They provide a logical explanation of structure 
and dynamics in organizations, grounded in institutional theory (Ranson et al. 1980).  
Using the perspective of Ranson, et al., organization structure can be defined as the 
pattern of interactions produced as a continually evolving outcome of group and 
individual interactions, interdependencies and cognitive processes as mediated by 
environmental constraints and power coalitions.  Moving from structure to architecture, 
Nadler and Tushman also recognize organization architecture as intangible and subject to 
group dynamics and human behavior.  For them organization architecture is a term that 
describes “the variety of ways in which the enterprise structures, coordinates, and 
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manages the work of its people in pursuit of strategic objectives.”  Adding detail, they 
define architecture as “…the grouping boundaries and linking processes, the patterns of 
personal and cultural relationships that get work done in certain ways, the interaction of 
the social with the technical sides of the organization.” (Nadler and Tushman 1999).  
Organization architecture has also been described as “how different types of capabilities 
fit together, to shape firm-level and aggregate technological and strategic advances” 
(Jacobides 2006). 
Lawrence and Lorsch identified integrated and differentiated structures within 
organizations contending with changing and uncertain external environments (Lawrence 
and Lorsch 1967).  Galbraith developed the concept of the organization as an information 
processor, where uncertainty drives information processing requirements and where 
different structures are able to deal with differing degrees of uncertainty (Galbraith 
1969).  Tushman and Nadler, following Galbraith, developed an information-processing 
model to aid in making choices among competing organizational designs (Tushman and 
Nadler 1978).  More recently, Moldoveanu and Bauer have taken an explicitly 
computational design approach to organizations, aiming to match computational 
requirements to processing structure of the organization (Moldoveanu and Bauer 2004).   
Combining these concepts from contingency theory and information processing 
with the concept of hierarchy allows us to move toward a multi-level understanding 
enterprise architecture (Lawrence and Lorsch 1967; Tushman and Nadler 1978; 
Moldoveanu and Bauer 2004).  In this view, nodes near the bottom of a hierarchy have 
better information about local conditions and the likely effectiveness and efficiency of 
decisions on operations at that level.  Nodes higher in the organization generally have 
less local knowledge and better global knowledge about operational effectiveness and 
efficiency in relation to system level goals.  We define allowing nodes within a level to 
coordinate, control, and share resources among themselves according to criteria 
developed at higher levels as laterality or lateral interactions (Galbraith 1993; Kometer 
2005).  Laterality enables nodes within the same layer of organization to share 
information and coordinate action.   
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Since higher levels handle more abstract problems, engage in interactions that are 
more complex, and usually specify constraints and provide direction to lower levels, 
lateral connections at higher levels can enable better local level interactions by lowering 
confusion about priorities and by clearly and formally delegating some decision authority 
to lower levels.  Interaction patterns in an enterprise are the result of innumerable 
decisions based on multiple criteria at all levels.  As we will see later (in Chapter 5), the 
interactions (or lack of them) among higher-level nodes (commanders and staffs) can 
inhibit the creation of connections at lower levels.  While the structure of the enterprise is 
a reflection of the many individuals acting to accomplish their individual and collective 
missions, at the highest level, it is a physical manifestation of the overall intent of the 
senior leadership (the commander in a military context). 
4.2.2.3 Enterprises 
The term enterprise has emerged as a general and intuitively applied description 
for large, complex organizational endeavors of almost any scale.  Black’s Law Dictionary 
defines an enterprise as "one or more persons or organizations that have related activities, 
unified operation or common control, and a common business purpose".  This definition 
applies to a two-person joint activity as well as to activities on the scale of societies and 
is too broad for our purposes of design and engineering enterprise architectures.  The 
Lean Aerospace Initiative, in their book, Lean Enterprise Value (LEV) has offered the 
following definition of enterprise: “It is significant when a leader in aerospace or any 
industry asserts that a given set of activities—regardless of scale—must be viewed as an 
interconnected whole.  That interconnected whole is an enterprise.” (Murman 2002).  
LEV further identifies program enterprises and industrial-scale enterprises as a way to 
focus on larger-scale, multi-organizational activities that must be integrated in order to 
deliver complex technical systems with minimal waste and with the goal of reducing 
overall system cost (Murman 2002).  A significant feature of enterprises as conceived by 
LAI is the need to collaborate across organizational boundaries and across multiple 
organizations with the goal of satisfying many requirements driven by multiple 
stakeholders.  The definition provided in LEV leaves many open questions regarding 
design, operation and management of enterprises. 
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Nightingale and Rhodes have defined enterprises:  “Enterprises are complex, 
highly integrated systems comprised of processes, organizations, information and 
supporting technologies, with multifaceted interdependencies and interrelationships 
across their boundaries” (Nightingale and Rhodes 2004).  They further define enterprises 
as moving “…from simple organization to a complex networked organization (an 
extended enterprise).  Though never explicitly stated, this makes enterprises conceptually 
similar to multi-organizational systems, a subject of public administration research 
(Agranoff and McGuire 1998; Mandeles 1998).  But there are differences between these 
two types of organization.  In multi-organizational systems, member organizations are 
not usually connected directly to enterprise outputs and generally pursue their own 
interests, with little consideration for a larger system-wide goal, even though achieving a 
system level goal may be the motivation for their participation in the system.  Thus, 
multi-organizational systems are less cohesive and less clearly managed than 
enterprises.72  Also, multi-organizational system research as well as the growing body of 
research on new organizational forms leave out issues of explicit control, guidance and 
design, all of which are important in enterprises (Chisholm 1989; Romanelli 1991; 
Agranoff and McGuire 1998; Castells 2000; White et al. 2004).  
4.2.2.4 Enterprise defined 
As a first step in addressing these gaps, we define an enterprise as an ensemble of 
organizations working cooperatively toward a defined and collectively accepted goal, 
with an explicit leadership and/or governance structure.  Enterprises are characterized by: 
1. More permeable organizational boundaries compared to individual organizations;  
2. Higher reciprocity in interactions compared to organizations;  
3. More variable interactions over time but with clearly recurring patterns; 
4. Interactions at multiple hierarchical levels; 
5. Simultaneous intersection and separation of member interests that change over 
time; 
                                                
72 The term “manage” implies tight controls.  As observed by multi-organizational systems researchers, 
these types of systems do not have very much central control, if any.  Enterprises are controlled, but less 
tightly than traditional organizations and more tightly than multi-organizational public administration 
systems. 
102 
6. More decentralized action than in a traditional organization; 
7. Difficulty in causal relationships between individual members’ activities and 
enterprise outcomes. 
This definition moves Galbraith’s longstanding conceptualization of organizations as 
information processors to a larger scale—they gather information from the environment, 
process it in numerous ways and then act on the environment.  Members of enterprises 
are, in general, more autonomous than members of organizations.  Higher information 
flows and more reciprocity in interactions enable (but do not ensure) more alternative 
ways to process information and to take action based on that information.  Whereas 
organizations are usually focused on clear and specific goals, enterprises must 
accommodate goals of individual organizations as well as those of the enterprise.   
A major issue in enterprises is using cooperation, collaboration, and coordination 
to gather and process information in order to achieve goal directed behavior by acting on 
a continuously changing environment.  We need to understand what types of structures 
can do this.  We are specifically interested in enterprise level flexibility, the ability to 
change interactions within the enterprise in response to internal and external uncertainty 
and change.  One of the main problems facing enterprises in this regard is balancing 
efficiency and effectiveness.  We discuss this trade-off in detail in Chapter 6. 
4.2.2.5 Enterprise Architecture 
We define enterprise architecture as the overarching scheme, the high-level 
statement of purpose and principles, that guides generation of patterns of interaction 
among enterprise members, that governs decisions about how to interact with the 
environment and that specifies the overall properties of the enterprise or the value to be 
delivered.  An enterprise architecture statement includes: 
1. Initial members of the system;  
2. A description of the structural pattern of interactions among members (tree, layer, 
lattice, network, etc.); 
3. Interactions:  relationships among the members and at what level of enterprise 
they operate; 
4. Constraints on interactions, member behavior and system level behavior; 
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5. Rules on entry/exit and addition/deletion of members from the system; 
6. A clear statement of where freedom is allowed when unspecified conditions arise. 
A strategic goal of the architecture statement should be to define and shape the 
evolutionary trajectory of the enterprise as it shapes and is shaped by the environment. 
4.2.3 Summary 
The approaches of organization design research and their definitions share 
similarities with information system architecture:  defining general rules, standard 
interfaces, ongoing evolution and change in response to internal and external demands.  
Early organization design research focused on understanding contingent forms (Lawrence 
and Lorsch 1967), and on how to build a structure that could deal effectively with 
external changes and the need for internal stability (Thompson 1967).  Recent work has 
aimed at understanding how to craft organizations that can operate under conditions of 
high external change and turbulence, both in the short and long term (Volberda 1998; 
Volberda and Lewin 2003).  In general, researchers claim that this is achievable by 
intelligent choice of product architecture and organization structures (Ulrich 1995; 
Sanchez and Mahoney 1996; Augier and Teece 2006). 
But there are nagging inadequacies.  First, the challenge of keeping an 
organization viable and competitive in a changing environment is a daunting task 
(Hannan and Freeman 1989; Christensen 1997; Kaplan and Henderson 2005).  Second, 
knowledge of organization architecture and design lags our experience and observation.  
Complexities of product development coupled with economic and other constraints 
require a larger array of and differently structured organizations to develop systems 
(Clark and Fujimoto 1991; Cusumano and Nobeoka 1998; Robertson and Ulrich 1998; 
Murman 2002).  Similarly, in military operations, changing threats, fiscal constraints, 
political risk tolerance and a trend toward use of military forces for a wider array of 
contingencies and operations drive operational force organizations in a similar direction. 
4.3 Enterprise Architecture constructs and relationships 
4.3.1 Hierarchy and complex systems 
A missing idea from many definitions of architecture reviewed so far is the notion 
of hierarchy.  Many engineering systems operate at multiple levels of abstraction, as do 
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organizations and enterprises.  Anderson’s seminal article on complexity offered an early 
discussion of the implications of scale (size) on the understanding of complex systems 
(Anderson 1972).  From a more practical perspective, Simon articulated the need for 
hierarchical decomposition and minimization of cross boundary interactions in order to 
manage both cognitive and physical complexity (Simon 1962).  Bar-Yam has proposed 
multi-scale representations as a framework for understanding complex systems (Bar-Yam 
1997).  More technically, the computational efficiency of models has been proposed as a 
means to identify different levels of abstraction.  If a model becomes cumbersome 
(computationally inefficient) as the system increases in size, the system can (should) be 
formulated as a new, more abstract, model, one that disregards certain details but captures 
the essential properties of interest in the system (Morse and Kimball 1998; Meyer 2000).  
This view is especially helpful in separating analytical approaches based on different 
performance or design concerns as well as for simplifying discussion and analysis of 
complex systems. 
But if we are to undertake design activities, we need to connect structure to 
system properties.  Connecting the ideas of decomposition and multiple levels of 
abstraction in analysis provides this connection.  Moses and the ESD Architecture 
committee have proposed a view of architecture that accounts for this connection (Moses 
2003; Whitney et al. 2004).  Simon’s hierarchies emphasize a tree-like decomposition, 
specifically limiting cross-tree branch interactions in order to minimize complexity.  But 
from a practical perspective, this approach lacks richness and reaches computational 
limits rather quickly.73  Also, in real systems, especially organizations, interactions across 
branches of a tree happen frequently (Chisholm 1989; Mandeles et al. 1996). Systems 
designed for one purpose are often applied to a previously unknown or not considered 
task.  For example, F-111 bombers were designed to strike strategic targets deep in 
enemy territory.  In Operation Desert Storm, they were used to hit Iraqi tanks after it was 
discovered that their infrared sensors could discriminate warm tanks against the cold 
                                                
73 A hierarchical tree with a constant branching ratio, represented as a network structure, grows 
exponentially in size (number of nodes) with branching ratio and number of levels:  size =
! 
b
l
l= 0
L
" ; where b 
= branching ratio and l = level of decomposition and L = total number of levels. 
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desert sand at night.  Moses’ idea is that creating alternatives in a system (paths through 
it) adds both flexibility and complexity, but that the increase in complexity can be 
managed (limited) with a judicious choice of architecture, specifically of the abstraction 
around which the architecture is crafted.  He claims that attention to architecture can 
achieve a balance between increased complexity and improved performance through 
flexibility while also reducing design cost over the lifetime of the system (Moses 2003).74  
4.3.2 Hierarchy and layers 
We say that hierarchies are vertical structures, where levels (layers) exist “above” 
and “below” each other.  We will consider two main types of hierarchy, “classic” trees 
and layered structures.  Trees are a specific type of hierarchy where there is a single root 
node, branching at succeeding levels of decomposition, with few interactions among 
nodes at each level (recall that in a strict tree structure there are no interactions among 
nodes at a given level, each node has only one parent and a limited number of children at  
 
Figure 16:  Tree with lateral interactions 
the next level down).  A level is a set of decomposed elements of the system that 
have similar attributes or characteristics; they exist at a similar level of abstraction.  If we 
use hierarchy as an organizing concept, layers are defined as horizontal substructures in 
the architecture, where each hierarchical level represents a different abstraction (Moses 
                                                
74 The logic is that if flexibility is enabled up front (before fielding the system) by a properly designed 
architecture, then there will be fewer system changes necessary after it is fielded and those that are 
necessary may cost less in both design and implementation. 
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2003).  We define lateral connections as interactions within a layer of abstraction (green 
arrows in Figure 16).  A simple example is the rank structure of the military services, 
where Generals and Admirals are above Lieutenants who are above Sergeants and Petty 
Officers.  In a formal hierarchy, command or direction usually flows from the higher 
levels to lower ones, so relationships are asymmetrical (Simon 1962; Allen 2006).  Figure 
16 depicts a simple representation of this type of hierarchy, where nodes represent 
entities at different levels, red arrows indicate directive interactions (commands) and 
green arrows indicate collaboration among peers. 
Since relationships between levels are asymmetrical by definition, entities in 
different levels have different interaction characteristics and can be described or modeled 
differently (Anderson 1972; Meyer 2000).  For example, in an organization a higher-level 
individual interacts differently, possibly using a different grammar, with a subordinate 
than with a peer; a higher-level committee deals with more complex and multi-
dimensional problems than a work group on the shop floor (March and Simon 1958; 
Tushman and Nadler 1978; Galbraith 1993).  In social systems formal rank, social status 
or other dimensions can be used to define hierarchical levels.75  In technical systems, 
types of interactions, or a specific grammar (data class, data format, program language, 
information exchange protocol, etc.) can be used to define layers.  In general, skipping 
layers in either a social or a technical context can create complexities that make certain 
aspects of system management difficult or can generate unintended operational 
consequences (Swain 1994; Moses 2003). 
4.3.3 Hierarchies and flexibility 
Thompson proposed the resource-based view of the firm, the firm as a consumer 
and processor of physical, information and knowledge resources (Thompson 1967).  
Lawrence and Lorsch developed the integration-differentiation model of contingent 
organizational forms, where different structures were needed in different locations in the 
organization in order to deal with different external conditions or different task 
integration requirements (Lawrence and Lorsch 1967).  Later, Galbraith highlighted 
                                                
75 These types of levels are also used for analytical purposes, as well as everyday social interaction 
purposes(Watts et al. 2002). 
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laterality as an organizational form that enables flexibility, beginning with information 
processing as a way to understand how contingent organizational structures cope with 
uncertainty in the environment (Galbraith 1969; Galbraith 1993).   
All of these versions of contingency theory address the connection between 
internal structures, the external environment and the potential for success or survival of a 
firm.  In short, organizational structure (the ability to process information and handle 
uncertainty) must match the problem.  But Thompson and Lawrence and Lorsch do not 
address how to keep the form matched to a changing environment, nor do they address 
hierarchical issues of organization.  Galbraith addresses the issue of matching to the 
environment by proposing lateral interactions—replication of the formal large-scale 
structure of the firm at the appropriate level hierarchy.  Analogous to Kometer’s depth of 
command, this method achieves flexibility by moving decisions down the hierarchy and 
enables the integration of knowledge at the level where it best matches the problem 
(Galbraith 1993).  This is one way to achieve flexibility:  lateral interactions at lower 
levels of hierarchy. 
4.4 Designing Flexible Enterprise Architectures 
4.4.1 Architecture model 
4.4.1.1 Theory, modeling, complex systems and operations 
research 
A key goal of modeling a complex system is to abstract and represent the property 
or characteristic of interest while retaining only essential detail (Morse and Kimball 
1998; Boccara 2004).  Military systems are highly complex, and many issues surrounding 
their behavior or choices about operating them can be traced to different models of war 
used by different military services (Wylie 1989).  This makes modeling military 
operations and communicating the results or implications of a model challenging.  Our 
goal here is a simple model, supported by a descriptive architectural analysis of military 
combat operations. 
We need to be clear about the bounds of this analysis.  The availability and 
application of computer power makes is easy to move prematurely toward simulation and 
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detailed design or modeling (Koopman 1999).76  But we must be careful, models running 
in silico can lead to difficulties, usually in the form of mismatches between reality and 
the mechanics of the model (Nordhaus 1973; Koopman 1999).77  Our intent is not to 
build a simulation or a design tool (yet).  Perhaps some day we can do this.  For now we 
seek to lay a foundation for designing enterprise architectures by developing a model 
grounded in “fundamental constants” that help us understand enterprise flexibility (Morse 
and Kimball 1998). 
As we have noted, complex systems—enterprises—operate at multiple levels of 
abstraction.  In a major corporation (like General Motors), there are both functional and 
product divisions (branches of a tree) that must work together at multiple hierarchical 
levels to generate products valued by markets that change over time.  In military 
operations, various organizations operate together at different levels, strategic, 
operational and tactical, to achieve the purpose of a commander, sometimes in the face of 
a deadly adversary.  In these examples (and many others we could present) the 
fundamental issues of information processing, resource allocation and alignment require 
a balance between top-down direction, bottom-up action, aggregation (abstraction) of 
information, coordination and myriad other dimensions of performance. 
We are interested in a model that allows us to understand structures that enable 
flexibility.  Based on our discussion so far, we expect these structures to be lateral as well 
as vertical.  Our earlier discussion showed us that complex systems are multi-scaled and 
sometimes hierarchical, where efficient description, modeling or qualitative analysis of 
activities identifies the levels of abstraction (or analysis).  We expect that interactions 
within levels of an enterprise are going to be less prone to misunderstanding, friction, 
filtering, loss or miscommunication than they would be if (or when) they cross layer 
boundaries. 
Key to our model is the definition of an interaction path within the system.  In 
simple terms:  what does a line on a diagram mean?  Is it information flow?  Is it 
                                                
76 In fact, a good deal of effort has been expended in the course of this research on investigating the utility 
and potential validity of a computational model. 
77 Anecdotal evidence suggests that current financial industry troubles can be traced to the continued use of 
quantitative models after the real market had outpaced their ability to accurately value certain aspects of it. 
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functional dependency in a sequential (grammatical) sense?  Can we simply discuss 
interactions abstractly and say that function alternatives are what the edges point toward?  
How general or abstract can our model be and still portray the system with appropriate 
fidelity?  The next sections will address these issues. 
4.4.1.2 Articulating a model 
Representing a complex system as a set of nodes and edges is a useful way to 
model a complex system.  This has been done for social networks, infrastructures, 
metabolic networks and product development organizations (Watts 1999) (Ravasz and 
Barabási 2003; Braha and Bar-Yam 2007).  In this type of enterprise model, a node is an 
organization, system or person, with an edge between them if there is an interaction 
relevant to the system property of interest.  For many systems, especially enterprises, we 
can classify nodes into a hierarchy by using abstractions.  A set of nodes can be 
contracted to a higher-level abstraction when input-output relations are identical between 
the single node and the set of individual nodes that are contained within it.  We can also 
identify a higher-level node if it is possible to make a short description that captures all 
the essential features of the nodes contained within it (Moses 2004b).  This form of 
hierarchy has been called “closed” or “nested” (Allen 2006).  We know we have a 
consistent abstraction when all nodes at a given level of the system hierarchy share 
similar attributes or interact with each other and levels above and below them in similar 
ways (Moses 2003; Allen 2006).  For example, an Air Operations Center (AOC) is a 
node that aggregates all nodes inside it into a single entity—nesting as noted above.  The 
external relationships of nodes inside the AOC to the rest of the enterprise are the same as 
the external relationships of the AOC as a single node to the rest of the enterprise.  A 
more common example is in a physical system, such as a city, where houses are nodes 
inside city blocks, but city blocks (made up of houses) are nodes inside a city, and a city 
is built up of city blocks.  In an enterprise context, this type of aggregation helps us 
identify hierarchical level (or level of abstraction).  For example, we could not reasonably 
place a tactical aircraft inside the AOC, indicating that it operates at a different level of 
hierarchy. 
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For the cases of combat air operations considered in this research, there are three 
levels of hierarchy:  strategic, operational, and tactical and three main functions that can 
be performed (or directed) across the levels:  sensing, deciding, acting.  Within the 
combat air operations enterprise, there are the headquarters node (the AOC), second 
echelon nodes such as the Air Support Operations Center (ASOC), Airborne Warning 
and Control System (AWACS) and the Airborne Command, Control and 
Communications (ABCCC) aircraft, and tactical level nodes: aircraft.  This is an example 
of a non-nested (or open) hierarchy (Allen 2006).  The design problem is to understand 
the implications of connecting these functions within and across levels of the hierarchy. 
What happens in our situation is that some nodes in an enterprise can be 
abstracted (nested) to create a hierarchical level.  At the same time, hierarchical levels 
created in this way are also part of a non-nested or open hierarchy, where higher levels 
often direct or command lower levels.  It may be possible to gather all of an air 
operations enterprise’s nodes and their relationships and then analyze the resulting 
structure as a single network.  This would provide us some useful information about the 
overall system.  By aggregating (nesting) some nodes into higher level entities removes 
non-essential detail and allows us to concentrate on issues appropriate to our concerns:  
enterprise level properties and structures that enable them. 
4.4.1.3 Flexibility, alternatives and paths 
Flexibility is about having alternative ways of delivering system level function, 
whether we are discussing theory, practice or analysis.  We have defined flexibility as the 
ability of using alternatives to handle certain changes in performance requirements with 
relative ease and in a time responsive way.  We say that the ability to respond to these 
changes is enabled by the ability to choose alternative configurations of the system’s 
parts—to have alternative sequences of steps through the system, alternative paths.78  
Therefore, the number of different alternatives (paths or sequences of steps to deliver 
                                                
78 As we noted earlier, systems engineers have used the system boundary as a demarcation point to 
distinguish flexibility from adaptability (Ross 2006).  They also use the time dimension to distinguish 
flexibility from agility (Fricke et al. 2000).  We do not make these distinctions.  We view flexibility as an 
overarching ‘-ility’, subsuming agility (flexible and fast), adaptability (flexibility over long time scales), 
robustness (maintaining function) and resilience (flexibility and robustness). 
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function or output value) can be used as a measure of flexibility.  If we represent the 
enterprise as an information processing system, the number of alternatives for processing 
information to make a decision and the number of alternatives available for action after 
making a decision (possible paths) becomes a measure of flexibility (Moses 2003; 
Mandeles 2005).79 
When military operations are represented as a networked structure and modeled 
as an input-output system, the idea of using path counting as a metric is natural.  In fact, 
the use of paths as a theoretical and metaphorical metric has precedence across a variety 
of research domains.  The ability to build reliable systems from unreliable components is 
based on the number of paths through the system (von Moore and Shannon 1956; 
Neumann 1956).  In manufacturing, one way to measure flexibility is to count the number 
of paths from input to output (Fine and Freund 1990; Sethi and Sethi 1990b; Gerwin 
1993; Jordan and Graves 1995; Graves and Tomlin 2003).  In safety engineering, 
multiple paths have been proposed as necessary to avoid loss of essential information for 
decision making (Leveson et al. 2003).  Research on future military organizations has 
identified communication paths as a critical structural consideration, as they offer 
potential for reducing uncertainty and decision making errors by enabling information 
combinations not possible via more traditional structures and operating rules (Mandeles 
2005).80  A similar approach has been applied in economics to models that emphasize the 
relationship between organizational architecture and screening functions to decision 
performance (Sah and Stiglitz 1986; Ioannides 1987).  In product design and 
manufacturing, system level analysis indicates that having more possible paths for 
equipment, product and information exchange may be helpful in understanding change 
and innovation (Brusoni and Prencipe 2006).  In the natural sciences, study of 
multiplicity of pathways in metabolic networks has exploded as a way to understand 
flexibility (and robustness) in biological systems (Papin et al. 2003). 
                                                
79 Leveson, et al. have also offered multiple information paths as a way to increase system safety by 
providing a means for adverse information to reach decision-makers (Leveson et al. 2003). 
80 Though Mandeles does not go as far as relying on von Neumann and Moore-Shannon, the connection is 
obvious. 
112 
In our model, alternative paths in a structure indicate potential flexibility.  
Flexibility of a system is related to the total number of paths from a given node (input) to 
a set of end (output) nodes, assuming that no node appears more than twice in the path.81  
A system may have many cycles, but a counted path has a limit of one on the 
representation of a cycle within it.82  To make this distinction clear, think of a decision 
loop or any feedback loop.  We could conceivably go around the loop forever, but in the 
execution of real world events, the number of cycles (especially decision cycles) is 
limited by criteria that are extrinsic to the paths, so we will limit the counting to one.83  
Unfortunately, this limitation is also optimistic on the confusion side.  If there are many 
cycles, there can be a lot of confusion.  We do not address how cycles are broken, only 
noting that in practice they are broken all the time (Arrow 1974; Wasserman and Faust 
1994).  Our focus is on structure and its relation to flexibility. 
4.4.1.4 Drawbacks of having alternatives 
In many complex systems, especially enterprises, it is difficult to know all of the 
possible situations that may arise and require attention.  This is particularly true in 
combat operations.  During Operation Desert Storm, the enterprise assembled to plan and 
control the air sorties had “so many linkages and pathways that naming, let alone tracing, 
all the connections may be impossible” (Mandeles et al. 1996, p. 81).  Mandeles, et al. 
document numerous instances of bypassing formal structures and processes in Operation 
Desert Storm as well as the difficulty of gaining precise and detailed knowledge of 
events:  “…neither planner nor General Horner, the joint force air component 
commander, knew the details of what was happening in the air campaign or how well the 
campaign was going.” (Mandeles et al. 1996, p. 82.)  Other conflicts are filled with 
                                                
81 Most complex systems have feedback loops (cycles).  If we do not limit the counting of paths with 
cycles, the number of paths is infinite.  An alternative is to count only all paths of length up to (n-1), where 
n = the total number of nodes in the system.  This counts some cycles many times, but also captures all 
possible paths that do not have a cycle (the longest non-cyclic path is one that goes through all nodes in the 
system once, from input to output, also called a Hamiltonian path) (Wasserman and Faust 1994). 
82 We limit ourselves here to one cycle because our purpose is to look at alternative ways to get from input 
output in the system.  In some contexts, such as product development or voting, assessing the dynamic 
impact of cycles is important for understanding the stability (or instability) of the system. 
83 I claim this is reasonable.  In combat air operations, or in any military operation, when decision cycles 
occur, they are usually broken by the necessity of making a decision, which exits the cycle.  In any case, 
our focus is not on cycles but on options—physical options (configurations) that can generate real action. 
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similar accounts (Davis 2004b).  Maintaining adequate control and accountability is 
critically important, but absent a coherent, well thought out architecture that recognizes 
the inherent uncertainties of combat, as we are attempting to develop here, it may be 
difficult to balance these priorities with needed flexibility. 
4.4.1.5 A simple example 
A simple example illustrates how flexibility can be represented as the number of 
paths in a system and how different types of hierarchical connections can impact 
flexibility.  Assume for simplicity that there is a single input point, the top of the 
hierarchy, and that all outputs are at the bottom.  If we begin with a simple binary tree 
with three levels below the root node, there are eight alternatives, if we count from the 
top.  If we add a single lateral connection, such as the one shown in Figure 17 between 
nodes 2 and 3, there are 8 additional paths.  If we add a vertical edge between nodes 1 
and 5, we add 2 additional paths.  This demonstrates that adding lateral connections 
increases flexibility more than a vertical connection:  one added lateral edge provides 
four times as many alternatives as the added vertical edge.84  If we measure system level 
flexibility by the number of paths per node (as a minimum, counting paths from the root 
node to the bottom nodes), architectures that have more added lateral connections than  
 
Figure 17:  Tree structure with various shortcuts 
vertical ones are more flexible, in terms of alternatives per node.  A tabular summary of 
the effects of adding single edges to a base tree is shown in Table 1.  We can also look at 
the marginal impact on flexibility as well by examining the number of paths per added 
                                                
84 Note the number of added alternatives varies with the level at which the edge is added.  This is true for 
both vertical and lateral edges. 
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edge (column 4) in Table 1).  Again, adding a lateral edge results in more additional paths 
than adding vertical edges across levels. 
Structure Paths (root to bottom) 
Increase 
above base 
Paths/edge 
Base 8 - 0.57 
Add edge (2,3) 16 8 1.06 
Add edge (1,5) 10 2 0.625 
Add edge (1,12) 9 1 0.6 
Table 1 Number of added paths to a tree with shortcuts (from Figure 17) 
There are many issues surrounding the value of alternative paths in a particular 
architecture.  Some of the new alternatives are longer paths, implying higher coordination 
costs or more time to execute than purely tree-like paths.  These are important factors and 
are addressed by other studies (Kometer’s is one).  Our focus is on the relationship 
between these extra interactions and system level flexibility.  As we noted in the 
beginning of Chapter 2, a major impediment to gaining cooperation, especially between 
the Air Force and ground forces, is a lack of appreciation for flexibility at multiple levels 
of combat, not just the geographic flexibility inherent in the technology of air power. 
4.4.2 Operational Model: Sense-Decide-Act  
Many models of information-enabled combat operations rely on variations of 
three basic functions:  sensing, deciding and acting.  The network-centric warfare 
operational concept is based on using widely shared sensor information to generate a 
common situational awareness.  This shared awareness enables a different command and 
control process model, one that relies on bottom-up organization (self-synchronization).  
In this model sensors feed information to decision-makers who, in turn, direct shooters.  
A visual depiction of the Network Centric Warfare (NCW) model is in Figure 18,  
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Figure 18:  Network Centric Warfare model 
showing a sequential (hierarchical) relationship from sensing to shooting.85  The NCW 
model does not address hierarchical interactions nor provide a hierarchical view of 
military operations or command.  Its focus is on tactical level engagements and almost 
total empowerment of tactical level forces to accomplish broadly defined missions under 
“carefully crafted rules of engagement” (Cebrowski and Garstka 1998).  It does not 
address the question of the type of enterprise needed to coordinate across geographically 
dispersed theater organizations and among multiple tactical units; it implicitly assumes a 
“flat” structure (Alberts and Hayes 2003; Kometer 2005; Scott 2006). 
 
Figure 19:  Hierarchical representation of NCW 
The main focus of NCW is at the tactical level of combat and is specifically 
aimed at shortening the sense-to-act sequence via robust information sharing and 
collaboration.  The role of upper command levels is not clearly addressed.  A hierarchical 
perspective of the NCW model is shown in Figure 19.  The core NCW concept is bottom-
                                                
85 Graphic is taken from a briefing titled “Network Centric Warfare, Briefing to Naval War College”, by 
Mr. John Garstka, Joint Staff/Directorate for C4 Systems, dated 6 Dec. 2000. 
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up organization of combat actions, with little top down direction.  This is represented by 
the many lateral (green) connections among tactical level units and the dashed command 
connections (red) from upper levels of the enterprise. 
The NCW model is similar to Boyd’s Observe-Orient-Decide-Act (OODA) 
model.86  Boyd’s model aims to represent and understand the dynamics of competition in 
air-to-air combat.  A diagram of the OODA loop is shown in Figure 20.  The main idea 
behind the OODA loop is to understand what is necessary to sense and respond faster 
than an adversary.  This is one aspect of flexibility as we have defined it, but is only 
 
Figure 20:  Boyd’s OODA Loop 
aimed at one level of hierarchy at a time.  Though the OODA loop model has been 
applied to other competitive situations, such as business strategy, it is silent on issues of 
structure—how differing levels of effectiveness might be achieved by different 
structures—it does not discuss the implications of hierarchical organization. 
We can examine the application of OODA loops within a hierarchy by a visual 
representation, such as that shown in  
Figure 21.  In the diagram, we have placed the OODA model on top of each node 
that can sense and process information and then make a decision.  While we can 
conceptually treat the entire enterprise, or subsets of it that consist of more than one node, 
as a single entity that has an OODA loop, the basic model does not help us with the 
                                                
86 Col John Boyd was a U.S. Air Force fighter pilot who has acquired legendary status as strategic thinker, 
brilliant tactician and innovator.  A good biography is Coram’s Boyd: The Fighter Pilot Who Changed the 
Art of War (Coram 2002). 
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fundamental problem, which is understanding how individual OODA loops interact 
impact higher level OODA loops.  Stated slightly differently, each stage in an individual 
OODA loop can be connected to another stage in a separate OODA loop.  We have no 
way to understand the implications of this using Boyd’s model.  While strategic or 
operational level OODA loops can be defined, there is no  
 
Figure 21:  OODA loops in a hierarchy 
framework for examining the impact of connecting several of them together, each 
operating at a different level of abstraction.87 
 A third model of combat is the Information Age Combat Model (IACM).  This 
model aims to highlight structure, process and evolutionary dynamics of combat 
simultaneously by leveraging network-theoretic constructs.  A two-sided model, shown in 
Figure 22, it consists of sensors (S), deciders (D), influencers (I) and targets (T) (Cares 
2004).  The IACM contains the same basic functions as other combat models, sensors 
provide information to decision nodes and deciders provide direction to influencers 
(usually, but not always, weapons).  Influencers act on targets (not necessarily in a 
destructive manner), which are sensed by sensors, completing a loop that starts the basic 
model sequence over again.  Because it explicitly includes targets, this model can  
                                                
87 We must be clear on this point:  the extent of our investigation is to understand the impact of architecture 
on flexibility at the enterprise level.  We are not going to address impacts at the level of individual or even 
collective OODA loops. 
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Figure 22:  Information Age Combat Model 
be used to model two-sided combat.  The IACM is silent on issues of coordination and 
control—the “decide” portion of the model–how different decision nodes address issues 
of coordination or resource allocation.  It is also explicitly “flat”—there is no hierarchy in 
the model, though a fully developed example would probably show clustering of 
connections.88  The IACM’s value is found in the ability to be specific about, and explore 
in more detail, complex combat-related issues that the OODA and NCW models cannot.  
This model allows issues such as the structural and dynamic implications of enabling 
wide access to sensor information to be explored with a more computationally oriented 
approach explicitly amenable to network theoretic tools. 
We can also examine how the IACM relates to our hierarchical framework.  The 
IACM aims for a comprehensive model of combat processes, dynamics, structure and 
evolution.  A more complete representation than that shown in Figure 22 is shown in 
Figure 23.  The IACM does not address hierarchical relationships among decision 
makers, nor does it address issues such as skipping over layers of decision makers.  The 
IACM  
                                                
88 Cares discusses the concept of autocatalysis enabled by certain network structures (that include 
clustering) and the benefits that may accrue from it (Jain and Krishna 1998; Cares 2004). 
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Figure 23:  More detailed IACM 
also addresses interactions that command (move) sensors, as well as other information 
flows and relationships related to combat.  Our goals are focused on flexibility (as we 
have already specified).  Also, though some sensors are primarily designed for strategic 
purposes and some for operational purposes, with increasing information connectivity, 
these distinctions are beginning to blur.  The same is true for many influencers in the 
IACM.  We examine the hierarchical relationship among the controlling aspect of the 
system—the decision nodes.  A simplified example of how the IACM looks in a 
hierarchical representation is in (Figure 24).  Figure 24 does not represent adversary 
targets (red) in Figure 23, nor does it depict all of the possible information flows. 
 
Figure 24:  Hierarchical representation of IACM 
All of these models are information processing perspectives of operations.  
Information from the environment comes into the system, is processed in some manner, 
120 
and an action is chosen and executed.  Once the action impacts the environment, the 
process repeats.  None of these models addresses the issue of hierarchy, a necessity if we 
are to honestly address operational issues, such as how to design specific properties into 
our social and technical systems and how to “solve” the complex and interdependent 
problems that must be addressed by a modern enterprise.   
We simplify these information-processing perspectives to create a Sense-Decide-
Act model.  In this model, the environment is sensed by the enterprise, information is 
processed, a decision is made and action chosen is then carried out.  As events unfold 
over time, the process is repeated, once the environment has “processed” or responded to 
the action by the enterprise.  The basic visualization of the model is shown in Figure 25 
and a summary of the models at Table 2.89  
 
Figure 25:  Sense-Decide-Act model 
Model  NCW OODA IACM SDA 
Input Sensor grid Observe-Orient Sensor Sense 
                                                
89 This is a very general model of systems, especially information processing systems.  It has been used as a 
model for the brain, for biological organisms and for organizations (Thompson 1967; Holland 1996).  It is 
also a simplification used in robotics (Brooks 1987b). 
121 
Processing Command-control grid Decide Decider Decide 
Output Weapons grid Act Influencer Act 
External   Target Environment 
Table 2:  Summary of various models of combat operations 
If we expand the representation in Figure 25 and show a more complex 
representation of the decision structure, we can begin to appreciate the complexities of 
operational decisions at multiple levels of abstraction and hierarchy. Figure 26 shows a 
decision hierarchy containing a single command node (white circle) and non-command  
 
Figure 26:  Hierarchy with one command node 
nodes (black circles).  For simplicity, we show only a generic sensor box representing 
possible sensor inputs to the command node.  In this representation, the command node 
can sense the environment and direct lower level nodes to take appropriate actions that 
result in an interaction with the environment through the “action nodes” at the bottom of 
the diagram.  Nodes at each level of command have different priorities based on the 
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capabilities at their disposal (tactical level nodes (shown as black circles)), area of 
responsibility and associated time horizon.  If we expand the ability to access sensor 
information to lower levels of hierarchy, the commander (node 1) can authorize lower 
level nodes (nodes 2 and 3 in Figure 27) to make decisions.  But at the same time, these  
 
Figure 27:  Hierarchy with two levels of command 
lower level nodes will have different time and space horizons (operational vs. strategic, 
(i.e., shorter vs. longer in time and smaller vs. larger in geography)) than the command 
node, #1.  In addition, if nodes 2 and 3 are decomposed by function (e.g., air vs. ground), 
their decision criteria are going to diverge from each other as well as from the overall 
commander, increasing the difficulty of coordinated action on and in the environment.  
We can further increase the sensing distribution through the hierarchy and create another 
level of command nodes, as shown in Figure 28.  Inspection of the diagram shows us 
further potential divergence of priorities, interests and capabilities. 
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Figure 28:  Three levels of command decision-making 
Our model of enterprise structure is grounded in a synthesis of theory that views 
complex systems as naturally hierarchical.  Hierarchy and abstraction are useful in 
managing complexity because humans have limited cognitive and physical resources, 
whether operational, technical or social (Simon 1996).  But pure hierarchical 
decomposition—a tree structure—is not sufficient to help us with the problems we aim to 
address.  When problems are complex, strict tree hierarchies can become exponentially 
large, cumbersome and inflexible.  In addition, natural interdependencies in the system 
may preclude an effective tree-like decomposition, even if only for analytical purposes; 
as discussed in section 4.4.1.4, interactions driven by the need to address unforeseen 
situations can create structures that are not trees. 
One solution to this challenge is layering and lateral interactions, as we discussed 
earlier.  Layering is a way to manage the challenge of complexity, to separate concerns in 
the design and development of systems (Parnas 1972; Eppinger 2003; Moses 2003; 
Yassine et al. 2003; Yassine Ali et al. 2003).  Though interaction details within levels can 
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be complex, specific attention to managing interactions within system levels as well as 
between them can improve overall organization performance in practice (Carpenter 1995; 
Sosa et al. 2004; Roberts 2006).  For example, a comparison of Army-Air Force structure 
to the Marine Corps’ structure in Operation Iraqi Freedom showed the Marine’s to have 
more interactions at low command levels (more complex) compared to the Army-Air 
Force side (Roberts 2006).  Because of these lateral interactions on the Marine side, 
aircraft were managed more efficiently.  On the Army-Air Force side, there were robust 
lateral interactions at higher levels, but fewer at lower tactical levels.  This resulted in 
overload of the higher headquarters and inefficient employment of aircraft.90  We will 
discuss this in more detail in our case analysis in Chapter 5. 
We can show in a simple hierarchical diagram how lateral interactions can 
address the issues of diverging interests as the hierarchy gets deeper as well as how more  
  
Figure 29:  Impact of lateral interactions 
                                                
90 This is a relative comparison between the Marine’s and the Army’s methods.  Operation Iraqi Freedom 
was notable for its overall highly flexible and effective use of air and ground power together (Kirkpatrick 
2004).  We will discuss Army-AF air power operations in Chapter 4 
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paths from sensing sources (input) to action nodes (output) are created by them.  
This is shown in   
Figure 29, where we have added a lateral interaction between nodes 2 and 3.  Here we 
can see how the addition of a lateral interaction can help reduce divergence of interests 
by enabling both nodes to share understanding and perception of the information 
provided by the sensing system at the top of the diagram.  We can also see how a sense-
decide-act path can be created by passing information, by collaboration and by direction. 
Few studies or models look at enterprises—groups of discrete organizations 
bound together by intersecting and sometimes conflicting interests.  Fewer still have 
proposed frameworks that can holistically grapple with hierarchical differences and 
system level flexibility—most models are “flat”.  Moses has proposed some general 
concepts to address this deficiency, which we use as a foundation for our architectural 
framework and model (Moses 2003; Moses 2004a).  
4.4.3 Structural baseline:  Representation of the system as nodes and 
edges 
4.4.3.1 Defining connections and relationships 
To specify a model that emphasizes laterality, we need to define the structural 
orientation of interactions among the components of the enterprise.  There are two broad 
classes of connections in a hierarchy, vertical and lateral.  There are two types of vertical 
connections in addition to the parent-child connections in the base tree structure:  parent-
grandparent connections and aunt-uncle connections.   
4.4.3.2 Vertical 
Vertical connections in a tree structure are parent-child relations (Figure 30).  
Vertical connections in information or social systems generally involve commands or 
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Figure 30:  Tree structure; parent-child relationships 
directions between parent and child, an exchange of information in either direction, or 
sometimes an attempt at negotiation or bargaining.  Normally a node in a tree has only 
one parent at any moment in time, but parents can shift over time, especially in 
operational situations (Figure 31).  For example, if a combat aircraft has different 
command authorities as it transits from its base to its assigned mission potential 
flexibility is increased:  the mission assignment may be adjusted by an appropriate  
 
Figure 31:  Examples of parents shifting over time 
authority as the aircraft transits to its assignment.  For example, in Figure 31 node 10 has 
shifted parents from node 5 to node 4 and node 6 has shifted parents from node 3 to 2.   
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Grandparent and aunt-uncle connections can also exist in a hierarchical structure.  
Grandparent connections arise when a node skips intermediate levels to interact directly 
with nodes that are more than one level away in hierarchy.  Some grandparent  
 
Figure 32:  Grandparent connections 
connections are shown in blue in Figure 32 (the connection between node 1 and 12 is 
technically a great-grandparent connection). 
Complications arise when a node has two or more input nodes (parent, uncle, 
grandparent) that can give it orders/direction at about the same time.91  This can cause 
confusion over the meaning or intent of the direction in at least three ways.  First, 
conflicting direction may be given.  Second, if interactions skip a level (a level violation), 
such as a grandparent or great-uncle connection directing action) the receiver may 
misunderstand the meaning of the direction, or the sender may misunderstand the 
capability of the receiver or have incomplete information about the situation of the 
receiver.  Third, an ongoing operation may be disrupted by a higher-level node if it re-
directs resources or mission assignments with inadequate knowledge of the tactical 
situation.  Aunt-uncle connections are shown in blue in Figure 33.  Non-vertical 
connections: lateral vs. vertical structures.  
                                                
91 Note that, in an environment of ubiquitous communication, the potential for this situation to exist is high.  
This places a premium on the type of planning that creates the depth of command advocated by Kometer. 
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Figure 33:  Aunt-uncle connections 
An uncle connection need not be fully hierarchical in nature—in many 
operational cases, uncle connections are only information passing channels.92  However, 
if an uncle connection exerts directive authority it may cause legitimate confusion over 
mission tasking or orders. 
Brother-sister/cousin connections are those that connect nodes at the same layer 
of hierarchy.  We call these lateral connections.  They mainly involve information 
exchange, coordination, and collaboration, and occur between peers—nodes at the same 
layer of hierarchy.  Lateral (cousin) connections are shown in Figure 34.  Coordination 
and alignment attempts are enabled by the structure but the motivating force for these 
attempts is a feature of nodes.  While node behavior is important, it is not our focus.  Our 
primary interest is in understanding how structural relationships enable flexibility.  
                                                
92 This was a dominant theme in the reporting of Operation Desert Storm, both in press and in formal 
analysis by the Gulf War Air Power Survey (GWAPS).  Extensive informal connections across multiple 
levels of hierarchy were reported (Atkinson 1993b; Cohen 1993; Mandeles et al. 1996)).  These 
connections can serve as van Creveld’s “directed telescope” as envisioned by Kometer (see discussion in 
Chapter 2), but for multiple higher-level decision-makers, not necessarily those in the operational 
enterprise. 
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Figure 34:  Cousin (lateral) connections 
4.4.3.3 Laterality 
We define laterality as the ratio of the number of lateral connections to the total 
number of connections in a system.  When the laterality of a system is zero it is a tree, 
when it is one it is essentially a one layer (flat), fully connected network, with no 
hierarchy.  Most systems of interest have laterality measures between 0 and 1.  We define 
a layer as a horizontal division of a system or organization according to criteria deemed 
operationally relevant.  A fully connected single layer by itself is called a network.93  In 
this approach, layer identification is determined by information imposed on the system by 
virtue of design knowledge, intent or analysis that enables the identification of a 
consistent abstraction that defines a set of nodes.  This makes abstraction a key factor in 
our analysis, very similar to its importance in information system design.  In software, 
middleware is often used to connect nodes to a layer and thereby to other nodes 
connected to the same layer (serving as a lateral connection).  In organizations, laterality 
arises when decision authority or other value added interactions occur across formal 
organization boundaries at the same hierarchical level (Chisholm 1989; Galbraith 1993; 
Mandeles et al. 1996).  Though there are many dimensions along which to classify layers, 
usually one dimension is more significant than others, such as seniority, rank or perhaps, 
                                                
93 Network as a term can be used very generically; technically a hierarchical tree is network.  Here, we 
consider network as it tends to be used in the organizational forms literature, which tends to place networks 
as a new form along with markets and bureaucracies (Powell 1990; Romanelli 1991). 
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operational level, such as strategic, tactical or operational.  This last dimension is what 
we emphasize in our model of combat operations. 
4.4.4 Scenario examples 
We will present an illustration of the operational implications of different 
architectures using two simple scenarios.  Each will provide a general discussion of the 
overall structure of the enterprise and the implications of these structures in terms of 
system properties and operational effectiveness. 
4.4.5 Top-down tree-like architecture with no laterality between units  
We start with a simple hierarchical tree structured enterprise, and employ it in a 
complex operational situation.  Assume in this case that the two main components of a 
fighting force are separated operationally.  There is coordination, but it is minimal, 
formally arranged and not collaborative.  This can be represented by a simple tree 
structure, where there is a single supervisor and two subordinates, each conducting their 
own operations.  Operating this way requires separation of forces in time and space for 
safety reasons, in both planning and operations.  When separation is not possible, the 
supervisory node coordinates operations.  This situation is shown in Figure 35 
 
Figure 35:  Tree Hierarchy—Physical separation of operations 
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This illustrates the limited flexibility of a strict tree-like structure.  The benefits of 
this structure are that it is simple and efficient from the perspective of information 
transmission and control; information flows in well-defined ways.  Responsibilities and 
accountabilities are easily defined and conflicts easily resolved.  From the commander’s 
perspective, alignment is simple as well—everyone follows directions from the top.  
There is little uncertainty inside the enterprise about roles, resources, overall strategy, 
procedures, etc.  
The challenge comes when the environment begins to change and coordination 
requirements increase beyond the capacity of the supervisor (commander).  Limited 
communication paths of the tree create an inability to process information from the 
environment (fewer information flow paths), which results in a limitation on the number 
of alternative force arrangements possible.  The limited ability to reconfigure interactions 
limits flexibility.  What was efficient in the previous circumstance becomes inefficient—
no matter how much effort is exerted, it is unlikely that effective action can be taken.  
The result in a situation like this is that people will work around the architecture (work 
around the system), creating new patterns of interaction (Chisholm 1989; Mandeles et al. 
1996).  Under the right circumstances, these new patterns (new structure) can create a 
cascade of problems, causing accidents or other types of unexpected behavior.  Kometer 
names this phenomenon “organizational drift.”  Achieving flexibility in this way is a 
problem because enterprise leadership no longer has control over the structure of the 
enterprise.94  Strategic coherence can be impeded and likelihood of accidents may 
increase, both of which lead to decreased effectiveness and increased inefficiency. 
4.4.6 Layered hierarchical architecture with lateral interactions at 
multiple levels 
If we have an enterprise similar to the last example, but that is laterally connected 
at one or more subordinate levels, the ability to respond better to uncertainty and 
changing external requirements can be improved.  If the environment is complex or 
changing rapidly, the ability to coordinate at lower levels enables better responsiveness—
                                                
94 This effect can be analogized to the complex systems concept of Highly Optimized Tolerance (HOT) 
(Doyle et al. 2005). 
132 
effectiveness can increase (Galbraith 1993; Joyce et al. 1997).  Not all information must 
go to the top for decision, not all disputes over possible responses require top-level 
arbitration.  This enables resources available at lower levels to be recombined faster—
flexibility goes up.  This increase in effectiveness is accompanied by an increase in 
efficiency, since there is a higher probability of generating an effective response (either 
responding before the environment changes again or responding with an action that is 
more likely to be relevant to the situation rather than irrelevant due to incomplete or 
inaccurate information).  In Figure 36, sensing information is available at three levels  
 
Figure 36:  Lateral hierarchy with multiple levels of command 
(white nodes).  We can examine this diagram and notionally compare how adding lateral 
connections can enhance flexibility.  To do this we will look at the average number and 
length of sequences from a sensor input location to one of the three action nodes at the 
bottom that interact with the environment.95  If node 1 is the originator of an action, there 
are 24 possible sequences (paths) through which the decision must pass to get to an 
appropriate action node.  The average length of these paths is 4.7 steps.  If we allow 
                                                
95 Our assumption here is that nodes 9, 11 and 13 are the only appropriate nodes for action based on the 
sensor information. 
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nodes lower in the hierarchy to act (node 4 for example), there are fewer alternatives, but 
the path length is only about half as long, indicating a faster response time.  A summary 
of the number of paths and paths lengths is given in Table 3. 
Level Node # paths Avg. path length 
1 1 24 4.7 
2 2 12 3.7 
2 3 12 3.7 
3 4 3 2.7 
3 5 3 2.7 
3 6 3 2.3 
3 7 3 3 
Table 3:  Summary of available paths and path lengths 
Figure 36 is reproduced in (Figure 37), showing two possible sense-to-act sequences, 
providing a visual demonstration of the differences in time responsiveness (represented 
by path length).  The path from sensor  
 
Figure 37: Lateral connections at lower levels enable shorter sense-to-act paths 
input through node 7 is only two steps, with a peer-to-peer interaction, instead of the path 
through node 1, which is three steps, through hierarchical connections. 
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Figure 37 can also show us how the architecture can be flexible to unknown 
circumstances.  For example, when sensor input from the environment to decision node 4 
requires action, node 4 does not have the best capability.  In this case, the lateral 
connection between node 4 and node 6 can enable the use of the action node capability 
directed by node 12.  This is shown in Figure 38 with the previous paths from Figure 37 
deemphasized by coloring them gray.  
 
Figure 38:  Use of alternate paths 
 We can also take another view.  With lateral interactions, the complexity of 
managing the enterprise increases and efficiency decreases.  There are more interactions 
and more autonomy among the members of the enterprise.  So to keep the chances of 
error from increasing, more attention must be paid to the rules governing interactions 
among subordinates, more training and exercises must be conducted to practice using 
these rules.  The lateral architecture is more complex, both structurally and operationally.  
It can also be viewed as inefficient or ambiguous when accountability is important.  Not 
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all possible information flow channels or resource combinations will be needed all the 
time.  So there is investment that may not be fully employed all the time.   
4.4.7 Trade-offs 
Our net assessment so far is that lateral architectures can be beneficial in complex 
environments.  They enable a higher level of increased flexibility compared to other 
means of gaining flexibility; the increased flexibility comes at increased cost, but this 
cost can be mitigated over time by learning (Arrow 1962a).  The complexity cost of 
managing a lateral architecture can also be mitigated by taking account of the benefits it 
provides in comparison to the opportunity cost of a less complex solution.  An efficient 
system that cannot respond to a changing environment is not very useful— it becomes a 
wasted resource.  Inefficiencies that arise from implementation of a lateral architecture 
can be addressed by refinement of the architecture, learning and training, with evaluation 
of flexible architectures clearly tied to the operational environment.  We will examine 
these trade-offs in more detail in Chapter 6. 
4.5 Summary and Discussion 
Flexibility is an operational imperative at multiple levels of enterprise activity, 
from strategic to tactical.  Enterprises have been identified as a new form organizational 
form, or at least a new level of organizational analysis.  We know little about how to 
explicitly design enterprise architectures so that they can be pro-actively guided or 
managed with respect to desired properties such as flexibility.  Our goal is to apply 
concepts from technical systems architecture and complex systems to extend existing 
organization theory and to build a simple model of enterprises with a framework in which 
to conduct architectural analysis.  Our model rests on the idea of hierarchical abstraction 
and on the goal of explicitly designing interactions in the enterprise that are usually 
treated as informal or ad hoc.   
Many concepts and theories of complex systems break them down hierarchically, 
either according to a “scale” of description or by decomposition into parts (Simon 1962; 
Bar-Yam 1997).  Most architecture concepts in engineering (outside of computer 
science), do not address hierarchical abstractions well, except in the area of systems 
integration (usually organizations that perform systems integration).  These limitations 
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rest on the idea of minimizing design challenges in physical systems and on the 
observation that for many physical systems, interactions introduce complexities that can 
detract from overall performance or function delivery.  In general, information systems, 
while suffering from these same problems, do not suffer them with the same impact on 
performance as in other engineered systems.  The ability to separate interactions more 
cleanly and to build abstractions that can simplify complex lower level problems is a key 
distinguishing feature of information systems and the main parallel to operational 
enterprise issues.  We also recognize that Simon's idealized model of “near 
decomposability” does not recognize all of the interactions in an organization (and by 
extension, an enterprise).  Explicit recognition of lateral interactions and of layered 
structures may add a helpful degree of richness to Simon’s construct. 
We combine layered architectures from computer science with the observation 
that organization science typically treats cross boundary interactions as “unprogrammed” 
or informal.  This allows us to take the perspective that we can design enterprise 
architectures to have specific, desired properties by explicit design of interactions that 
will allow uncertainty to be handled by the formal structure.  Lateral and layered 
interactions are enablers of flexibility that, when placed in an overall hierarchical 
structure, allow us to balance flexibility with the need for stability and control.  Our 
emphasis is on the operational side of enterprise architecture—multiple organizations and 
sub-organizations working together to achieve specific outcomes.  Kometer’s 2005 
analysis of combat air operations and his recommended concepts provide a starting point 
for exploration of this framework.  Our architectural analysis of Kometer’s cases is 
presented in Chapter 5. 
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Chapter 5  
Architectural analysis of the Combat Air Operation System (CAOS) 
5.0 Introduction 
In this chapter, we examine the conflicts that Kometer used in his analysis.  
Rather than teasing out the implications of constraints on behavior and potential outcome, 
we examine these conflicts from the perspective of system level architecture.  We do not 
mean to imply that details—that understanding how various constraints and orders are 
translated to action and the implications for combat outcomes—is not important.  Quite 
the contrary.  We feel that, in addition to understanding how constraints effect behavior 
and outcomes, it is important to have an understanding of how structure effects overall 
system properties and that properties are a critical enabler to crafting and enabling 
desired outcomes.  
Increased collaboration and cooperation among the military services is a key goal 
of the Department of Defense (DoD).  Using information technology to enable this 
cooperation and collaboration is a central tenet of the Department’s Network Centric 
Warfare concept, which aims to make military forces both more efficient and more 
effective in an environment of increasing uncertainty and tighter resource constraints.  A 
desire to transform the Department of Defense by leveraging advanced technology in 
conjunction with new concepts of operation helps explain Secretary of Defense 
Rumsfeld’s push to use a smaller ground force when planning Operation Iraqi Freedom 
in 2002-2003 than was used in Operation Desert Storm (Franks 2004, p. 135; Woodward 
2004; Feith 2008).96  Missing from most accounts and analysis of efforts to increase 
                                                
96 The extent to which that Secretary Rumsfeld may have pushed his commander, Gen. Franks, on this 
point is debatable.  There were many political and strategic considerations driving the development of the 
second Iraq war plan.  Feith’s account in War and Decision notes that Rumsfeld cautioned against the 
overwhelming force used in Desert Storm as “remarkably wasteful”.  Feith also notes that Franks’ 
emphasis as the plan developed was on surprise (due to strategic considerations, both military and 
diplomatic), which argued against a long build up of a large force.  Woodward’s account in Plan of Attack, 
chronicles the overall evolution of the Iraq War plan, OPLAN 1003, from the “on the shelf” version of 
1998 to the implemented war plan of March 2003.  The main theme running through Woodward’s account 
is the continual iteration of the plan to meet the strategic intent of the President, as shaped and translated by 
Rumsfeld, which included both internal and external political constraints.  Franks’ own account emphasizes 
his tendency, throughout his career, to innovate with new ways of operating and the overall goal of 
strategic surprise that shaped the plan. 
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enterprise flexibility is an appreciation for the relationship between architecture and more 
effective and efficient operations.  Simply cutting the ground force and relying on 
advanced technology in Operation Iraqi Freedom is insufficient; effectiveness of the 
force is, at least in part, a function of architecture. 
Most information-age operational concepts do not address the role of structure 
well and often explicitly de-emphasize the role of hierarchy, relying instead on notions of 
extreme decentralization:  bottom-up, self-organizing combat (Cebrowski and Garstka 
1998; Alberts et al. 1999).  Amplifying on the prevalent theme of decentralization, “edge 
organizations” have been proposed as a major organizational form for network-centric 
operations (Alberts and Hayes 2003).  In this form of organization, all actors are able to 
make well-informed and “skilled” decisions; little decision or authority hierarchy is 
implied.  From a hierarchical perspective, the organization is “flat”; from an information 
access perspective, it is “flat” as well.  In edge organizations, all actors and all 
organizations have equal access to all possible (and relevant) information.97  While 
delegation of decisions to the lowest practical hierarchical level may be a good idea in 
many complex battle situations, there are theoretical, practical and sometimes legal 
problems with this type of structure (Kometer 2005; Scott 2006).  The Network-Centric 
Warfare focus on bottom-up organization may be useful for tactical level activities, but it 
is unclear how this concept scales to higher levels of operations—how numerous tactical 
level activities can or should be coordinated to achieve operational level goals and 
strategic ends in an information-rich environment. 
In short, there is little to guide military commanders and other decision makers in 
design, management and evolution of information-age organizations.  Enrichment of 
Kometer’s process-oriented case studies using an architectural perspective can help us 
with the challenge of designing flexible military organizations.  This research aims to 
develop a more formal description and analysis of emerging trends toward information-
intensive military operations. 
                                                
97 While edge organizations lack a concrete definition, the characteristics they are deemed to hold imply 
this general characterization.  For a thorough review and critique of the concept, please see (Scott 2006). 
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This chapter serves two purposes.  The first is to enrich Kometer’s analysis by 
connecting his empirical observations with an architectural perspective of combat air 
operations and the overall warfighting system.  The architectural transformation of U.S. 
military operational forces between 1991 and 2003 is highlighted in Table 5.  The second 
is to examine the connection between structure, flexibility and laterality in these case 
examples.  Focusing on architecture enables us to highlight more precisely the tradeoffs 
of different architectural approaches to military command and control in the information 
age.  We will examine tradeoffs in Chapter 6.   
5.1 Architectural analysis 
Kometer is concerned with the nature of interactions among different components 
of the Combat Air Operation System (CAOS).98  He addresses hierarchy from the 
perspective of how authority relationships impact individual or organizational behavior—
the characteristics of nodes in the system.  Kometer’s aim is to understand practice and 
process—how to do things, concluding that it is important to “make decisions about who 
makes decisions.”  This is another way of saying “pay attention to the design of the 
enterprise” and he provides two tools with which to do this:  a general formula for 
command and control and his depth of command concept.   
Our focus is on architecture design of flexibility in enterprises.  This chapter 
applies the framework developed in Chapter 4 to examine its potential utility for design.  
We know that hierarchical features of complex systems and lateral interactions are one 
key to understanding system properties in general and flexibility in particular (Galbraith 
1993; Simon 1996; Moses 2003).  As reviewed in Chapter 3, Kometer looked at four 
conflicts from five different perspectives, integrating these individual views to assess air 
power command and control.  Our analysis will examine each conflict once, looking at 
hierarchical structure, lateral interactions and how they relate to, or impact, flexibility.  
By highlighting this single dimension of combat air operations, architecture, we aim to 
illuminate the relationship between laterality, flexibility and layered architectures. 
                                                
98 “CAOS” is a term coined by Kometer to describe the totality of people, organizations, institutions, 
systems and relationships involved in planning and executing the application of combat air power.  It 
includes the Air Operations Center (AOC). 
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Architectural analysis and model building of this type must have three 
components: 
1. Identification of the architecture rules and the connection of these rules to the 
resulting structure.  Kometer established a clear and compelling connection 
between political constraints (strategic level architecture rules) and the nature of 
command relationships.  Missing from his analysis is a clear theoretical 
foundation that can help generalize his findings.  This development was presented 
in Chapter 4. 
2. An appropriate abstraction of the system that represents its structure in a way that 
(a) highlights flexibility in an operationally relevant way and (b) enables us to 
measure it.99 
3. Extraction of enterprise structure from data (Kometer’s case analysis).100  The 
ability to capture structure in detail at the scale of joint military enterprises is 
difficult.  But the nature of Kometer’s analysis, supplemented by other reports and 
data sources, helps ensure that the overall patterns and broad constants of the 
system’s structure and performance can be captured.101  It is difficult to capture 
the totality of interactions in a system such as this, unless it happens to be fully 
instrumented.  Several inquiries to organizations that might have such data 
revealed that it does not exist.  One analyst from the 1994 Gulf War Air Power 
Survey made this comment:  “...I started trying to count the informal and lateral 
links between people and organizations in theater and between theater and [the 
Continental U.S.].  I gave up because it was very difficult to count and the number 
was very high.  I'm sure I remarked in the Survey that the number of formal 
lateral (i.e., specified roles and relationships) and informal connections was (a) 
very high, (b) very difficult to trace, and (c) these connections saved the formal 
                                                
99 Koopman, Search and Screening, p. 251-252; Watts, Small Worlds, 42-44.  Wolfram, A New Kind of 
Science, p. 991-992. 
100 See Krepinevich for a discussion of the difficulties in gaining a system level appreciation of events and 
outcomes in recent conflicts (CSBA report:  “Operation Iraqi Freedom: A First Blush Assessment”).  This 
is a separate, but closely related, issue to the challenges of effective architectural analysis of complex 
enterprises. 
101 Morse and Kimball, p. 38. 
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organization conducting the air campaign…the JFACC--from collapse by 
providing timely information, analysis, and instructions” (Mandeles 2006).  In 
2003, a detailed process analysis of time-sensitive targeting in Operation 
Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, sponsored by Air Combat Command, noted a 
similar problem.  Timing data on engagement decisions was not available, so 
process timelines, as well as judgments about engagement effectiveness, had to be 
estimated (LaVella 2003).102 
We review Kometer’s analysis at different levels for each case.  First, we look at 
the operational level of interactions among the services (Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine 
Corps); second, specific engagements at the tactical level will be examined, which 
provides a mostly air-power perspective.  The structure of each example will be analyzed 
in order to discern trends over time and to illuminate the connection between architecture 
and flexibility.103  We classify architectures according to where in the hierarchy we see 
lateral connections by using a simple notation of L1, L2 or L3 to denote strategic, 
operational or tactical level laterality. 
5.2 Summary of Kometer’s main ideas and cases 
Kometer aimed to gain a more fundamental understanding of command of air 
power and the drivers of operational outcomes than most previous air-power research 
(Kometer 2005).  He looked at command and control of combat air power through five 
different lenses (chapter numbers listed below are from Kometer’s thesis): 
1. Control from the strategic level (Chapter 4) 
2. Interactions inside the Combat Air Operations System (CAOS) (Chapter 5) 
                                                
102 The issue of gathering relevant data on operational processes is significant, if we are to attempt more 
extensive investigation of enterprise architectures.  The fact that a detailed study of a significant Air Force 
process was hampered by lack of data is a strong indication that there is poor understanding or appreciation 
for the important features of the time-sensitive-targeting process. 
103 We will also note the implications for sensor information access.  Since laterality-enabled flexibility is 
dependent upon access to information, a desired enterprise architecture (or a class of enterprise 
architectures) can have implications for design of technical system architectures.  We must reiterate that, 
for the purposes of our analysis our strong assumption is that information access is ubiquitous—
information relevant to operations is widely available and widely shared.  Where information asymmetries 
exist, they relate to an inability to transmit information in its full richness (we analogize this to the enduring 
nature of friction in combat discussed by (Watts 2004)). 
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3. Technical ability to gather and process information at a central point (Chapter 6) 
4. Decision making inside the command and control loop (Chapter 7) 
5. Impact of distributed and dispersed command and control functions (Chapters 8 
and 9) 
Kometer’s main observation and argument is that Air Force command and 
control doctrine is imprecise and does not adequately recognize some recurring lessons of 
history.  Specifically, he identifies a disconnect between preferred command and control 
methods for air power and the type of command and control necessary for effective air-
ground operations.  This disconnect is troublesome because of a trend toward increased 
emphasis on these types of operations in recent conflicts, the counter-insurgency 
campaign in Iraq in particular.  This is a trend noted in by other analysts as well 
(Lambeth 2000b; Haave and Haun 2003).  He recognizes the tension in trying to achieve 
optimal command and control relationships for different air power missions and the need 
to be able to shift control modes as the situation requires--flexibility.  Kometer’s main 
recommendation is to address this tension by developing depth of command, the ability to 
move decision-making to the lowest practical level in the hierarchy, depending on risk 
considerations.  Kometer’s method for achieving depth of command is through a “general 
formula” for command and control.104  This general formula specifies a process whereby 
a commander’s strategy is developed into detailed operational plans through multiple 
iterations across and within levels of the organization, often down to tactical level unit 
plans, creating depth of command by virtue of working through the planning process 
before combat starts.  Together, depth of command and the general formula provide a 
means to design flexibility into the enterprise, to “adapt the hierarchical organization of 
the forces and arrange them to work together to do whatever the situation requires” 
(Kometer 2005).   
5.2.1 Summary and overview of the four cases 
                                                
104 Kometer, p. 240. 
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Kometer used CLIOS105 systems analysis to highlight the intimate relationship 
between behavior and structure in complex military operations:  political constraints 
drive behavior of actors as they develop command relationships, but performance 
demands create individual and group incentives to modify these relationships, both 
formally and informally.  These command relationships, in turn, impact system level 
outcomes.  System level outcomes influence subsequent modification and interpretation 
of political constraints, beginning the cycle again.106  His discussion and analysis expose 
important feedback loops in the system, helping us to understand enterprise level 
(strategic and operational) dynamics better and to identify key relationships for 
management attention with the goal of better enabling operational and tactical level 
flexibility. 
Kometer does not connect constraints on interactions to specific types or classes 
of structure or to system properties such as flexibility, nor does he connect these 
structures with system properties.  Our interest is only in a narrow aspect of the system, 
flexibility.  We will not address the details of interactions, where they come from, or their 
motivating forces, but will examine only structure—interactions and their hierarchical 
relationships, with an emphasis on operational and tactical levels.  Examination of these 
relationships, in context of an overall assessment of effectiveness will help us to 
understand the relationship of flexibility to architecture. 
Air power was used for different purposes and was commanded differently in 
each of the four conflicts analyzed between 1991 and 2003:  Iraq-I (Desert Storm, 1991), 
Kosovo (Allied Force, 1999), Afghanistan (Operation Enduring Freedom, 2001-2) and 
Iraq-II (Operation Iraqi Freedom, up to the end of Major Combat Operations in May 
2003).107  Because of differences in political objectives (constraints) and technical 
systems, we should see differences in structure across the cases.  The overall technical 
trend across the conflicts was increasing sensing and information processing capability 
combined with increasing use of precision weapons, all tied together with robust 
                                                
105 Complex, Large-scale, Interconnected, Open, Socio-technical system (Mostashari and Sussman 2009) . 
106 This is a familiar logic chain in social science literature and has recently gained visibility in the growing 
literature on network theory (Ranson et al. 1980) (Sewell) (Watts and Strogatz) (Newman). 
107 Sometimes Desert Storm is called the First Gulf War and Iraqi Freedom the Second Gulf War. 
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communication systems.  The main organizational construct for air power command and 
control did not change significantly over the cases.  In each case, an Air Force officer in a 
centralized headquarters commanded air power.  Even with this generally constant 
structure, there were observable architecture differences across the cases. 
The key similarity observed across cases was the need to decentralize certain 
decisions to capture the full benefits of the inherent flexibility of air power, especially in 
air-ground situations.  Another common theme is that this need to decentralize was (and 
remains) in constant tension with the desire to employ air power resources efficiently, a 
goal that drives toward centralization of command and control.108  Centralization also 
develops when political risk tolerance is low.  This generally happens when politicians 
want to ensure that chances of negative outcomes are minimized or when they have an 
expectation of being able to precisely manipulate the outcome of an interaction with an 
enemy.  The doctrinal drive toward centralization is also in tension with a warrior culture 
that prizes initiative and ‘can-do’ attributes in pilots.109  This is no accident—the Air 
Force (and the other Services) deliberately recruits, trains and promotes people for these 
attributes.110  The main challenge in today’s highly complex, interconnected and 
interoperable technical, operational and strategic environment is to channel these traits 
efficiently and effectively.  We will address efficiency and effectiveness in Chapter 6 
5.2.2 Summary Assessment of Air Operations Architectures: 
5.2.2.1 Desert Storm 
Operation Desert Storm (Iraq-I) was the first post-Cold War conflict and the first 
major military operation in the Goldwater-Nichols era.111  It marked the first time that a 
                                                
108 For airmen, efficient employment or air power is when resources are applied to achieve maximum 
impact on the enemy in furtherance of strategic objectives.  Employment of air power in support of 
objectives that are not clearly and directly tied to achieving strategic level impacts are considered sub-
optimal (U. S. Air Force 2003). 
109 Kometer highlights this fact and the effects of it in detail in Chapter 9, “System Accidents.”  He also 
repeatedly points out that pilots, finding themselves without targets, will “dial around the radio frequencies 
looking for work”; something that he implies has a strong likelihood of causing inefficiency and loss of 
strategic coherence of the air campaign (and that is also noted in Mandeles, et al. (Mandeles et al. 1996). 
110 My thanks to Dan Whitney for pointing this out, which prompted the follow-on amplification. 
111 The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 (G-N) aimed to correct long-standing problems of inter-service 
cooperation and to streamline the military chain of command between the President and the operational 
military forces (the Combatant Commands).  G-N stemmed from a desire to address lessons from the failed 
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Joint Force Commander exercised command authority over forces of all four military 
services and the first time all air forces were under the command of a single commander, 
a Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) (Cohen 1993, Vol. 1, Planning and 
Command and Control).112  Because of the relative newness and immaturity of the Joint 
command structure and poor doctrinal interfaces between services, there was minimal 
collaboration and coordination across service lines.  Desert Storm has been characterized 
as four individual service campaigns integrated by Gen. Schwarzkopf and his staff at the 
top of the command structure, Central Command (CENTCOM) headquarters (Atkinson 
1993b; Mandeles et al. 1996; Krepinevich 2003).113  Architecturally, this describes a 
hierarchical tree structure.  Planning and operational interactions between air and ground 
forces were mainly those necessary to ensure individual service plans did not interfere 
with each other and for safe execution of planned air operations in support of the ground 
force.  In practice, however, significant ad-hoc interactions in both air planning and air-
ground operations were necessary to achieve flexibility needed to address mismatches 
between the formal structure, the planning requirements for the air campaign and 
operational requirements of the battlefield (Cohen 1993; Mandeles et al. 1996; Kometer 
2005).  Our detailed analysis of Operation Desert Storm’s structure in this chapter should 
show minimal laterality in the structure and flexibility in only some situations.  
5.2.2.2 Operation Allied Force (Kosovo, 1999)  
NATO’s Kosovo operation was a limited objective, air power-only, campaign 
heavily constrained by political considerations.114  At the operational level, political risk 
aversion removed the option of using ground forces.  This decision limited flexibility by 
removing ground forces as a tool that may have helped achieve political objectives, 
                                                                                                                                            
1979 hostage rescue attempt in Iran and inter-service coordination problems during the invasion of Grenada 
in 1983.  A useful short summary can be found at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Goldwater-Nichols_Act, the 
legislation is reproduced at http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/congress/title_10.htm. 
112 The difficulties of command structure at the theater level were noted in the Strategic Bombing Survey 
following WW-II.  Various solutions to this challenge had been proposed and tried since then, with the 
latest version the G-N Act. 
113 It is also well documented that Gen. Schwarzkopf’s personality and top-down leadership style were 
significant factors in the ultimate architecture of the Joint Force (Swain 1994) 
114 There was, in fact, very little autonomy in decision making at the level of the air commander, Lt. Gen. 
Short.  See Gen. Wesley Clark’s account in Waging Modern War as well as press reports, speeches and 
interviews given by Gen. Short and VAdm.  Murphy following the completion of the operation (Murphy 
1999; Priest 1999b; Priest 1999a; Tirpak 1999; Clark 2001). 
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resulting in a less effective campaign and an inability to address unforeseen reactions of 
the Serbian leadership to the campaign (the ethnic cleansing of Kosovo).115  Political 
considerations created a low risk environment with tight controls on action, creating a 
top-down structure for employment of air power.  Politically driven targeting constraints 
coupled with lack of a ground force combined to create a relatively inflexible vertical 
structure, with little laterality in terms of overall force application.116  However, for some 
types of missions, such as attacks against fixed targets or air defense sites in Serbia, 
lateral connections enabled flexibility and some notably flexible engagements occurred.  
But for the major campaign objective, attacking Serbian Army forces in Kosovo, the 
overall structure was vertical more than lateral, which limited flexibility.117 
5.2.2.3 Operation Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan, 2001-02)  
This operation was the United States’ initial response to the Sept. 11, 2001 
attacks.  The architecture of this campaign is similar to Kosovo:  there were relatively 
tight constraints placed on the use of air power.  But unlike Kosovo, political goals were 
more aggressive and ground force was explicitly recognized as a necessary supplement to 
air power.  However, geography, lack of operational plans, political sensitivities and a 
desire to act quickly constrained the size of the ground force.  At the operational level, 
ground forces provided an additional option to the commander, complementing air power 
and increasing flexibility in its use.  Tight operational constraints based on risk concerns 
created a tree-like structure between the strategic and operational headquarters and 
consequently enabling a lower level of flexibility at the operational level of the campaign 
than might otherwise have been possible.  But looser constraints on some types of 
operations and lateral connections between air and ground forces at the tactical level 
                                                
115 The effectiveness of the Kosovo air campaign is still the subject of debate, the recent death of Milosevic 
may forever preclude a precise answer to his decision to give up (Daalder and O’Hanlon 1999; Byman and 
Waxman 2000; McPeak and Pape 2004; Pape 2004) 
116 Even though air and ground operations were not well integrated in Desert Storm, the lack of a ground 
force in Kosovo removed even the potential of flexibility via air-ground coordination. 
117 Because of tightened rules of engagement (ROE), following an erroneous attack on a civilian convoy, 
Lt. Gen. Short held decision authority on engagement of Serbian Army targets for much of the campaign.  
This necessitated a “talk-on” procedure from the Air Operations Center (AOC) to the tactical aircraft, an 
interaction that normally occurs between two tactical level operators (a ground controller and pilot). 
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increased flexibility and effectiveness in air-ground support engagements.  Overall, this 
campaign was tree-like at the top, but lateral at the bottom. 
5.2.2.4 Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) (March-May 2003:  Major 
Combat Operations (MCO))  
OIF was the second major campaign in the global war on terrorism.  Lessons 
learned from Afghanistan, a long planning timeline and different political guidance 
(tighter resource constraints, but more freedom of action) combined to create an 
operational and tactical structure different in character than both Enduring Freedom 
immediately before it and Desert Storm a decade earlier.  For the duration of major 
combat operations, Iraqi Freedom was a more lateral structure that enabled more 
flexibility than Desert Storm, its closest analog.  Other major differences from an 
architectural perspective were the political objective (regime change) and use of a ground 
force size one third that of Desert Storm.118  Lessons learned from Operation Anaconda 
in Afghanistan the year before and the use of a smaller ground force combined to create 
closer interactions between the ground and air component.119  This tighter integration 
between air and ground forces (more lateral connections at multiple levels of command), 
enabled increased flexibility in operations, making this campaign’s structure the most 
flexible of the four cases.120 
5.2.2.5 Summary 
Overall, U.S. military operations have been highly successful over the period of 
these cases, though causal relationships between successful outcomes and mechanisms 
are the subject of recurring discussion and debate.  An understudied aspect of military 
operations has been enterprise architecture.  Based on technical and organizational 
                                                
118 The size of the ground force in Desert Storm was two Army Corps and a Marine Expeditionary Brigade, 
about 500,000 U.S. troops.  In Operation Iraqi Freedom, the ground force size was approximately 175,000 
U.S. Troops.  I have not included coalition forces or other U.S. service components. 
119 Operation Anaconda began as a relatively small operation at the end of Operation Enduring Freedom to 
round up remnants of Taliban and al Qaeda forces before they could escape to Pakistan.  It became the 
largest ground operation since Operation Desert Storm.  It also exposed significant problems with inter-
service planning that were the subject of at least two studies, an Air University thesis by Maj. Mark G. 
Davis, USA, Operation Anaconda:  Command and Confusion in Joint Warfare, and an unclassified U.S. 
Air Force Lessons Learned document (Davis 2004b; Jumper 2005). 
120 A detailed account of the Air Force-Army integration at multiple levels can be found in a study of Joint 
Fires during Operation Iraqi Freedom published by the Land Warfare Association (Kirkpatrick 2004). 
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literature on architecture, we expect to see a variety of hierarchical structures based on 
mission complexity and political and resource constraints (Alexander 1964; Lawrence 
and Lorsch 1967; Thompson 1967; Simon 1996).  This is what we see—in each case, the 
architecture was different.   
We do, however, see a common pattern across the four examples.  In each case, 
where operational flexibility was needed, lateral connections developed in response to 
those needs.  Also, while lack of lateral interactions at high levels of enterprise did not 
stop development of lateral interactions at lower levels, the asymmetry across the 
hierarchy had adverse effects.  First, some potential lateral interactions at lower levels 
were inhibited, which limited overall enterprise flexibility.  Second, lack of lateral 
interactions at high levels created tension over priorities and goals.  In Desert Storm and 
Kosovo, this led to an inability to achieve overall alignment of strategic purpose, causing 
uncertainty in the value and purpose of lower level lateral connections.  In Afghanistan, 
clearer guidance at the upper levels of hierarchy combined with a relatively simple 
operation to lessen the difficulties caused by lack of upper level laterality.  In the last 
case, major combat operations of Operation Iraqi Freedom, there were robust lateral 
interactions at multiple levels of hierarchy, enabling more flexible and more successful 
operations under challenging environmental and resource constraints.121  We will see a 
recurring pattern of development of lateral interactions (some successful, some not) at 
multiple levels.  This pattern has implications for how we might begin thinking about 
enterprise design and a more pro-active (and less reactive) approach to management of 
complex operations. 
Table 4 summarizes a qualitative assessment of structure and flexibility: 
Campaign Laterality Flexibility Depth Notes 
Desert Storm  
(1991) Low Low Shallow 
Ad hoc attempts to increase 
flexibility via lateral connections in 
planning and execution. 
                                                
121 The notable contrast is between Desert Storm, where the air campaign preceded the ground campaign, 
and Operation Iraqi Freedom, where the air and ground campaigns were simultaneous. 
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Kosovo  
(1999) Low Low Shallow 
Some narrow examples of 
flexibility and laterality, but mostly 
against targets in Serbia, not the 
Serbian army in Kosovo. 
Afghanistan  
(2001-2002) Mixed Mixed 
Medium; 
inverted 
Lateral interactions at the tactical 
level enabled flexible air-ground 
operations; headquarters level 
laterality was low, inhibiting 
flexibility at the operational level. 
Iraqi Freedom 
(2003) High Highest Deep 
Tight resource constraints and the 
lessons of Operation Anaconda 
generated increased lateral 
interactions at all levels. 
Table 4:  Trade-off analysis summary 
5.3 Architecture Analysis of the Campaigns 
A more detailed analysis of the four conflicts follows.  Each campaign 
will be reviewed using the following framework: 
1. Operational context and characterization of the conflict 
2. U.S. approach to the conflict and structural features of our forces 
3. Operational level discussion 
4. Tactical level discussion 
5. Summary 
A summary analysis of all four cases will follow the last case. 
5.3.1 Operation Desert Storm (1991) 
5.3.1.1 Operational context and characterization of the conflict 
The August 1990 invasion of Kuwait by Iraq created concern over stability of the 
Middle East, the sovereignty of a key U.S. ally and potential for a follow-on invasion of 
Saudi Arabia.  U.S. political leaders built a broad coalition of states to eject Iraq from 
Kuwait and restore its government.  The military was given clear goals and the Services 
threw enormous resources at the problem.  Militarily, Desert Storm represented a classic 
Cold War engagement:  two large, armored, mobile ground forces facing off against each 
other on fairly isolated battlefields, combined with air forces. 
From a resource perspective, Desert Storm was not tightly constrained.  The 
United States threw the bulk of its force structure behind the effort to eject Iraqi forces 
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from Kuwait.122  These excess resources brought a degree of flexibility to the system that 
reduced pressure to integrate across service component boundaries.  But we are interested 
in flexibility as the ability to have alternative responses to internal or external demand; 
flexibility requires different arrangements of organizations and systems—the activation 
of alternative ways (paths) to deliver function (capabilities).  In Desert Storm, excess 
resources allowed Schwarzkopf and his commanders the freedom not to force 
collaborative interactions among the services during planning.  This allowed them to use 
relatively simple schemes based on spatial and temporal separation to keep forces from 
interfering with each other during the operational phases of the campaign (Atkinson 
1993a; Gordon and Trainor 1995) . 
5.3.1.2 U.S. approach to the conflict and structural features of 
our forces 
Structurally, Desert Storm was a hierarchical tree that developed some ad hoc 
laterality.  The Joint Force commander, Gen. Schwarzkopf, was in charge of all service 
components and responsible for the overall execution of the war.  Desert Storm was also 
the first time a Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) commanded all air 
assets in the campaign.  It became the first real test of the core tenets of air force doctrine:  
centralized control, decentralized execution.  Relationally and functionally, however, 
each service component operated independently: 
“Schwarzkopf’s component commanders communicated with one another 
and served as effective deputies.  But they divided the war into separate 
pieces and then fought these with little concern for each other’s parts.”  
(Mandeles et al. 1996)  
Further, a close relationship developed between Horner and Schwarzkopf during the 
planning phase (Desert Shield).  This strong vertical connection enhanced the tree-like 
structure relative to the other services: 
                                                
122 The lack of resource constraints is widely accepted; evidence is found in statements from senior 
leadership (Atkinson 1993b; Gordon and Trainor 1995; Mandeles et al. 1996).  It is also borne out by 
simple counts of percentage of aircraft in the U.S. inventory vs. the numbers used in Desert Storm (See 
Appendix A). 
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“The down side of this one-on-one, quietly personal relationship was that 
Schwarzkopf’s ground commanders were left out of it.  In effect, there 
was no joint command at the highest level.  Horner and the other 
deputies…did not work together under Schwarzkopf’s guidance…Instead 
the component commanders planned separate campaigns that overlapped.”  
(Mandeles et al. 1996) (p. 135) 
To further describe the structure, relations between commanders of each service have 
been characterized as cordial but not collaborative (Mandeles et al. 1996).  Where inter-
service conflicts arose, the approach of the commanders was to avoid dealing with them.  
There were enough resources (forces and weapons) that, in general, more resources were 
added to solve problems rather than trying to collaborate and overcome inter-
organizational differences to solve problems (Carpenter 1995; Gordon and Trainor 1995; 
Krepinevich 2003).123   
This planning structure carried over to execution at the operational level.  The 
ground forces (Army and Marine Corps) were geographically separated, operating 
independent and deconflicted ground campaigns.  The air campaign was similarly 
separated, both geographically and in time from the ground campaign (Atkinson 1993b; 
Gordon and Trainor 1995; Mandeles et al. 1996).  Both of these situations created an 
environment where little cross-organizational collaboration was required in order to 
execute the campaign effectively.124  These observations paint a structural picture of 
branches feeding to a root, with the root (Schwarzkopf and his staff) directing each 
branch as independent parts. 
5.3.1.3 Operational level discussion 
Flexibility at the operational level of military operations comes from (1) 
combining forces of different services, with each service itself composed of different 
                                                
123 Examples of service independence can be found in Gordon and Trainor’s The General’s War on p. 96-
97, 159-162 and 311.  Of particular note is the discussion of Schwarzkopf’s handling of Marine and Army 
plans on page 162.  Mandeles, Hone and Terry review the relationship of Lt. Gen. Horner, the JFACC, with 
the other component commanders and with Gen. Schwarzkopf in Chapter 5 of Managing Command and 
Control in the Persian Gulf War. 
124 Note that there were cross-organizational interactions, but that they were pro-forma, aimed at 
deconfliction and coordination of plans, not at flexibility in the face of changing requirements. 
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capabilities, and (2) from being able to change the mission and orientation of the overall 
force in response to external conditions.  This allows commanders to exploit strengths 
and minimize weaknesses of each service, improving total force effectiveness while 
simultaneously working to maximize efficiency in a dynamic and uncertain environment.  
Unfortunately, only a minimal amount of this kind of flexibility occurred during Desert 
Storm.  Two examples demonstrate this lack of flexibility.   
Lack of a high level connection between Lt. Gen. Horner and the Marine Air 
Commander, Maj. Gen. Moore reduced flexibility.  An early agreement between the two 
commanders traded Marine attack and electronic warfare aircraft for use in the strategic 
air campaign in return for allocation of Air Force B-52 and A-10 aircraft against ground 
targets in the Marine’s area of responsibility (Gordon and Trainor 1995; Glosson 2003) 
(Mandeles et al. 1996).  This type of layered flexibility could have enabled a more 
optimal allocation of air assets, enhancing overall campaign effectiveness.  But as the 
campaign progressed and the date for commencement of ground operations approached, 
the Marines withdrew their aircraft from support of air campaign missions to focus on 
missions in support of Marine ground operations.   
Carpenter’s analysis of Joint decision-making in Desert Storm provides another 
example (Carpenter 1995).125  Early in the Desert Storm air campaign, Army Advanced 
Tactical Missiles (ATACMS) were used in a responsive attack against an Iraqi air 
defense site.126  However, attempts by the Air Force planners to schedule more ATACMS 
strikes were unsuccessful.  Army doctrine reserved ATACMS for the Army Corps 
commander’s use in the deep battle.127  Staff-level attempts by the Air Force to leverage 
these assets in support of the air campaign were unsuccessful because of the army’s 
adherence to its doctrine and the unwillingness of the air commander (Lt. Gen. Horner) to 
                                                
125 A detailed discussion of this example can be found as a case study analysis of Joint decision-making in 
the Desert Storm (Carpenter). 
126 The use of an ATACMS missile against an air defense site frees up substantial aircraft for other 
missions, a potentially useful trade-off that could increase efficiency as well as effectiveness of the overall 
force, but would, at the same time reduce the number of ATACMS available to the Army commander when 
the ground campaign began (It is important to note that the ATACMS system was new in 1991 and fielded 
in limited numbers). 
127 Deep battle is a term used for attacks against targets geographically remote from the current battle, but 
relevant to near term future operations. 
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raise the issue with his counterpart (Lt. Gen Yeosock).  While the initial use of ATACMS 
was a good example of how flexibility could be enabled by lateral interactions in the 
architecture, there was little coordination of this type beyond the single engagement.128  
Carpenter’s final assessment is that the overwhelming size of the U.S. forces allowed 
commanders to side-step difficult collaboration issues, relying only minimally on 
cooperation and heavily on separation in time and space (i.e., there were essentially no 
resource constraints). 
More important than these examples was that the lack of laterality between the 
Army and the Air Force limited ability to agree on or to update targeting priorities and to 
adjust battlefield coordination lines.  This lack of flexibility created motivation to skirt 
normal processes for target approval and allowed operational havens and escape routes 
for Iraqi Republican Guard troops late in the ground campaign (Carpenter 1995; Gordon 
and Trainor 1995; Glosson 2003).  Many writers have offered reasons for this lack of 
interaction and integration, but it is more helpful to understand the potential operational 
benefits that lateral connections might have enabled.129   
A simplified representation of the enterprise architecture in Desert Storm is 
shown in Figure 39, showing only Army and Air Force organizations.  This diagram 
shows both hierarchical relationships between different organizations as well as 
information flows between them (red lines).  Inspection of the diagram shows that if both 
the Army and the Air Force have capability to attack a certain type of target, there are 
four ways to do it:  Central Command (CC) can delegate the task to either the Land 
Component (usually the Army) or the Air Component (usually the Air Force).  
Alternatively, CC could develop a solution and direct one of the services to execute it.  
This alternative places a large burden on the CC node, especially when there are other 
                                                
128 It is important to note, as Carpenter does, that use of ATACMS or Army armed helicopters for some air 
campaign missions may not have been the best decision at the campaign level.  But, as General Horner 
observed, the fact that the discussion could not be had prevented the option from being explored (Carpenter 
1995, p. 58, 65). 
129 Many assessments of these faults in Desert Storm have been attributed to a lack of trust in the Air Force 
and its command and control process by the ground force.  A lot of progress has been made since Desert 
Storm on inter-service trust, mostly evidenced in air-ground operations of Operation Iraqi Freedom.  But 
there are lingering problems, which have manifested themselves in the control and allocation of unmanned 
air vehicles in Operation Iraqi Freedom.  (Odierno et al. 2008; Osborne and Hoffman 2008). 
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service components in addition to Army and Air Force that require coordination.  The 
burden on the top node is further increased when we consider that the details of a 
particular problem and how best to solve it, (a) may not be knowable to the CC node 
and/or (b) may require a mixing of ground and air resources of which the CC node may 
not have full understanding.  Also, since information and direction must move up and 
down the structure, time delays can occur that inhibit effective enterprise-level response 
to changes in the environment.  We assess laterality in this diagram as “zero.” 
 
 
Figure 39:  Desert Storm architecture (Army and Air Force) 
Kometer’s prescription for solving this problem is depth of command—
identifying situations where the Air and Land Component Commanders are empowered 
to make decisions and take action.130  A diagram showing depth is at Figure 40.  In this  
                                                
130 Note that this diagram does not show sensor inputs.  At the level of the components, we assume that 
each node has access to the same information:  Central Command, Air Component and Land Component 
all have the same information access, enabling delegation of decision authority to the lower level. 
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Figure 40:  Desert Storm architecture indicating depth of command 
diagram, both the air and the ground component can make decisions about attacking the 
target (we denote this by the circles around those nodes).  This unburdens the Central 
Command node by requiring intervention only when risk or other circumstances warrant.  
In turn, the Air component and the Land Component can delegate further decision 
making to lower levels of their respective commands (not shown in Figure 39 or Figure 
40).  However, without a lateral connection between Air and Land components, 
coordinated action or collaborative re-allocation of resources becomes difficult, and must 
be done at the higher level (Central Command).  This lowers the number of possible force 
employment alternatives available to Central Command. 
Next, we view this architecture in terms of sensor inputs as well as the decision 
hierarchy.  In Operation Desert Storm the same sensor data were available at multiple 
levels of hierarchy.  Figure 41 shows that moving decisions to the Air and Land 
Component level shortens the path (time) required from input to output (sensor data  
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Figure 41:  Moving decisions to lower levels of hierarchy 
inputs are indicated by the dark red lines.  In this figure we have colored decision-making 
nodes white, to separate them from the sensing and action (aircraft, and ground unit) 
nodes. 
5.3.1.4 Tactical level discussion 
At the tactical level, flexibility is necessary to adjust to competing demands for 
air assets as the battle unfolds.  Examples of flexibility at the tactical level are the ability 
to change the mission assignment of an aircraft (the “action” step of the basic model), or 
to coordinate unplanned operations between air and ground forces.  Because of 
centralized command of air power, arms-length relationships among the service 
component commanders, and the sheer complexity of allocating and scheduling the 
thousands of sorties necessary to execute the Desert Storm air campaign, tactical level 
flexibility was limited (Carpenter 1995) and attempts to achieve it were only marginally 
successful (Mandeles et al. 1996).  It was difficult to modify resource allocations or to 
adjust target or mission assignments.  
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Consequently, Operation Desert Storm was a mostly vertical structure at the 
tactical level.  The Tactical Air Control Center (TACC) developed the air campaign 
strategy, which was then used to build the Air Tasking Order (ATO).131  Air wings and 
squadrons conducted detailed mission planning using the ATO.  This cycle, from the 
beginning of ATO planning to execution, was nominally 48 hours, but occasionally was 
as long as 72 hours.  Airborne command and control aircraft (AWACS and ABCCC) 
used the ATO to execute the plan, directing aircraft and providing flexibility in terms of 
attacking targets not specified in the ATO.  Some of these targets were identified and 
reported via radio to the airborne command nodes by both aircraft and ground forces.  
Unfortunately, the ATO planning cycle could not keep pace with changes in the ground 
situation at the operational level—it was not flexible enough to address changing 
interdiction requirements as defined by the ground commanders.  This fact generated ad 
hoc organizational responses to achieve needed flexibility.  We show this general 
situation in Figure 42 (we have deemphasized the common sensor inputs on the left side  
 
Figure 42:  Possible sense-to-act sequences with unique sensor information 
                                                
131 The ATO is the commanding document for the air campaign.  It specifies missions to aircraft, times, 
airspace assignments, refueling assignments as well as non-attack assignments such as intelligence, 
surveillance and reconnaissance missions. 
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of the diagram).  We will discuss this in more detail later, but Figure 42 shows how, 
when information available to one component must be made available to another, along 
with the need for an engagement decision, there are multiple ways for it to flow and 
multiple places where the decision could be made.  In Figure 42 the information would 
go to Central Command for decision and direction of the Air Component.  We show an 
information flow connection (dark red) to the Air Component from the Land Component, 
but no collaboration mechanism to facilitate a decision at that level of the hierarchy.  We 
could also consider that a connection can be made directly from the Land Component to 
an aircraft (a cross-layer connection, also not shown).  Each of these could enhance 
flexibility and lower the decision burden on the Central Command node. 
Interdiction missions are used by ground commanders to shape the battlefield for 
upcoming operations, so are geographically at a longer distance from our troops and do 
not require as much detailed tactical coordination with friendly ground forces.132  Early 
Desert Storm interdiction efforts were ineffective because the proposed targets moved 
between the time Army requested they be attacked and the time that the ATO process 
addressed them with an interdiction aircraft.  In response, the air component created 
“Killer Scouts.”133  Killer Scouts aimed to improve the results of air interdiction missions 
by providing local direction of incoming sorties toward valid targets.  Structurally, Killer 
Scouts created lateral connections at the tactical level of operations among aircraft, but 
maintained vertical connections to the operational level within the air component 
(Kometer 2005).  Killer Scouts are an example of a lateral connection (between the Killer 
Scout and an interdiction mission), increasing flexibility by creating a new, shorter and 
better-informed engagement path in the system.134 
                                                
132 We address interdiction missions here because close air support (CAS) was conducted via a “push” 
process.  Air sorties were “pushed” through the control points for CAS; if they were not needed, they 
proceeded on to another mission, which could have been interdiction.  Also, it was in the interdiction 
mission where architectural issues of flexibility and laterality became important. 
133 The Killer Scout concept was derived from similar operations (and a similar need) in Vietnam.  Then, as 
in Desert Storm, there were certain ground support missions that had to be directed locally in order to be 
effective.  The concept involves a dedicated aircraft to conduct scouting of targets in an interdiction area.  
The Scout conducts its interdiction mission, then remains on station and directs other aircraft to valid 
targets. 
134 It is also an example of depth of command—moving decision-making to a lower command echelon in 
order to add flexibility and increase effectiveness and efficiency in the interdiction campaign. 
166 
A second organizational response to the dynamic changes on the battlefield was 
the placement of ground force liaison officers on board airborne command and control  
 
Figure 43:  Adding Liaison officers to Airborne Command and Control platforms 
aircraft (ABCCC).  The role of these officers was to work with the onboard commander 
to adjust ATO targeting priorities so that they would more closely align with current 
ground force priorities (Cohen 1993; Kometer 2005).  In addition, the Joint Stars aircraft 
(JSTARS) passed ground targets to the ABCCC, adding another sense-decide-act path to 
the system (Figure 43).135  Both of these modifications are shown in Figure 43 
(collaborative connection with the liaison officer in green).  Two possible paths are 
shown in Figure 43, one that goes through the JFLCC and one that goes directly form 
JSTARS to the ABCCC node.  We can see how the lateral connection made by the 
liaison officer provides a path for Army priorities to be transmitted to the Air Force side. 
These examples illustrate an increase in laterality at the tactical and operational 
levels as Desert Storm evolved.  Killer Scouts moved decision making lower in the 
organization by connecting a new sensor and decision maker (the Killer Scout), to action 
                                                
135 Joint STARS (JSTARS) was a prototype moving ground target radar used in Desert Storm.  It provided 
near real time ground target information to headquarters organizations.  As the campaign developed, 
operators on JSTARS began to provide ABCCC aircraft with ground targets for engagement. 
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nodes (interdiction aircraft).  But the Killer Scouts were working in areas and with 
targeting priorities defined by the air component.  This is an example of using flexibility 
to increase efficiency by adding new alternatives—incoming interdiction sorties were not 
wasted because they lacked available targets:  Killer Scouts targeted them.  The use of 
Army and Marine liaison officers on ABCCC aircraft is another example of flexibility.  
The one-way lateral connection between air and ground forces was created in order to 
point the air power system toward different targets.136  A diagram of the structure created 
by adding JSTARS as a target sensor for the ABCCC aircraft and adding liaison officers 
is shown in Figure 43.  This is an example of laterality at the operational level (L2).137 
5.3.1.5 Summary  
In Desert Storm, every example given by Kometer of the need for timely or more 
effective response to external demand required decentralization of decision making 
coupled with connection of timely sensing information to those decision makers.  
Structurally, these modifications created interactions within the system that were closer to 
lateral (peer-to-peer, collaborative) than they were vertical (senior-to-subordinate, 
directive).  These connections also increased the number of alternatives (options) by 
which the enterprise could achieve its goals.138  However, some of the lateral connections 
at lower levels of hierarchy (ground liaison officers) were in tension with concerns for 
accountability and coherence of the overall air campaign strategy.  These are central 
concerns in military operations:  the chain of accountability and strategic coherence.  
Kometer is meticulous in ensuring this issue remains clear in his concepts.  From this 
perspective, there is never a lateral structure—somebody or some group is always 
‘above’ or ‘in charge’ when decisions are made.  There is always a tree hierarchy.  This is 
                                                
136 Once again, the effectiveness of this connection can be debated.  The priorities were an amalgam of 
existing ATO targets, updated interdiction targets from the ground force and real time requests from ground 
forces (Cohen 1993; Kometer 2005).  The air force argument is that these changes could potentially 
undermine the Commander’s strategic priorities and suboptimize the application of air power, therefore 
decreasing efficiency and effectiveness. 
137 Though the Killer Scout can be considered a lateral connection, since we are interested in enterprise 
level laterality—laterality between organizations—and this is a lateral connection inside the Air Force, I 
have not scored Desert Storm with a lateral connection at the tactical level (L3). 
138 The Gulf War Air Power Survey also addresses this in its findings on Command and Control (Cohen)(p. 
334).  Though most of these decentralized interactions were one-way (directive instead of collaborative or 
cooperative), they increased flexibility in the sense that they enabled the air power system to respond better 
to changing external requirements. 
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true in virtually every decision-making context, something that Arrow showed us many 
years ago (Arrow 1950).  So, for the purposes of architectural analysis in Desert Storm 
and all other cases, we define lateral interactions as those interactions (even if they are 
directive in nature) that occur at similar levels of abstraction (hierarchy).139 
The main operational issue in Desert Storm was ad hoc interactions that 
developed to make the well-scripted Air Force plan more operationally responsive to the 
dynamic and changing ground situation.140  These interactions generally resulted in a 
change in the flow of aircraft to targets by increasing the number of information paths in 
the CAOS and increasing the number of command decision locations.  These interactions 
improved efficiency, effectiveness or sometimes both.141  The difficulty in relying on 
these types of interactions and information flows is that they are not formally managed 
and it becomes difficult (potentially impossible) to know what targets are being attacked, 
whether they are priority targets from the strategic perspective and what the net effect of 
the attacks are on the enemy.  Where these interactions were most effective in terms of 
responsiveness to uncertainty and change, they were lateral ones that moved decision-
making to lower hierarchical levels, effectively increasing the possible engagement 
alternatives that the system could generate. 
A key architectural observation from Desert Storm is that the lateral connection 
between the air and ground forces (liaison officers on ABCCC) was limited in 
effectiveness.  We have classified this connection as an operational level one (L2).  The 
liaison officers were acting in response to the Army Corps’ priorities and mainly 
addressed their concerns at the operational level of war—interdiction missions that were 
of longer-term impact than immediate engagement with the enemy.  This connection was 
                                                
139 We know from Arrow’s General Possibility Theorem that there is always a “dictator” or “decider” upon 
whom the ultimate decision depends, whether the situation is collaborative or directive (Arrow 1963).  The 
potential consequences of this theorem for autonomous machines (software driven collaboration) has been 
explored as well (Meyer and Brown 1998).  By accepting this phenomenon and viewing the problem from 
a layered hierarchical perspective, we open the door to another way of understanding the operation of 
complex systems.  We don’t consider the micro-scale dynamics of the situation, but only the overall 
flexibility in the system.  Also, see the discussion of lateral connections in Chapter 3. 
140 Similar types of interactions developed in the planning organization, but are not discussed here. 
141 Because of the difficulty in assessing effectiveness of attacks, something Kometer reviews in detail and 
that is comprehensively covered in the Gulf War Air Power Survey (GWAPS), evaluations of effectiveness 
in these ad hoc interactions is difficult.  This challenge still exists, more than a decade following the 
GWAPS (Krepinevich 2003). 
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only able to influence the assignment of aircraft to specific targets or target areas, not the 
allocation of aircraft to missions, something that is generally a strategic level concern.  In 
addition, the liaison officer was not assured of influencing the on-board commander, who 
was charged with faithful execution of the air campaign plan according to the ATO.  
With this ad hoc change to the architecture, there was always a question of whether the 
revised targets were in alignment with the overall campaign strategy and whether it was 
possible to gather accurate damage assessment information.  Lack of higher-level 
collaborative connections between the air and ground force inhibited this kind of 
alignment (Atkinson 1993a; Carpenter 1995).142   
As we have previously noted, lateral connections have been identified as a key 
enabler of flexibility in organizations (Galbraith 1993; Joyce et al. 1997).  But the 
existing research generally ignores the issue of multiple levels of lateral connections, 
preferring to address lateral interactions in limited contexts.  These examples provide an 
initial indication that, to enable flexibility and increase alignment with an overall 
strategy, lateral connections must be built from the top of the enterprise and work 
downward. 
5.3.2 Operation Allied Force in Kosovo (1999): 
5.3.2.1 Operational context and characterization of the conflict  
Operation Allied Force in Kosovo was a conflict with unclear objectives, marked 
by near continuous disagreements at the strategic and operational levels over both policy 
goals and an appropriate strategy to achieve them.143  The campaign was conceived as a 
limited use of force operation to coerce Serbian leaders from suppressing Albanian 
separatists in Kosovo.  This situation created an operational context where tolerance for 
risk (collateral damage, loss of aircraft or personnel) was low and where air power was 
perceived as a low-risk, possibly quick and precise, way to achieve political goals.  Based 
on expectations of a quick capitulation by Serbia, and high estimations for air power 
                                                
142 It is also important to note that the ABCCC and the on-board commander were also part of the close-air 
support process, so the ABCCC as an organization, straddled tactical and operational levels of the 
campaign. 
143 Details of the political and strategic context can be found in numerous places, but a reasonably clear 
picture can be found in Gen. Wesley Clark’s book, Waging Modern War.  Bacevich, in Limits to Power (p. 
149-150) provides an interesting assessment of the campaign from a strategic perspective. 
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effectiveness, an early political decision was made to remove ground forces from 
operational planning.  Unfortunately, shortly after the campaign started, Serbian 
leadership began a campaign of ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, raising the stakes for 
NATO.144  This change confused the operational challenge by moving the focus of 
attention from coercion of Serbian leadership to prevention of ethnic cleansing in 
Kosovo. 
5.3.2.2 U.S. approach to the conflict and structural features of 
our forces 
The U.S./NATO approach to this conflict was tightly controlled application of 
precision air power.  Risk aversion at the strategic level caused Gen. Clark, the NATO 
commander, to maintain control over many details of the air campaign, sometimes down 
to weapon selection (Clark 2001).  As a result, of high sensitivity to errors, the AOC 
retained more decision-making authority on tactical level action than it might have 
otherwise (Lambeth 2000a; Haave and Haun 2003; Kometer 2005).  The political 
constraint on resources reflected low risk tolerance of senior political and military leaders 
and impeded development of an architecture that could have enabled flexibility (Kometer 
2005).  Strategic level risk sensitivity percolated down to the tactical level, reinforcing 
the top-down decision making structure and limiting lateral interactions (Haave and Haun 
2003; Kometer 2005).  
5.3.2.3 Operational level discussion 
In Allied Force, the initial enterprise architecture was developed to accomplish 
narrow strategic objectives.  Removing NATO ground forces as an option was considered 
appropriate, given the theory of the campaign: coercion with air power.145  This 
architecture may have been effective, had the theory held.  Unfortunately, the Serbian 
leader, Milosevic, was not coerced; he changed his strategy and tactics, stepping up the 
oppression of Kosovar Albanians with his army.  This shifted operational priorities away 
from strategic targets and coercion of Milosevic and toward the Serbian Army in Kosovo. 
                                                
144 Bacevich, p. 149. 
145 See Bacevich, p. 149 for a succinct discussion of Clark’s theory of victory. 
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Lacking a ground force with which to detect, attack and influence the Serbian 
army, achieving campaign objectives became difficult.  NATO was left without the 
flexibility provided by an air-ground combination of forces, which would have been more 
effective (Tirpak 1999).  This difference is shown in Figure 44.  With a ground force, 
targets would have been vulnerable to three kinds of force:  manned aircraft, cruise 
missiles and ground forces.  Limiting options only to aircraft and cruise missiles may not 
have been a problem, if the pattern of the conflict had unfolded as expected.  As noted 
earlier, fixed infrastructure or air defense systems are well suited to attack by air power,  
 
Figure 44:  Kosovo architecture representations 
but it is difficult to use air power alone against a ground force (Tirpak 1999). 
At the next level, inside the air power structure, flexibility is still possible (right 
side diagram of Figure 44).  Two types of air power, manned aircraft and cruise missiles, 
provided operational level flexibility.  For many targets inside Serbia, it was possible to 
trade-off cruise missile missions for manned aircraft missions, flexibility helped adjust 
for weather, equipment, target characteristics and other factors.  But once the focus of the 
campaign shifted to Kosovo, lack of a ground force both to enable flexible air operations 
as well as to hold territory (maintain direct control of or influence on Serbian Army 
actions) proved problematic. 
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Architecturally, the command structure for manned aircraft and cruise missiles 
was split.146  The air commander, Lt. Gen. Short, was in command of both Navy and Air 
Force manned aircraft.  The naval commander, VAdm. Murphy was in command of both 
Navy and Air Force cruise missiles.  Both commanders had established a good working 
relationship and lateral interactions between their two command centers, which enabled 
flexibility.  Flexibility at this level consisted of shifting missions between cruise missiles 
 
Figure 45:  Kosovo fixed target architecutre 
                                                
146 This command structure is discussed in the DoD After Action Report on Kosovo to Congress (31 Jan 
2000). 
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and manned aircraft as well as between Navy and Air Force squadrons.147  Flexibility 
here comes from having multiple systems with redundant and complementary capabilities 
and from organizational interactions at multiple levels that enable shifting assignments 
among these systems, providing operational responsiveness to unforeseen demands.148  A 
diagram of this structure is shown in Figure 45. 
Analysis of the Kosovo conflict remains contentious regarding the appropriate 
strategic approach to the campaign and the employment of air power as a coercive tool.  
For example:  “What caused Milosevic to give up?”  Was it the effectiveness of strategic 
targeting or was it the combined threat of a ground invasion and loss of Russian political 
support?  (Byman and Waxman 2000; Stigler 2003).  A frequently cited reason for any 
ineffectiveness of air power in the Kosovo campaign is a general claim that air power 
was not employed properly (Priest 1999b).  When analysts of the Kosovo conflict deviate 
from this pattern of arguing over strategic approaches to the conflict, the effectiveness or 
ineffectiveness of air power and the reasons for it, they mainly focus on the technical and 
procedural aspects of engaging time-sensitive targets.149  Little attention is paid to the 
architecture of the organization and technical systems (the enterprise) and even less to its 
flexibility, particularly at the tactical execution level.  The next section addresses 
architectural aspects of tactical operations. 
5.3.2.4 Tactical level discussion 
For the Air Operations Center, the main problem became an exercise in rapid, or 
time-critical, targeting.  The Serbians had learned the lesson of Desert Storm:  if you are 
exposed and stationary, the U.S. Air Force can hit you.  They were effective in hiding and 
                                                
147 VAdm. Murphy provided an example of this type of lateral connection during October 1999 
Congressional testimony. 
148 There were both exploited and unexploited flexibilities in the form of capabilities of the Navy’s Carrier 
Air Wing.  Some aircraft carried reconnaissance systems that could have been used for real time battle 
engagements.  But because of organizational preferences or poor communications between operational 
staffs, these capabilities were only used for battle damage assessment.  Also, the Navy’s Air Wing was 
used for a time sensitive strike against the Podgorica airfield when the CAOC could not alter the ATO 
quickly enough (Lambeth 2000a). 
149 Though searching for moving (time-sensitive) targets was a problem in Desert Storm, the Kosovo 
campaign was the first campaign where new technical systems existed that could support efforts to attack 
these types of targets with some expectation of success.  Most of these early attempts (and many of the 
current ones) focus on streamlining procedures to reduce the time from sensor detection to engagement 
with a weapon. 
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moving their air defense systems.  Once Milosevic began operations in Kosovo, engaging 
the Serbian Army added to the challenge.  To hit these moving targets, Lt. Gen. Short 
created a Flex Targeting Cell.  The Flex Targeting Cell was composed of two parts.  The 
Fielded Forces Attack Cell was aimed at the Serbian Army and the Integrated Air 
Defense Systems Cell was aimed at Serbian air defense systems (Kometer 2005).  In 
essence, these cells represented a new organization in the AOC, specially designed to 
process information and make decisions faster than the formal structure.  To achieve 
needed flexibility, new technology was applied (new types of targeting workstations and 
processing software applications) and lateral connections between dispersed 
organizations were created.  The architecture was still vertically oriented overall:  the 
Flex Targeting Cell was located in the AOC and passed its targeting information 
vertically to tactical level aircraft.  But at the level of the Air Operations Center, there 
was an increase in laterality as formal information channels (mostly military intelligence 
channels) were bypassed and information passed peer-to-peer.  The net effect of these 
cells was to increase lateral information processing connections and to move decision-
making lower in the AOC command hierarchy (Kometer 2005). 
The Fielded Forces Attack Cell (FFAC) targets were the more challenging of the 
two types of target.  While air defense systems are vulnerable to electronic and signals 
detections, which makes finding them and generating targeting data largely an exercise in 
automated information processing, the Serbian army in Kosovo was a more difficult 
target.  They controlled their radio emissions, hid under forests and in buildings and used 
proximity to civilians as a shield.  The FFAC had access to Predator UAV video, 
sometimes JSTARS sensors and, toward the end of the campaign, ground-based radars 
from U.S. Army units in Albania.  These types of sensors required more interaction with 
tactical level aircraft than the automated information generated by the IADS cell.  
Without a tactical ground force to coordinate with tactical aircraft, it was challenging to 
deliver appropriate sensor information from decision-makers to an attack aircraft on 
timelines that could engage the Serbian Army before it moved. 
The challenges of passing information from the AOC to aircraft inhibited the 
responsiveness of the FFAC.  The flexibility of the fielded forces cell also varied with 
risk sensitivity.  Early on, rules of engagement allowed Airborne Forward Air Controllers 
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(FAC-As) to detect targets and either take or direct action, an example of flexibility and 
laterality at the tactical level.  FAC-As, when directing other aircraft, created lateral 
connections to strike aircraft.  But when errors were made, risk tolerance decreased.  
Specifically, rules of engagement were tightened and Lt. Gen. Short withdrew decision 
authority from the FAC-As, moving decisions to the FFAC (sometimes to Lt. Gen. 
Short), creating a vertical structure.  Kometer defines this variation as depth of command, 
the ability to move decision authority up and down command levels as the situation 
changes. 
As the risk tolerance of strategic level decision-makers dropped, lower level 
decisions were not allowed, decreasing flexibility—there were fewer alternatives (paths) 
for engaging targets.  Architecturally, when the CAOC became the decision maker in  
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Figure 46:  Kosovo architecture showing vertical interactions and two engagement 
paths 
engagements against fielded Serbian army forces, there was only one path, from the 
Predator or JSTARS sensors (Remote sensor in Figure 46) to the CAOC, then down to 
either the FAC-A or a strike aircraft.  That is, there was only one ‘legal’ decision node in 
the system, limiting the number of paths.  In some cases, this limitation (lack of 
flexibility) kept the system from reacting to emerging targets in time.  When risk 
tolerance increased, and decision authority was allowed to move down the hierarchy, 
JSTARS was sometimes able to detect targets and pass information to the FAC-As or to 
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other strike aircraft, another lateral interaction (Cohen 2000).  A simplified architectural 
diagram of these missions is shown in Figure 46. 
At the tactical level, the architecture in Kosovo showed both vertical and lateral 
structures as commanders tried to balance risk management with the need to adjust 
information and decision paths to meet the operational demands of hitting moving 
targets.  When constraints eased, lateral connections at the tactical level enabled 
flexibility to adjust to moving targets (Serbian Army units).  When constraints increased, 
decisions were passed vertically through the architecture from operational headquarters 
(CAOC) to the tactical units (aircraft).  This lowered flexibility, by removing engagement 
paths and by increasing response time, allowing Serbian Army units to escape attack 
(Lambeth 2000a; Kometer 2005). 
5.3.2.5 Summary 
In Allied Force, the main architectural issues concern attempts to achieve 
flexibility inside a tightly controlled hierarchical command structure.150  There are two 
core observations from our architectural analysis of this case.  First, lack of ground forces 
removed potential lateral interactions and alternative information flow and action paths 
(Daalder and O’Hanlon ; Byman and Waxman ; Cordesman).151  Without ground forces 
operational level campaign options were limited.  Second, without ground forces the 
sense-decide-act architecture inside the air power command structure became critically 
important.  Though there were notable successes, the vertically oriented sense-decide-act 
structure attempted to limit operational risk but at the same time limited tactical 
flexibility, especially against mobile Serbian Army targets.152,153  
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Our overall assessment of the Kosovo campaign is that it exhibited low flexibility 
and low laterality at the operational and tactical levels.  Though there were strong lateral 
connections among the Navy and Air Force component commanders and their staffs, 
because of the top-down style of command these were not leveraged well, and were 
possibly inhibited.  The use of information exchange capabilities enabled flexibility in 
gathering and processing information, but this flexibility mainly existed at the 
headquarters level.  It was effective against targets vulnerable to electronic intelligence 
and targeting, but less effective against the more mobile and harder to detect Serbian 
Army.154  It is important to note that the addition of more lateral connections through the 
availability of a ground force, or of more lateral interactions at the tactical level may not 
have solved the lack of flexibility in the Kosovo campaign, nor would it have positively 
prevented certain problems in the campaign (targeting errors, mainly).  Choosing how 
and when to leverage flexibility in an operational situation is difficult, and will likely 
remain so.  Our point is that without attention to lateral interactions and the effects of 
layers of hierarchy, flexibility will be a difficult property to achieve when it is needed.  
Attention to laterality and the effects of hierarchy beforehand can reduce confusion 
(friction) in operation—can enable flexibility. 
Overall, flexibility was low due both to technical architecture limitations as well 
as enterprise architecture constraints.155  In general, actions taken in the Kosovo 
                                                                                                                                            
150 Kosovo remains a contentious conflict in terms of air power.  When analyzing aspects of this campaign, 
there is a temptation to migrate into a discussion of the merits and demerits of the method of command and 
operational employment of air power chosen by Gen. Clark.  These are interesting and useful issues, but 
not our focus, just as they were not the focus of Kometer’s work. 
151 21 days into the campaign, Clark ordered Army Apache helicopters deployed to the theater in an attempt 
to provide a capability to attack the Serbian army more effectively—to increase effectiveness of air power 
by adding a lateral connection between sensors (Apaches) and act nodes (strike aircraft).  Some credit this 
move as a factor for the eventual capitulation by Milosevic, though there is debate on this point (Stigler 
2003).  Again, detailed discussion of causality in this context is beyond the scope of this analysis. 
152 Toward the end of the campaign, the ability to connect more sensors to tactical level units showed the 
promise of increase flexibility through added execution paths (Lambeth 2000a; Haave and Haun 2003; 
Kometer 2005). 
153 It is important to note that vertical hierarchies do not eliminate risk or error.  The bombing of the 
Chinese Embassy is an example of tight controls and a non-moving target where we still made a mistake. 
154 Haave and Haun describe lateral connections at the squadron level, where the details of missions were 
planned.  While this is important for efficiency and effectiveness at the tactical level, it does not 
significantly impact the flexibility of the enterprise in operation for the purposes of our analysis. 
155 Extensive discussion of these limitations, as well as others can be found in the DoD’s After Action 
Report to Congress on Kosovo (Cohen 2000). 
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campaign to increase flexibility created lateral connections that improved efficiency and 
effectiveness of operational level activities, but did not significantly improve flexibility in 
tactical execution of missions. 
5.3.3 Operation Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan, 2001-2002) 
5.3.3.1 Operational context and characterization of the conflict 
Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan provides both contrast and similarity 
to the Kosovo campaign.  The post 9-11 world is obviously different from that of the 
Kosovo conflict.  In Afghanistan, the U. S. goal was to remove the Taliban regime, 
eliminate a safe haven for terrorists, hit al Qaeda and demonstrate U.S. resolve to engage 
and remove the worldwide threat of terrorism.156  Unlike Kosovo, Afghanistan was 
geographically and operationally remote.  The U.S. had no prepared operational 
contingency plan for fighting in Afghanistan and no access to nearby foreign bases from 
which to stage military operations.157  In contrast to Serbia and the Serbian army, the 
Taliban military was poorly trained and equipped and Afghanistan had little valuable 
infrastructure to hold at risk with air power.   
At the time of the 9-11 attacks, Afghanistan’s rebel militias had essentially fought 
the Taliban military to stalemate in an internal civil war.  For the United States, strong 
political resolve following 9-11 combined with a challenging operational context to 
create a need to think innovatively about military force employment.  These two factors 
combined with the lessons of Kosovo to drive the creation of what became a standard, 
though innovatively implemented, air-ground campaign (Biddle 2003). 
5.3.3.2 U.S. approach to the conflict and structural features of 
our forces 
In Kosovo strategic guidance was unclear and risk tolerance low, leading to an air 
power-only campaign with limited flexibility.  In Afghanistan, strategic guidance was 
clear and, in general, tolerance of risk higher.  However, despite the strong resolve, 
                                                
156 Feith, p. 88-89. 
157 Though the CIA had intelligence operators in Afghanistan before 9-11, there were no plans for combat 
operations “on the shelf”.  The CIA eventually developed the plan that evolved into the campaign run by 
Gen. Franks.  
180 
political concerns over being viewed as an invading force and an acute consciousness of 
the 1980s Soviet invasion and its outcome combined to place tight constraints on the 
operation.  These conditions generated a tree-like campaign architecture at the 
operational level.158  
Among the senior leadership, there was a perception that air power alone was a 
blunt instrument (at best) or ineffective (at worst), given the unsophisticated Taliban 
military and economic infrastructure.159  This perception drove the Secretary of Defense 
to push hard for early use of ground force in the campaign.  On the other hand, he was 
sensitive to the U. S. becoming perceived as an occupying force.  This drove his desire to 
limit the footprint of U.S. ground forces.160  There were also political concerns about 
minimizing collateral damage from air strikes (especially to structures such as mosques) 
as well as concern over targeting errors.161  The result was that the top level of command, 
Central Command (CENTCOM) performed most targeting and operational level 
coordination among the component forces.  Many key engagement decisions were made 
by Gen. Franks, in some cases higher, creating a top-down (vertical) structure with regard 
to air power.162  To address these constraints, but still enable needed flexibility, the 
operational approach was to conduct an air-ground campaign using Special Operations 
Forces (SOF) and CIA paramilitary personnel as the interface between Afghan resistance 
forces and U.S. air power.  The idea was to capitalize on precision air power to increase 
the effectiveness of the Afghan resistance against the Taliban.163  
As we will see, the overall architecture of Operation Enduring Freedom was a tree 
hierarchy at the operational level, with CENTCOM at the root and a single layer of 
                                                
158 There were also sensitivities about perceptions of the U.S. retaliating against the general population of 
Afghanistan as well as the wider Muslim or Islamic culture and not simply al Qaeda and their Taliban 
sponsors (Biddle 2003; Franks 2004; Woodward 2004; Rumsfeld 2006; Feith 2008). 
159 Biddle, p. 1. 
160 Feith, p. 76.  Other discussions of the limitations on ground force size in Afghanistan can be found in 
(Davis 2004b) and Sean Naylor, Not a Good Day to Die, a journalistic account of Operation Anaconda and 
in Franks, p. 324. 
161 In testimony to Congress in July 2003, Gen. Franks testified to the value of limiting collateral damage in 
contributing the overall success of the campaign (HASC Testimony, JULY 10, 2003).  Franks describes his 
concerns about targeting errors in American Soldier, p. 289-95. 
162 Kometer describes the operational impact of this constraint in detail.  Also, see Franks, p. 289-95.   
163 Initial support was to the Northern Alliance.  Later, support was provided to forces led by Pashtun 
warlords in southern Afghanistan. 
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operational level command organizations below that did not interact very much.164  At the 
tactical level however, SOF and air forces were laterally connected, providing flexibility 
and responsiveness to the ground situation.  
5.3.3.3 Operational level discussion  
At the operational level, there were restrictions placed on the size of ground 
forces and restrictions on the use of force against certain targets.165  Tight political 
constraints required Gen. Franks to hold key decisions at his level (or only delegate them 
to his immediate staff).  This created an environment that limited operational level 
coordination among his service components.  As described by Kometer, there was little 
interaction between the service component organizations and decision authority was 
“consolidated at CENTCOM.”166  The CIA (a non-DoD government agency) worked 
only for Franks, the Special Operations Force (SOF) ground detachments operated 
independently, coordinated by individual Northern and Southern Task Forces (SOTF) 
under Gen. Franks.167  The Air Component Commander (JFACC/CAOC) operated based 
on targeting guidance, target selections and solutions determined by the CENTCOM 
staff.168  As noted earlier, SOF and CIA forces connected Afghan resistance forces with 
precision air power.169 
For operations with air and ground forces, this paints a picture of a tree-like  
                                                
164 Davis, p.  
165 These were separate from fundamental physical constraints on moving a large number of heavy (or 
light) forces into Afghanistan simply because of the shear distances and geography involved. 
166 Kometer, p. 126. 
167 Early in the campaign there was no established Special Operations Component Commander (SOCC) 
(Davis, p. 18-19 and 128.) 
168 LaVella, p. 12-14; Fyfe, p. 10-12; Kometer, p. 126-128. 
169 Biddle’s entire thesis is that the success in Afghanistan was unique and does not signal a 
transformational shift in the conduct of warfare.  Biddle’s argument is an example of the need to focus on 
flexibility in overall force structure design (the ability to use SOF to direct air power in a ground campaign) 
as well as to focus on flexibility when designing operational architectures (actually choosing to use SOF to 
direct air power). 
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Figure 47:  Afghanistan architecture for Special Operations Force ground 
operations 
structure shown in Figure 47.  The lateral connections between SOF-N and the air 
component are indicative of the interface between those two components, beginning 
about Nov 7, 2001, a month into the campaign.  Also, note that this connection is 
unidirectional.  The SOF forces were placing requests for air support to the air 
component; there was little two-way interaction, at least at the headquarters level, due to 
the nature of the operations.170  The SOF-S component was initially not equipped to 
interface with air power at either the tactical or operational levels.171   
In addition to the unique SOF-air interactions, there were other SOF operations 
underway—against al Qaeda leadership targets.  Because of the nature and operating 
location of these targets, they were handled differently.  There were wider considerations 
                                                
170 Davis, p. 39-59. 
171 This situation created problems as noted in (Davis 2004a) and (Kometer 2005). 
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than the ability to leverage flexibility to strike these targets immediately despite any real 
or perceived importance.  For these targets, the National Security Council (NSC) set  
 
Figure 48:  Afghanistan Time-Sensitive Targeting architecture 
priorities and rules of engagement.  These rules limited Gen. Franks’ ability to delegate 
authority and limited his flexibility against these targets early in the campaign.172  As was 
the case with SOF-directed air-ground engagements, the AOC was limited in its ability to 
engage targets—targets were selected and engagements directed from CENTCOM.  
Decisions flowed from the top level, limiting depth and flexibility.173  The key 
architectural observation is that the overarching rules established in the White House and 
                                                
172 Kometer, p. 126. 
173 This observation mostly concerns time-sensitive targets, those of interest to Gen. Franks and higher 
levels of command.  Even though the targeting process and decisions were conducted and made at 
CENTCOM, the CAOC performed its own independent targeting process.  These parallel targeting 
processes increased friction when differences between targeting models and judgments arose between the 
CAOC and CENTCOM  (LaVella, p. 19-20). 
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Pentagon drove the structure and delegation of decision-making authority, which limited 
enterprise flexibility.  The structure for sensitive targets is shown in Figure 48.174 
At the operational level, Afghanistan, like Kosovo, was a tree-like architecture 
with ground forces added, but this overall vertical structure and the consequent lack of 
flexibility were not overly harmful in Afghanistan.  After an initial 11 days of strategic 
bombing, the air component’s sortie load in support of ground operations was limited and 
manageable.  The ground force was dispersed and relatively small, lowering the 
deconfliction/coordination load and there were plenty of aircraft overhead; the ground 
force was rarely lacking air support.  Tactical level activities could be coordinated at the 
operational level headquarters without the need to have intervening layers of organization 
to handle large workloads or more complex coordination and collaboration.175,176 
However, unlike Kosovo, in Afghanistan there were lateral connections at the tactical air-
ground interface, which increased tactical level effectiveness and enhanced operational 
level performance.177 
5.3.3.4 Tactical level discussion  
There were three basic classes of tactical operations in Afghanistan, there were 
targets identified by SOF forces supporting Afghan rebels, those identified by special 
SOF teams operating independently and those identified by CENTCOM or the CAOC 
using unmanned air vehicles (UAVs) or space-based sensors.  The architectures for these 
targets were different in each case.  We will deal with the first and the last cases, since 
the middle case involves highly classified operations where little open-source information 
is available.178 
                                                
174 It is worth noting that both CENTCOM and the CAOC had access to the same sensor data.  The 
different perspectives on targeting leadership targets generated friction between the air component and 
CENTCOM (LaVella 2003; Kometer 2005). 
175 Jumper (USAF Operation Anaconda Lessons learned), p. 42 discusses the CAOC Operations director’s 
discussion of the workload issues in conducting tactical level functions in the CAOC. 
176 The large exception to this is Operation Anaconda, a complex ground operation that revealed 
weaknesses in the Operation Enduring Freedom command architecture.  Davis and Kometer analyze this 
operation in detail. 
177 These connections were established after about a month of independent, uncoordinated SOF operations 
(Davis, p. 41-42). 
178 These operations were titled “sensitive site exploitation” operations 
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At the tactical level, the Afghanistan operation was a mixture of vertical and 
lateral structures.  Special Operations teams provided lateral connections between U.S. 
aircraft and Afghan rebel forces.  In situations where there were direct engagements with 
Taliban or al Qaeda, the air and ground forces were able to adjust as necessary to achieve 
objectives.  It is also clear from the previous discussion that the structure of the enterprise 
was vertical when it came to operations against politically sensitive targets and in areas 
where collateral damage was possible.179  
Kometer outlines the fundamental tactical level architecture in Afghanistan, 
which had to address these two major target classes.  The first class of targets was 
handled by either the CAOC or a terminal air controller (TAC) who provided targeting 
information to the aircraft, with permission to attack granted by either CENTCOM or 
the CAOC, depending on the location and classification of the target (see Figure 48).  
The second type of target was handled more like traditional close air support:  “[aircraft] 
followed direction from the CAOC for almost all mission details until they were directed 
to contact a ground team.  After that, they were under the team’s control.”180  Normal 
doctrinal connections between the ground force and the air force were not in place due to 
the non-traditional ground force used in Afghanistan and the lack of an advanced 
operational plan.181 
Architecturally, a lateral connection between TACs and aircraft existed:  
“…several of the controllers related they had broad permission from the CAOC to work 
directly with the aircraft.  They also had clear guidance on what types of targets they 
could have the aircraft attack without coordination, and what types required higher-level 
coordination.”182  This example demonstrates flexibility through lateral connections at 
the lowest level.  For non-SOF designated targets, the CAOC or CENTCOM used 
UAVs and space-based sensors to develop targeting information, then passed it directly 
                                                
179 Kometer, 126-127, Davis, p. 39 
180 Kometer, p. 181. 
181 Davis, p. 56 and 58.  In many areas where the U.S. has long-term concerns, operational plans are 
developed and used in exercises, wargames and other venues to craft effective responses to contingencies.  
There were no such plans for Afghanistan in 2001. 
182 Kometer, (p. 202). 
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to the aircraft.  Diagrams of the two examples of Afghanistan tactical operations are in 
Figure 47 and Figure 48.  It is clear from the diagrams that flexibility (as well as  
 
Figure 49:  Overall Afghanistan architecture 
responsiveness) can be enhanced by the use of lateral connections.  A diagram combining 
the Time Sensitive Targeting and the SOF ground structures is in Figure 49. 
5.3.3.5 Summary 
The enterprise architecture in Afghanistan was similar to Kosovo, but with the 
addition of ground forces and a higher tolerance for risk at the strategic level.  There were 
two major classes of targets:  sensitive targets, controlled from top levels of command, 
and those similar to close air support (CAS) targets but that required a higher degree of 
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lateral coordination and collaboration between ground forces to be effective.183  This dual 
control scheme led to a mixed level of tactical flexibility in Afghanistan operations.   
The mixed architecture generated both flexible-lateral and inflexible-vertical 
structures, corresponding to the conflicting needs of the overall strategic approach to the 
operation.  For ground force operations against the Taliban army, the architecture was 
decentralized—lateral interactions at the tactical level enabled tactical level flexibility.  
There were also situations where pre-established engagement zones were in effect.  In 
these cases, the CAOC and SOF ground forces had wide latitude to make decisions to 
achieve an objective.  In these special cases, flexibility was high; lateral connections 
between air and ground forces increased efficiency and effectiveness of both air power 
and ground forces.184   
High value targets, usually those with special political sensitivity, were handled 
with a vertical structure.  For cases where the vertical structure dominated, flexibility, 
efficiency and effectiveness evaluations are problematic and highly dependent on 
hierarchical level:  the context and priorities of the senior level decision maker, usually 
Gen. Franks.185  From an air power control perspective, where direct support of SOF 
forces was necessary, decisions were delegated to low levels, but with the CAOC always 
providing detailed direction and coordination of the aircraft up to the point of hand-off to 
a terminal ground controller. 
At the operational level, air and ground power combined to provide flexibility and 
effectiveness not achieved in Kosovo.  Though the structure at the operational level was a 
tree, when combined with tactical laterality it proved highly effective:  the Taliban 
                                                
183 Kometer, p. 139 notes the gradual shift in character of air-ground missions from classic close air support 
and interdiction to a new type of mission based on time and target importance or sensitivity.  He highlights 
the procedural and process changes that have occurred and that continue, emphasizing a trend toward 
decentralization (depth of command) necessary to achieve success.  In Air Power Against Terror: 
America’s Conduct of Operation Enduring Freedom, Lambeth also notes the qualitatively different nature 
of air support provided in Afghanistan compared with traditional close air support operations (p. 341). 
184 It is important to note that the ground force had very limited offensive capability, which made air power 
the dominant physical force.  It is equally important to note that, until the SOF forces were able to direct 
the air power, it was of limited combat value.  (Biddle 2003, p. 1, 7, 42). 
185 LaVella discusses the differences of opinion between CENTCOM and the CAOC in these situations.  
Franks, in American Soldier, provides his version of events for one particularly significant engagement 
(LaVella 2003)(p. 290-295) 
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government fell in 72 days, a stark contrast to the Kosovo operation and to the Russian 
occupation of Afghanistan in the late 1980s.186  Ground forces, even though limited in 
size, connected to air power and enabled system level flexibility as well as increased 
effectiveness.  As a cautionary note, the overall small size of the ground force, the 
relative low tempo and dispersed nature of operations did not stress the vertically 
oriented architecture until the last major operation of campaign, Operation Anaconda.  
This operation was envisioned as a “sweep-up” operation where little resistance and a 
small opposing force were expected.  The intensity of the actual battle and the close 
physical space in which both ground and air power were employed stressed the command 
structure to the breaking point.187  Kometer uses Operation Anaconda as a prime example 
of the consequences of low depth of command.  Operations in Afghanistan were 
dispersed and low tempo, from the air command perspective.  These types of operation 
do not always require depth of command or high degrees of laterality.  Anaconda turned 
out to be a concentrated, intense, high tempo ground engagement that exposed tactical 
level control problems resulting from a lack of operational level coordination and 
collaboration.  Kometer emphasizes lack of depth in relationships in this case, implying 
from top to bottom.  What happened in this case, and what largely existed in all previous 
cases, was the inverse:  lateral connections at the bottom, with a lack of connections at 
the operational level headquarters.  In Operation Anaconda, however, there were other 
factors that exacerbated the problem of poor laterality at the top:  lack of attention to the 
operation, focus on Iraq as the next step in the War on Terror are two of these factors. 
In Afghanistan, in situations where air power operated in support of ground 
forces, there was low flexibility at the beginning (SOF-South), but when ground 
controllers joined the SOF-South forces, flexibility and effectiveness increased.  In cases 
where there were highly sensitive targets, the architecture was vertical and less flexible.  
                                                
186 Though there are many other factors that differentiate between Operation Enduring Freedom and the 
Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, there has been little argument over the effectiveness of the SOF-Air 
Force combination in this conflict. 
187 Kometer addresses Operation Anaconda in more detail than I have chosen to present here.  The most 
comprehensive analysis of this operation is Davis’ thesis from Air University.  The Air Force lessons 
learned report also contains valuable information.  Sean Naylor’s Not a Good Day to Die:  The Untold 
Story of Operation Anaconda, presents a journalistic view of the operation from the Army’s perspective.  
Beyond these, there are few unbiased sources of information that could support more detailed architectural 
analysis. 
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When extensive flexibility was needed (Operation Anaconda), lack of lateral connections 
at the operational headquarters level caused tactical level confusion when flexibility at 
the tactical level was needed. 
5.3.4 Operation Iraqi Freedom—Major Combat Operations (2003): 
5.3.4.1 Operational context and characterization of the conflict 
In a study of campaigns between Desert Storm in 1991 and Iraqi Freedom in 
2003, these two conflicts serve as bookends.188  These two conflicts are amenable to a 
side-by-side comparison.  Though there are significant differences, there are enough 
similarities such that we can gain architectural insights from a comparison.  The 
operational context of Iraq-II was dominated by the need to address what was assessed as 
a key threat in the post 9-11 security environment.189 The U. S. had been engaged in a 
low level war with Saddam Hussein essentially since the end of Desert Storm through the 
enforcement of no-fly zones and oil embargoes.  Over the decade since the end of Desert 
Storm, the Iraqi regime had progressively whittled away at the effectiveness of U. N. 
sanctions aimed at containing it as a threat to regional stability.  As in Afghanistan, 
strategic, diplomatic and political constraints drove development of a plan that could be 
executed on short notice, which meant limited forces (resources).   
Desert Storm left Saddam’s Republican Guard largely intact, so the conflict was 
set up as a classic high-end armored ground campaign, combined with a dominant air 
force on our side.  Though the forces may have been mismatched in technology, the 
capability imputed to the Iraqi army was not minor and overall success of the U.S. effort 
was by no means assured beforehand.  As with Desert Storm, Iraqi Freedom can be 
characterized as relatively symmetric; both sides had similarly composed ground forces 
                                                
188 Operation Iraqi Freedom is also sometimes called Iraq-II or the Second Gulf War. 
189 The motivation, rationale, political and factual support for the decision to invade Iraq and depose 
Hussein’s regime is a volatile subject that will not be settled here.  We ascribe honest, well-meaning, 
motives to those who made tough strategic and leadership decisions during that period.  It will be decades 
before clarity and rationality on this subject prevails.  While addressing Iraq as a strategic problem was a 
focus early on in the Bush Administration, the first reported direction for explicit consideration of attacking 
Iraq is November 2001 (Franks 2004; Woodward 2004). 
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with advantage to be gained through either larger more numerous forces or more 
innovative combinations and uses of those forces.190 
5.3.4.2 U.S. approach to the conflict and structural features of 
our forces 
The major differences on the U.S. side between Desert Storm and Iraq-II were 
available resources and strategic goals.  In Iraq-II, physical resources were more tightly 
constrained, with the U.S. ground force about one third the size used in Desert Storm.191  
The overall U. S. approach in Iraq-II was to build a more highly integrated, cross-service 
effort—a more “Joint” campaign than Desert Storm or even Afghanistan.192  This was 
driven in part by the limited force size—resource constraints forced operational 
integration of forces to compensate for smaller numbers.193  In addition to reduced force 
size, lessons from Afghanistan and a year of planning contributed to development of 
better command relationships, which led to a lateral enterprise architecture, especially at 
the operational level.194  Personnel stability was also a factor, with the senior leadership 
of the Afghanistan campaign continuing to work together as Operation Iraqi Freedom 
planning progressed.195  These initial observations show a more lateral structure at the 
headquarters level than any of the other campaigns.   
The overall operational differentiator between Desert Storm and Iraqi Freedom is 
that Desert Storm was designed as a sequential operation:  the air campaign preceded the 
ground campaign.  Iraqi Freedom was designed for simultaneity—a single air and ground 
                                                
190 Both Iraq and the U.S. used innovative methods to gain advantage.  Iraqi forces used urban areas, 
decoys and cover to hide and evade U.S. sensors and air power.  The U.S. used innovative combinations of 
air and ground power enabled by pervasive sensor and communication technology to “overmatch” the 
Iraqis (Franks 2003; Rumsfeld 2003; Kirkpatrick 2004). 
191 Desert Storm was fought with about 500,000 American ground troops (Army and Marine Corps) and 
Iraqi Freedom with about 175,000 troops (Army and Marine Corps).  In terms of air assets and resources, 
the level of effort was about the same in terms of the number of aircraft employed. 
192 (Franks 2004)Franks, p. 383. 
193 (Kirkpatrick 2004). 
194 Rumsfeld desired to limit the size of the ground force both for strategic and management reasons.  Gen. 
Franks and his planners determined the final force size for the operation.  Additionally, the last minute 
withholding by Turkey of access and over-flight rights caused further constraints on the deployment of men 
and equipment to Iraq. 
195 Kometer, p. 132.  He also highlights Gen. Franks’ focus on building command relationships at the 
component commander level during the lead up to the Iraq war. 
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campaign.196  As a result, the overarching qualitative difference between Enduring 
Freedom and Iraqi Freedom was the delegation of more decision authority to component 
commanders.197   
5.3.4.3 Operational Level Analysis 
For Operation Iraqi Freedom, Gen. Franks implemented a Joint Guidance 
Apportionment and Targeting (JGAT) process that prioritized air power requests from all 
components.  This created lateral information interaction at the headquarters level and 
was supplemented by a CENTCOM-led (top down) Combined Targeting Coordination 
Board (CTCB) (Kometer).  In addition, to facilitate coordination and collaboration 
between other commanders and the air component, Gen. Moseley (the Joint Force Air 
Component Commander (JFACC)) created an additional organizational link, the Air 
Component Coordination element (ACCE).198  The ACCE is specifically tasked with 
establishing lateral connections between commanders of other component operational 
commanders and the air component commander.  This was an organizational change to 
“enhance the communication” between air and ground component commanders.199  The 
addition of the ACCE is represented by the green lateral connections between the JFACC 
and the JFLCC and V Corps headquarters organizations in Figure 50. 
                                                
196 Kirkpatrick, Land Warfare Paper 48, p. 6. 
197 Kometer, p. 185. 
198 A major contributing factor in the difficulties of Operation Anaconda was ineffective personal 
communication and coordination between the Air and Land component commanders.  The ACCE was 
specifically aimed at correcting this problem by creating a direct connection between commanders 
(Grossman 2005).   
199 (Kometer 2005) and (Grossman 2005). Kometer notes this interface enhanced development of the 
overall plan before the start of the war and enabled flexibility in execution by allowing better coordination, 
especially in moving the fire support coordination line (FSCL) during the campaign. 
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Figure 50:  Iraqi Freedom V Corps-ASOC architecture 
For simplicity, an architectural diagram of only the Army-Air Force interactions 
in Iraqi Freedom is shown in Figure 50.  The lateral connections in Figure 50 below the 
level of the Air Force-Army connection are discussed in the next section, 5.3.4.4.  
Though sensor information was widely shared in Iraqi Freedom, there were some systems 
that were still service unique, such as some UAV sensor information.  This is represented 
in Figure 50 by a second set of “remote sensing” inputs, some of which cross over service 
lines (e.g., the Army’s sensor input to the ASOC). 
5.3.4.4 Tactical Level Analysis 
An important example of air-ground architecture in Iraq-II was the connection 
between the Army’s V Corps (Lt. Gen. William Wallace) and the 4th Air Support 
Operations Center (ASOC).  Wallace’s ASOC developed an innovative concept to 
leverage access to sensor information (UAV, JSTARS and Strike aircraft) that it did not 
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have in previous conflicts.  The idea was to attack targets as they were found instead of 
placing them in the ATO targeting queue.  In addition to better sensor information, the 
ASOC could talk directly with aircraft via satellite phone, also something not possible 
before.  In order to implement this concept, the V Corps Fires Effects Coordination Cell 
(FECC) and the ASOC were tightly integrated before deploying to Iraq.  This created 
lateral connections at multiple levels that allowed flexible control of aircraft and ground 
fires.  In fact, during the famous dash to Baghdad, Lt. Gen. Wallace gave the ASOC 
authority to shape the Corps’ battlespace beyond the Fire Support Coordination Line 
(FSCL), a task normally not assigned to a member of the air component.200  Because of 
the new lateral interactions, the ASOC shifted from acting as a “traffic cop,” directing 
aircraft to lower echelon forces for close air support missions, to being an integral part of 
the V Corps’ fires team, making decisions and directing air and ground fires to achieve 
commander’s objectives.201 
Another example of depth and flexibility in Operation Iraqi Freedom can be found 
in the CAOC’s Time Critical Targeting (TCT) Cell.  For Operation Iraqi Freedom, TCT 
decision authority was delegated from Franks to Moseley, who delegated to the head of 
the Time Critical Targeting (TCT) Cell in the CAOC.  The TCT Cell is an example of 
lateral interactions, in that it coordinated with the CAOC Strategy Cell and with ISR 
analysts in the United States to identify and develop coordinates on targets.202  This is 
also an example of the CAOC, an operational level headquarters, operating at the tactical 
level of combat.  At the operational level, we identify this as a vertical connection—the 
AOC directing tactical action, architecturally we identify it as “level skipping.”  But we 
can also see flexibility inside the TCT Cell itself.  The TCT Cell was actually divided in 
to three parts:  North, South and West in order to manage workload.  Inside each cell, the 
interactions were laterally oriented, or “flat”, with members of the cell working many 
targets in parallel.203 
                                                
200 The “deep battle” is considered operations beyond the fire support coordination line (FSCL), an area of 
action normally reserved for the Army Corps, with the Air Force providing interdiction support. 
201 Kirkpatrick, Land Warfare Paper No. 48, p. 2-3. 
202 Kometer, p. 156-157, 
203 Fyfe, p. 20. 
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5.3.4.5 Summary 
There were lateral connections at multiple levels during Iraqi Freedom, more so 
than in Desert Storm or the other two cases.  The addition of the ACCE at the 
commanders’ level and the much closer, more highly integrated ASOC-FECC connection 
at the V Corps level and below are the two significant operational and tactical level 
lateral connections that enabled flexibility.  From a laterality perspective, we classify 
Iraqi Freedom as having L1/L2/L3 laterality. 
5.3.5 Overall Case Analysis Summary 
Kometer emphasizes distributed cognition, the fragmentation of kill chain 
functions among multiple, geographically dispersed organizations, and its impact on 
operational outcomes.204  While he emphasizes the influence of hierarchical relations, he 
does not address hierarchy at the system level.  Our focus is on the hierarchical aspect of 
the distribution of functions across organizations and how it relates to enterprise 
flexibility.  A major trend in military operations since Operation Desert Storm has been 
for wider access tactical level information and, increasingly, for higher headquarters 
(specifically the CAOC and, in Iraqi Freedom, Central Command) to perform selected 
tactical level functions.  This is a trend toward vertical structures and also toward more 
random structures that could inhibit desired flexibility as well as enable increased risk of 
accidents (Kometer 2005).  Inattention to the impact of hierarchy on these properties may 
prevent development of effective organizations for dynamic and uncertain environments. 
Over the period between Desert Storm and Iraqi Freedom, the sense-decide-act 
sequence has become fragmented.  This fragmentation is the result of the diffusion of 
information systems and widely accessible data, which has increased the number of 
functions that can be performed by each entity in the enterprise, enabling a redistribution 
of functions involved in the planning and execution process.  This enables many more 
combinations (alternatives) of people, organizations and systems to accomplish 
operational tasks —alternative to address uncertainty in the environment.  Kometer 
discusses these changes in detail, chronicling technical and social factors that have 
                                                
204 He uses the Find-Fix-Track-Target-Engage-Assess (F2T2EA) model; recall that we have simplified this 
to sense-decide-act for the purposes of enterprise architectural analysis 
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influenced it, assessing the cost (system accidents) and benefits (more effective and 
responsive air power) of this fragmentation as a function of internal interactions and 
external operating conditions.  In Desert Storm the number of aircraft that could be flown 
against targets, each executing the entire sense-decide-act sequence, limited the options—
the degree of flexibility available to the commanders.  Because of technical advances in 
sensors and communications, the challenge in Afghanistan and Iraqi Freedom became 
choosing a useful configuration from among the many possible configurations of the 
sense-decide-act sequence—designing architecture to deliver “overmatching power.” 
Overall, the picture painted by Kometer is that tighter controls result in less 
empowerment, and lower ability to innovate when it is needed.  Looser control can 
enable the use of alternative combinations of functions (flexibility), but runs the risk of 
unintended consequences.  In structural terms, tight control generally creates vertical 
structures while looser control creates interactions that cross organization boundaries 
more often.  In our examination of these cases, we see a pattern of increased flexibility 
when multiple levels are allowed to coordinate and collaborate directly to complete kill 
chains or other function/task sequences.  We also see a common pattern of lack of lateral 
interactions at multiple, especially high, levels of command until Operation Iraqi 
Freedom in 2003.205  In addition, though technological challenges remain, the emergence 
and availability of new technologies have contributed to the creation of these lateral 
connections. 
As sensor information diffuses to lower echelons and they become able to connect 
with each other in value adding ways, more options for employment are available—the 
system becomes flexible.206  Representing the architecture as a series of sense-decide-act 
steps, we conceptualize these sequences as alternative paths through the system—
representing more options for executing missions.  What we have seen in this chapter is 
that descriptive accounts of these campaigns can be represented structurally, that there 
                                                
205 Recall that our definition of lateral interactions embodies collaboration among peers (organizations and 
people operating at the same level in the enterprise hierarchy). 
206 This is the implicit rationale for the current operational employment for tactical UAVs in Iraq.  They 
have been placed under the control of tactical commanders, increasing flexibility at that level.  This comes 
at the cost of possibly being unable to re-task these assets to higher priority missions should the need arise. 
(Odierno et al. 2008). 
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are hierarchical patterns to these structures and that these patterns correspond generally to 
the qualitative assessment of flexibility observed in each case.  Table 5 summarizes the 
laterality in each of the case examples and illuminates the trend toward multi-level 
laterality.  
Fig. Conflict 
Levels where lateral 
connections existed 
(L=Level) 
Assessed Flexibility207  
Figure 39 Desert Storm 0 Low  
Figure 43 Desert Storm L2 Medium (interdiction) Legend: 
Figure 44 Kosovo 0 Low L1:  Strategic level 
Figure 45 Kosovo L1/L2 High (fixed targets) L2:  Operational level 
Figure 46 Kosovo L3 Medium (moving targets) L3:  Tactical level 
Figure 47 Afghanistan L2/L3 Medium (SOF-air)  
Figure 48 Afghanistan 0 Low (sensitive targets)  
Figure 49 Afghanistan L2/L3 Medium (overall)  
Figure 50 Iraq-II L1/L2/L3 High (air-ground ops)  
Table 5:  Summary of Laterality and Flexibility Across Cases 
Kometer’s analysis developed two concepts for building or evolving an enterprise 
that can respond effectively to changes in external requirements.  We seek to add an 
architectural focus with our interpretation of his work based on original, focused, analysis 
of four major case examples.  As our systems (and enemy systems) become more capable 
and interoperable, the number of possible arrangements for a military campaign increases 
exponentially.  Senior leadership needs to think more carefully and clearly about design 
of their enterprises in this age.  The design challenge that makes this problem different 
from the relatively unstructured approach assumed by most research is that for military 
operations control of the degree of flexibility is crucial, especially in combat.  Kometer 
identified methods to manage this flexibility.  By looking at hierarchical structures, we 
have started taking initial steps toward a design model of enterprises. 
Key issues in choosing architectures or in evaluating enterprise structures are the 
trade-offs between efficiency, effectiveness, flexibility, risk and architecture.  These 
                                                
207 This flexibility assessment is the summarized qualitative assessment from the case analysis earlier in the 
Chapter. 
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trade-offs are dependent upon operational context (the enemy and third parties), political 
objectives handed down from the strategic level of command and the conceptual level at 
which the trade-off calculation is made.  Chapter 6 discusses these trade-offs. 
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Chapter 6  
A Trade-off Analysis: 
Advantages and Disadvantages of Flexibility in Complex Operational Systems:   
6.0 Introduction 
If we focus on flexibility in systems, it is helpful to understand the advantages and 
disadvantages to having flexibility and the relationship of flexibility to other important 
system properties, such as overall effectiveness, complexity and efficiency.  What does 
flexibility cost?  What are its benefits?  Is flexibility always good?  How can we balance 
efficiency with flexibility, which requires slack resources at some level in the system and 
is therefore at least somewhat inefficient?  This chapter examines complex military 
operations from Chapter 5 to highlight the relationship between efficiency, flexibility and 
effectiveness.  
A major challenge in all forms of design is balancing many conflicting 
requirements.  This challenge is particularly acute when considering flexibility as a 
system property.  This chapter will discuss the relationship of architecture to flexibility, 
complexity, efficiency and effectiveness at different hierarchical levels of enterprise 
operations.  Our main argument is that enterprises operating in dynamic and uncertain 
environments should have flexibility as a goal, possibly an overarching one.  Flexibility 
and efficiency are multi-level concepts—they are valued differently depending on the 
hierarchical level of the enterprise at which their value is assessed.  While flexibility is 
not necessarily free—there is usually a loss of some efficiency or some cost paid to gain 
greater flexibility—the central theme of this chapter is that traditional “either-or” trade-
offs between efficiency and flexibility are less important in enterprises because the trade-
off depends on the hierarchical level in the system at which the trade is considered.  It is 
also our observation that system complexity plays a role in the trade-off as well, but that 
this cost can be mitigated by factors such as learning and trust.  Learning and trust can 
mitigate the cost of added complexity, especially in information-intensive systems such 
as enterprises.  Architecture is a key determinant of degree of added complexity for a 
given level of flexibility and can influence how effectively learning can reduce the cost of 
this additional complexity.  A rich stream of empirical and theoretical literature supports 
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this observation (Arrow 1962b; Adler et al. 1999; Koste and Malhotra 1999, Vol. 1, Part 
2; Roberts 2006). 
6.1 Enterprise compared to technical and organizational architectures 
A significant challenge in physical system design is balancing trade-offs between 
desired system performance attributes.  An emerging trend in system architecture is the 
tension between efficiency and flexibility, requiring an understanding of the trade-offs 
that must be made in system design.  Product design and development and traditional 
systems engineering methods emphasize meeting requirements efficiently, usually by 
decomposing the system into components, designing these components and then 
integrating them into an operating product (Ulrich and Eppinger 1995; Eppinger 2003).  
One focus of research in this area is on designing processes and organizations to 
maximize efficiency by reducing “churn” and uncertainty, sometimes by matching 
organizational architecture to product architectures (Whitney 1990; Eppinger 2003; 
Yassine et al. 2003; Sosa et al. 2004).  Software engineers and developers also emphasize 
meeting requirements through effective decomposition of systems into relatively 
independent modules (which allows efficient system development) (Parnas 1972). But 
they add an additional design consideration for architecture, composition, which is the 
consideration of overall system properties under a variety of system uses and changes 
(Garlan et al. 1992; Garlan and Shaw 1993).208  Also, computer network architects are 
not dominated by efficiency considerations as much as other technical disciplines.  In 
general they tend to give trade-off between efficiency and flexibility more importance 
than other trade-offs, such as specific performance parameters, because of the relative 
ease of changing information systems (Whitney 1996; Moses 2006b).  Their method is to 
take a technologically informed approach to architecture design, with an understanding 
that technology and the overall system will change over time.  Their main emphasis is on 
system-level performance goals and setting criteria (standards) that govern interaction 
among systems that compose the network (Clark 1988; Clark and Tennenhouse 1990; 
                                                
208 Composition in the area of software is more than just integration of components into a functioning 
whole.  Software composition is consideration of how different parts of the system may be invoked 
(composed) at different times based on user needs, which can be widely variable.  Consideration of the 
many ways that date can be accessed and manipulated is important in software. 
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Clark et al. 2005).  Standards and performance goals in combination with more specific 
user requirements then drive detailed design decisions and system implementations. 
Moving to organization studies and other branches of research, there is a long-
standing debate over efficiency and flexibility (Astley and de Ven 1983; Scott 1992; 
Adler et al. 1999).  In most frameworks, the choice has historically been considered 
“either-or”, reflecting the general assumption that it is difficult to operate at any point 
other than at either end of a spectrum between an efficient (mechanistic, bureaucratic, 
hierarchical) and flexible (organic, networked) organization and that this is the critical 
strategic choice for management.209  Along with this assumption is the corollary that 
efficiency and flexibility are incompatible, that it is difficult or impossible to craft a 
structure able to combine efficiency and flexibility.  This assumption logically generates 
the view that, therefore, there is only a single choice to be made and where, once the 
decision has been made, all that management can do is hope the environment remains 
favorable to the choice (Hannan and Freeman 1989).210  Adler, et al. present a succinct 
review of the pervasiveness of this dichotomy across disciplines and theoretical 
constructs (contingency, social-psychological) (Adler et al. 1999).  A major finding of 
their analysis is to show how efficiency-flexibility trade-offs have shifted over a number 
of years at a Toyota and GM joint venture automobile assembly plant (NUMMI).211 
                                                
209 A third choice is possible, derived from computer science.  This is to craft a layered hierarchical system, 
one, which may be able to achieve a balance between efficiency and effectiveness in operation.  This form 
is in use in some fields, such as law firms, the Catholic Church and some aspects of military organizations 
(Moses 2006a). 
210 Effectiveness of a system is supported by properties such as flexibility, change, innovation or adaptivity, 
which help to maintain a level of fitness with a changing external environment.  Recent research in product 
development and manufacturing processes suggest that the choice is not “either-or.”  There are 
organizations able to respond to high-rate of change environments while still maintaining the necessary 
efficiency to remain competitive (Bourgeois and Eisenhardt 1988; Iansiti 1995a; Adler et al. 1999; 
MacCormack 2001).  These organizations represent a “middle ground” that has not been deeply explored in 
research and not from an architectural perspective. 
211 NUMMI is a joint venture automobile plant in Fremont, CA between Toyota and General Motors.  
NUMMI has been used as a case study in lean production.  Adler, et al. highlight management and 
leadership tools used at NUMMI that allow both flexibility and efficiency and that also identify causal 
relationships that allow conscious management of these two properties.  
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Something only tangentially addressed by the main body of research on 
organization and management is multi-level analysis.212  At the enterprise level, many 
approaches lack explicit recognition that efficiency and flexibility exhibit a different 
character and different value at different levels of analysis and operation.  Related to this 
is the lack of a temporal perspective that can account for improvement over time through 
learning (Arrow 1962a).  We think these are major sources of confusion, resulting in 
inconclusive debates and seemingly inconsistent analytical results across research studies 
(Henderson and Clark 1990; Sethi and Sethi 1990b; Iansiti 1995a; Barki and Pinsonneault 
2005).213  Consequently, managers and senior leaders of organizations are presented with 
conflicting practical guidance.  This problem is magnified when we move to the 
enterprise level. 
The chapter proceeds with a general framework for thinking about flexibility in an 
enterprise context.  We include a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of 
alternative architectures, with special attention to lateral and layered structures.  We then 
present some simple operational scenarios as examples of the differences between 
efficiency and flexibility across different levels of enterprise.  We conclude with concrete 
examples taken from recent military conflicts, and discuss the ramifications of 
architecture on flexibility-efficiency-complexity trade-offs.214 
6.2 Framework for analyzing trade-offs 
The most fundamental goal of an architecture choice is to maintain effectiveness 
of the system in its environment.  We have defined flexibility as the ability to change a 
system to meet new demands with relative ease (design flexibility) or to have alternative 
ways within the architecture of delivering value in a time responsive way in response to 
changing requirements (operational flexibility).  We define efficiency as delivering the 
same output with fewer resources (planes, bombs, people, money) or by increasing output 
(maintaining ability to deliver value) with the same level of resources.  In a military 
context we define effectiveness as the ability to exert some form of control over the 
                                                
212 The multi-scale and multi-level nature of complex systems is well documented (Anderson 1972; 
Mandeles 1998; Koste and Malhotra 1999; Bar-Yam 2003). 
213 Mandeles also discusses this in his case study of development of the B-52 (Mandeles 1998). 
214 The discussion that follows is based on Dr. Joel Moses’ class lecture notes from ESD.935, Advanced 
System Architecture (Moses 2006a). 
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enemy or, more generally, control over the pattern of the conflict (Wylie 1989).  This is a 
perspective that focuses on outcomes.215  Though Wylie was mainly concerned with 
military strategy, the idea of control over an adversary is a valid concept at multiple 
levels of war.216  At the operational level, control involves the movement of large-scale 
forces to shape enemy action or limit his options or his flexibility.  At the tactical level of 
military operations, control mainly involves destruction of enemy forces, but can also 
entail the creation of conditions to shape the short-term actions of the enemy or to make 
him give up at the local level. 
For relatively symmetrical competitive situations and similarly sized forces (e.g., 
sports such as football, or nation-state military combat) we consider two main 
competitive choices:  (1) use more numerous and/or better systems, personnel, and 
specialized forces to outperform opponents or (2) use flexibility both to confuse 
opponents and to respond better to actions of the other side or to other aspects of the 
environment.  Using systems that are more capable and people with more specialized 
skills can become expensive.217  It can also place an increased decision-making and 
control burden on management because of the need to coordinate specialties to deliver 
system level functions.  It is also important to note that use of narrowly focused, 
specialized skills is subject to strong diminishing return effects (Arrow 1962a).  
Competing with increased flexibility usually entails increased system complexity.  This 
implies that there is a trade-off that must be considered when making strategic choices 
about how to compete.  In relatively centrally managed competitive situations, where 
unequal sized forces are involved (resources are constrained on one side), flexibility 
(with a more complex architecture) can be used.  Alternatively, a choice can be made to 
use excess resources or highly specialized and skilled forces (overwhelming force) to 
dominate the enemy (competition). 
                                                
215 The importance of an outcome-based approach in military operations is discussed in detail by the Gulf 
War Air Power Survey, Volume 1, Planning and Command and Control (Cohen 1993). 
216 This idea also applies to business and political situations. 
217 This corresponds to the well-known “quality over quantity” trade-off, to which the counter is “quantity 
has a quality all its own,” meant to capture the idea that having only a few highly specialized and highly 
capable people can add risk.  The preference for one over the other is dependent on the specifics of a 
situation and the resources available, among other things. 
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We can use this framework to think through how laterality can be used to improve 
competitive advantage.  Laterality, as an enabler of flexibility, can allow forces 
(commanders and operators) to be more effective with fixed resources or to maintain the 
same effectiveness with fewer resources (be more efficient).  How does laterality 
accomplish this?  First, it can enable “programming” the enterprise to shift the location of 
decisions automatically in response to events and to automatically shift resource 
allocations and action sequences.  Second, at the tactical level, laterality allows people to 
work together based on local information, enabling action that can be both more effective 
as well as more efficient.  Forces at the local level can shift objectives more easily, 
adjusting to changing requirements without the inevitable time delays and potential 
confusion associated with getting permission or decisions from higher levels.  It also 
allows forces at the scene of action to capture fleeting opportunities that would otherwise 
be missed while waiting for a decision from above.  Third, operating safety margins can 
be lowered while maintaining the same risk level, thus reducing the need for some 
resources.  Laterality, used as a means to enable flexibility, can result in both increased 
efficiency and increased effectiveness.  We should emphasize here that there is no 
guarantee that laterality will make the force more efficient or more effective.  Humans 
will always be prone to errors and will make mistakes that create friction and loss of 
effectiveness and efficiency, something that appears to be a structural feature of war not 
likely to be dissipated by technology (Watts 2004). 
A good example can be found in use of the Fire Support Coordination Line 
(FSCL) in Operations Desert Storm and Iraqi Freedom.  The FSCL is the line on the 
battlefield beyond which air forces are allowed to attack targets without direct 
coordination with ground forces.218  Traditionally, the location of this line has been 
controlled at the Corps level of Army command.  In Operation Desert Storm, inability to 
move this line on short notice enabled the escape of some Iraqi Republican Guard forces 
(Atkinson 1993a; Carpenter 1995).  In Operation Iraqi Freedom, a “Kill Box Grid” was in 
                                                
218 Targets in the area beyond the FSCL are, however, chosen based on ground force priorities, as modified 
by a dialogue between the Joint Force Commander and the Joint Force Air Component Commander (Force 
2000). 
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use for part of the ground battlefield short of the FSCL as a supplement to it.219  Kill 
boxes can be opened or closed more easily than moving the FSCL, providing more areas 
for air power to operate without the need for direct coordination with ground forces.  Use 
of Kill Boxes increased alternatives (that is, flexibility) for employing air power by 
allowing air power assets more freedom of action (decision), and requiring increased 
lateral interactions at tactical levels in the air campaign during Desert Storm and between 
ground and air forces in Iraqi Freedom (Cohen 1993, Vol. 1, Part 2, p. 310; Roberts 
2006).  This increased both efficiency and effectiveness of the air and land battles.  It also 
increased safety margins for ground forces when aircraft operated short of the FSCL 
during Operation Iraqi Freedom, because closed grid boxes were easily specified, 
reducing potential confusion.220   
6.2.1 Defining effectiveness 
The most general definition of effectiveness in war is the ability to impose some 
form of control on the enemy (Wylie 1989).  In general, this amounts to disrupting, 
destroying or manipulating the enemy’s structure.221  
Controlling the enemy is a goal of both the Army and the AF.  The AF likes to 
emphasize breaking structures deep inside enemy territory.222  The object of strategic 
bombing and of air interdiction is to break the will of the opposing people and their 
national leadership and to disconnect the enemy army from its support structure.  These 
arguments of early air power theorists such as Douhet and Mitchell have been carried 
                                                
219 Kill Boxes are an innovation developed in Desert Storm by the Air Force for operations beyond the 
FSCL.  The concept was extended in Operation Iraqi Freedom to operations short of the FSCL.  Kill Boxes 
are 30x30 nm2 in size, keyed to geographic coordinates and demark sections of the battle space that are 
either open or closed to attack from the air.  This enables more discrete (flexible) application of air power 
when in proximity to ground forces.  If ground forces are inside a kill box, the box is closed; if not, the 
ground commander can open the box for air attack.  A more thorough discussion of Kill Boxes can be 
found in (Roberts 2006) and (Cohen 1993, Vol. 1, Part 2).  Coordination is required when moving the 
FSCL to ensure that it is not inadvertently moved beyond open Kill Boxes. 
220 The use of GPS navigation systems enabled precise locating of friendly forces.  This information was 
disseminated in a system called Blue Force Tracking (BFT), which enables wide dissemination across all 
command echelons of locating information of friendly forces. 
221 Breaking structure does not have to mean physical destruction, but in our cases, this is the primary 
measure.  There has been a great effort by the DoD in recent years to understand the non-kinetic 
(destructive) means to achieve control on the enemy.  This discussion is beyond the scope of the present 
analysis. 
222 This emphasis can be traced to the earliest air power theorizing by Douhet, Mitchell and others (Mitchell 
1925, 1988; Douhet and Ferrari 1998). 
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forward, driving the centralized command and control architecture of today’s Air 
Force.223  In contrast, the Army likes to emphasize breaking the structure of and out 
maneuvering the opposing army, and then keep it from reconstituting by remaining on the 
scene of action after the battle.  The Army’s goal is to control the enemy by physical 
occupation of space.   
The Air Force can break structures deep inside enemy territory but has difficulty 
sustaining these breaks (the enemy can repair or work-around the breaks after the Air 
Force leaves).224  The Army has a better chance of sustaining breaks in the opposition’s 
structure because it does not range as far or as fast as aircraft, so can maintain persistent 
presence in an area.225  In Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Air Force and Army worked 
more closely than ever before.  The Air Force enabled the maneuver of the Army by 
attacking Iraqi troops on the ground.  Likewise, the maneuver of the Army forced Iraqi 
Army units to expose themselves and created opportunities for the Air Force to attack.  
The two forces were complementary to each other.  This complementarity improved 
overall effectiveness in the eyes of the V Corps Commander (Kirkpatrick 2004). 
While we have discussed only military operations, Wylie’s idea of control or 
manipulation of outcomes as a measure of effectiveness can be generalized to other forms 
of competition or operational activity. 
6.2.2 Defining efficiency 
A relatively simple traditional measure of efficiency is output divided by input 
resources.  Efficiency is an internal metric.  It is a measure of stewardship or how well 
resources are being used, inside a given process or system.  Efficiency is also dependent 
upon a chosen value set.  In technical systems, once the performance measures of the 
system are set, optimization generally centers on efficiency metrics:  how much input 
does it take to deliver the specified output?  Where can waste be eliminated?  How do I 
minimize chances of system failure?  In these cases, the system boundary is well defined 
                                                
223 A good summary of Douhet’s arguments can be found in J. C. Wylie, “Military Strategy:  A General 
Theory of Power Control”, p. 36-41. 
224 This is a complaint that the Army makes about substituting close air support aircraft for artillery.  
Artillery provides persistence (makes the enemy keep his head down so the Army can maneuver); aircraft 
come and go, allowing the enemy to recover before the Army can maneuver. 
225 These are variations on arguments made by Wylie. 
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and accepted.  For example, the efficiency of a Rankine thermodynamic cycle is well 
accepted as a performance measure of a steam plant.  But efficiency of the plant does not 
tell us anything about whether the Rankine cycle is the best selection for power 
generation. 
Efficiency is not, however, a universal metric.  The value of efficiency is 
contingent upon the values that drive the selection of the system that is being measured.  
The efficiency of thermodynamic cycles varies based on the nature of the energy 
conversion and extraction process.  One can be said to be more efficient than another in a 
technical sense, but the selection of a specific technology is driven by other factors, 
usually those of mission requirements.  The same can apply to enterprise or organization 
architecture. 
Bureaucratic organizations have historically been characterized as the most 
efficient form of organizing.  Bureaucracies, if properly designed to their mission, 
minimize unnecessary interactions and distractions and they make maximum use of input 
resources.  But if the architecture becomes mismatched to the problem, inefficiencies 
develop.  In the extreme, where the problem changes very fast, a network, which is 
intrinsically flexible, may become the most effective and efficient structure.  Short 
communications paths, many possible communication paths or many possible function 
combinations characterize network forms of organization (Moses 2006b).  These 
attributes enable fast response and/or provide many alternative responses.  The increase 
in the number of alternatives and faster response can be viewed as both effective and 
efficient in a changing environment, but also can make the system difficult to manage.226  
In this case, the efficiency metric might become:  “effective output/input resources” or “# 
of used and useful alternatives/# of total alternatives”. 
The bottom line is that discussions of efficiency must always be accompanied by 
a discussion of the problem or mission context and the strategic choices exercised when 
developing the system architecture. 
                                                
226 This difficulty is rarely or poorly addressed in many discussions that attempt to operationalize network-
theoretic concepts such as Network Centric Warfare.  Our hierarchical approach is an attempt to address 
this gap; it offers a way to balance the potentially overwhelming complexity of networked operations with 
the demand for flexibility in operations that is both enabled and created by information technology. 
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6.2.3 Summary 
Our framework shows us two ways to use flexibility at the enterprise level.  First, 
we can make the opponent’s problem harder to solve while using the same level of 
resources.  This entails competing by creating or identifying new opportunities and/or 
giving the opponent a higher number of alternatives to counter (creating confusion).  
Using flexibility to compete in this manner increases the complexity of our operations 
mainly because of external factors.  We call this externally focused complexity.  Second, 
we can maintain the same level of performance with fewer resources, competing 
efficiently (more output with fewer resources) by having the ability to implement more 
alternative combinations of forces in response to the uncertain and changing battle 
environment.  Using flexibility in this manner increases the complexity of our operations 
because of internal factors.  We call this internally focused complexity. 
The alternative is to use excess resources in both number and quality, competing 
by using overwhelming force and skill.  The trouble with this approach, at least in 
modern high-end warfare, is that many combat systems have improved to the point that 
there is little difference in technical capability between opposing sides at the tactical 
level of combat.227,228 This drives advantage to the operational and strategic levels of 
competition, where novel combinations of systems and organizations—architectures—are 
important (Watts 2008b).  Another issue is that overwhelming skill and force drive 
enemies to work around this advantage—they change the operational problem.  In cases 
such as insurgencies, competition is less symmetric, and is usually based on flexibility.  
In asymmetric situations, commanders can use flexibility to present more complexity to 
the opposition (externally focused).  Sometimes this flexibility is enabled by complex 
internal architectures.229  Leveraging or enabling flexibility usually increases internal 
complexity at the same time as it provides a more varied response to their external 
environment or competitors, as summarized in Table 6. 
                                                
227 There are also national fiscal constraints that make system improvement without consideration of 
complementarities with other systems prohibitive. 
228 Dr. Barry Watts of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) recently reported on 
this phenomenon.  Improved technical capability of combat systems is leading toward a high probability of 
tactical parity in future operations (Watts 2008b).  
229 Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) are an example of innovative use of stand-alone technical systems 
to create difficult problems for the opposing side to solve. 
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Scenario Resources Complexity Flexibility Efficiency Effectiveness 
1. Lower than others Moderate 
Use flexibility to 
maintain 
effectiveness 
Same or better 
effectiveness with 
fewer resources 
Winning, 
surviving, 
controlling 
2. Same as others High 
Use flexibility to 
increase 
complexity for the 
opponent; or to 
respond faster to 
changing 
requirements 
Maintaining 
effectiveness without 
needless use of 
excess force  
Winning, 
surviving, 
controlling 
Table 6:  Various trade-offs for flexibility 
6.3 Flexibility-efficiency trade-off 
Flexibility is not always worth the cost in terms of lost efficiency or gain in 
effectiveness.  It comes with costs and benefits, which have been discussed in the 
economics literature since the mid-20th Century.  Flexibility was neglected for decades in 
organizational and mechanical (production systems and product systems) disciplines, but 
surged in importance starting in the 1980s, as manufacturing machinery became more 
automated and globalization surged.  Economists, operations managers, systems 
designers attacked the changed context of competitiveness from many perspectives.  In 
hindsight, the core findings from these lines of research are obvious.  While flexibility is 
necessary to compete in a changing environment, its value is dependent on the specific 
problem and the measure of merit chosen to evaluate it.  Flexibility can be achieved in 
many ways and for many objectives.  It is a multi-dimensional attribute of complex 
systems, with motivation from a number of different sources both internal and external to 
the system.  We seek a deeper, more general understanding of flexibility, one that can be 
used at the enterprise level. 
How does an organization choose how much flexibility to “buy” and choose 
where to locate it in its overall enterprise?  A wealth of literature shows us flexibility is 
not free; operations researchers have demonstrated the capability of optimizing processes 
and manufacturing operations by using flexibility (Fine and Freund 1990; Sethi and Sethi 
1990a; Suárez et al. 1991; Jordan and Graves 1995).  But when we consider multiple 
levels of system hierarchy and analysis in situations that require timely response, the 
utility of operations research based optimization methods becomes less clear—especially 
in high-paced military operations, they cannot optimize the system faster than 
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environmental demand changes.230  When the environment introduces changes faster than 
the ability to calculate cost-benefit trade-offs and subsequently rearrange equipment or 
processes, we need to take a new approach.  Because it is generally more difficult to 
design flexible matter-energy systems than it is to design flexible information-intensive 
systems, an emerging trend is to expend more analytical effort on understanding the costs 
and benefits of flexibility in the very early stages of the design process.  Methods to 
address these issues in matter-energy systems are embodied in multi-dimensional 
optimization methods and multi-attribute utility analysis, which rely on understanding 
uncertainty in future requirements (de Weck et al. 2004; Silver and de Weck 2006; Ross 
et al. 2008).  These design problems become even more challenging when moving to a 
socio-technical operational context, where uncertainty can be very large, its type 
unknown and originate from both internal and external sources.  To address the design 
problem of flexibility in operational military enterprises, we need to understand the 
nature of military operations from an analytical point of view. 
War is complex, non-deterministic, fundamentally uncertain, and fraught with fog 
and friction that is unlikely to be dissipated any time soon (Clausewitz 1984; Watts 2004; 
Mattis 2008).  Based on our discussion in Chapter 4, this makes war a multi-level, 
stochastic, phenomenon—it takes place at multiple levels of abstraction.  Because of this, 
commanders and political leaders balance the risk of error and loss of strategic focus with 
the necessity of enabling flexibility within resource limitations.  The tensions involved in 
this balancing act pervade virtually every aspect of the military enterprise.  Since the 
operational military force is composed of independent technical systems and 
organizations, each with its own internal measures and guides for efficiency and 
effectiveness, the central design challenge is developing an architecture by which these 
systems can be integrated to achieve enterprise-level effectiveness while maintaining a 
balance with service organization-level effectiveness.231  A central tension in this area is 
                                                
230 The computational demands of optimization in many problems can grow exponentially in size.  This 
prevents real time optimization using computers (at least so far), so we must craft the system to have 
flexibility “in real time”. 
231 A key focus of many defense acquisition reform efforts is to get individual services to craft program 
requirements that enable interoperability with other service systems or that enable use of the system by 
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how to balance efficient employment of combat (air) power with the structural 
uncertainty and dynamics of war, which may demand some inefficiency from an air 
power resource perspective in order to integrate with other combat arms; integration that 
can enable enterprise level effectiveness.  We will discuss this trade-off in this chapter. 
6.3.1 Flexibility-efficiency in air power 
Kometer addresses air power across three levels of war:  strategic, operational and 
tactical.  Air Force doctrine states that air power can be applied effectively at all three 
levels.  This makes it a uniquely flexible combat arm.  Given the multi-level and context 
dependent nature of flexibility as a concept, the Air Force emphasis on flexibility and 
efficiency presents an architectural challenge.  While flexibility can confer significant 
advantage in battle, the multi-level nature of war makes flexibility a relative term in 
practice.232  The ability of the AOC to shift mission assignments of aircraft across the 
theater is an example of flexibility.  But for a ground commander planning an operation, 
the possibility of losing the use of an air asset based on an emergent higher priority 
tasking by the Air Component in response to its own, more globally focused, priorities, 
complicates planning.  This complication can take the form of contingency planning or 
establishment of excessive reserves as a way to increase flexibility for the tactical ground 
commander, but that simultaneously reduces efficiency for the air commander.233  An 
additional factor in operational flexibility regarding the control of aircraft is related to the 
physical distance that an aircraft must cover when required for emergent support as well 
as the time required to establish coordination with ground forces when arriving on scene.  
Despite the flexibility of aircraft to range the depth and breadth of the battlespace, it still 
takes time to move across larger distances.  And despite the proliferation of technologies 
that enable sharing information between ground and air forces, it still takes time to 
synchronize awareness and understanding when aircraft arrive to support a ground force.  
                                                                                                                                            
multiple services.  An early effort in this area was the TFX, a 1960s effort to build a fighter usable by the 
Air Force and Navy.  Its descendent is today’s F-35 (Joint Strike Fighter). 
232 This usage risks confusion.  We are mainly concerned with flexibility as a system property.  When 
considering trade-off analysis, the “value” of flexibility must be considered.  In general, value judgments 
are highly context dependent—in particular, dependent on the level of analysis. 
233 An example of this is the Marine Corps during Operation Desert Storm.  In this case, the Marine Air 
commander intentionally requested more air support than he could use, knowing that he could cancel what 
was not needed.  This was done to insure that he had enough to support his plan once all mission requests 
had been prioritized (Atkinson 1993a; Mandeles et al. 1996). 
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The control architecture can limit the tactical flexibility of aircraft when response 
timelines become very short.234  Again, what is efficient at one level of war may not be 
efficient at another level. 
In Kometer’s view, the risk a commander takes in empowering lower levels of 
command is two-fold:  risk of accidents and loss of strategic focus.  The net result of 
these types of errors is a less effective application of air power and/or damage to the 
success of the overall campaign.  A claimed benefit of tight (top-down) control is 
increased efficiency and lower risk of error.235  Specifically, top-down direction can 
ensure that targets attacked with air power are supportive of the commander’s overall 
strategy.  This type of control (architecture) claims to ensure effectiveness and, usually, 
efficiency.  Air Force Doctrine Document 2-1, Air Warfare, specifically addresses 
efficiency-effectiveness in the use of air power (U.S. Air Force 2000).  When discussing 
development of an air campaign strategy and the choice of employment of air power 
against certain classes of targets, the preferences are clear:  air power should be 
prioritized so that its employment is efficient.  There are some cases, such as close air 
support of ground forces, where inefficiency at theater level must be accepted to have 
effective employment at the local tactical level. 
Kometer’s recommendations attempt to balance the conflicting demands of 
warfare with the doctrinal preferences of the Air Force.  He seeks to enable flexibility in 
order to balance the need to address uncertainty and change in combat with the demand 
for efficiency in resource allocation across various missions in order to control an 
adversary and better maintain strategic focus.  Air Force doctrine aims to achieve 
efficient application of air power so that its inherent geographic flexibility is used to 
greatest possible impact on the enemy.  The Air Force emphasizes an ability to impact the 
enemy at the system-level, aiming to coerce the enemy without the need for ground 
operations.  In this vein, “efficient” is defined as:  achieving the maximum possible effect 
                                                
234 Recent analysis at the Joint Forces Command has indicated that when timelines drop below about 2-3 
minutes, it becomes difficult to call in a non-organic air asset to support the ground force. 
235 Error is assumed to come from a combination of lower experience and knowledge and lower levels or 
poorer quality information at lower levels of command. 
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on the enemy with the least amount of effort.236  “Flexibility” is defined as the ability to 
move aircraft across theater-level distances quickly in response to changing priorities of 
the Joint Force Commander.  Air interdiction and close air support are given lower 
priority; flexibility and efficiency across these missions are less important (U.S. Air 
Force 2001). 
One of Kometer’s unique contributions is to show how tactical level actions can 
percolate up to strategic levels and how difficult it is to predict how strategic level intent 
is translated to tactical action.  He also demonstrates that it is difficult to direct tactical 
level employment of aircraft from high command levels with necessary precision in many 
important situations.  Effectively, the multi-level nature of warfare requires first, 
decomposition and second, decentralization in many situations.  However, tension arises 
because of feedback loops in the larger system.  In the years since WW-II, media and 
other information sources have increased the flow of tactical level battle information to 
the strategic (social and political) levels.  The trend for politicians to use military force in 
a broader range of situations, along with the wider media coverage and tactical level 
events, can have more immediate strategic impact.  Kometer concludes that the media 
feedback loop, coupled with increased precision in targeting and global communication 
capabilities, creates a tendency for political leaders to retain control (create vertical 
shortcuts) and place tighter restrictions on the use of air power, lowering flexibility. 
The same issue of hierarchical level impact on the evaluation of efficiency and 
effectiveness is also true of flexibility.  What is flexible at one level may be inflexible at 
another.  This sensitivity to level is a general property of complex systems (Simon 1996; 
Bar-Yam 1997; Meyer 2000).  For example, Air Force doctrine argues that assigning air 
                                                
236 For detailed references on the air power theory of war on which doctrine is based, good sources are 
Douhet’s The Command of the Air, and Billy Mitchell’s, Winged Defense: The Development and 
Possibilities of Modern Air Power Economic and Military, and Robert Pape’s Bombing to Win: Air Power 
and Coercion in War.  For a systems level discussion and brief but comprehensive overview of air power 
theory, J. C. Wylie’s, Military Strategy: A General Theory of Power Control is superb.  It is important to 
note that the validity of air power theory is still much debated in professional and academic circles (Pape’s 
book and a subsequent series of articles in the journal International Security are examples).  Even though 
the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey following WW-II demonstrated the ineffectiveness of strategic 
bombing, it became, and in many ways remains, the centerpiece of Air Force thinking.  A detailed 
discussion of the theory and evidence, as well as the institutional and cultural issues that drive Air Force 
doctrine, is beyond the scope of this research. 
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assets to be commanded directly by ground units is inefficient because it removes the 
inherent flexibility of air power.237  A ground unit may not be able to use the assigned air 
asset effectively or efficiently from the perspective of the operational level of war (U.S. 
Air Force 2001).  Once the ground commander has an air asset assigned, he (or she) may 
be reluctant to give it up to another unit.  From the ground force perspective, an assigned 
air support asset serves as an operational option—it provides flexibility against 
unforeseen combat needs.  From the Air Force perspective, it looks like unnecessary 
hoarding of assets that may be more effectively employed elsewhere in the theater.  
Contributing to the problem is that procedures for transferring the air asset to another unit 
may also be complex, further reducing flexibility in the system.  This is the core rationale 
for centralized control of air power—to avoid lowering theater-level flexibility.238  
Providing an asset to the ground force that enables flexibility at the tactical level 
can hamper flexibility and lower efficiency at the operational and strategic level.  Since a 
fundamental operational capability that aircraft bring to the combat problem is the ability 
to enhance flexibility at the theater level, the Air Force prefers to control at and optimize 
aircraft employment for the operational and strategic levels of war.  For the Air Force, the 
cost of assigning aircraft to ground (tactical level) units (a form of lateral architecture) is 
too high in terms of the complexity of retaining operational level flexibility.  Not 
addressed in this scenario is the possibility of crafting an architecture that can enable 
effective sharing of assets and efficient adjudication of inevitable disputes that will arise 
if lower level commanders are given control of air resources. 
Air Force preference for central control of air power dates to World War II and 
the Battle of Kasserine Pass in North Africa.  In this battle, the division of air power into 
“penny packets” by placing them directly under the control of the individual, separated, 
ground commanders resulted in the inability to shift the air power focus of effort against 
the German Army.  A similar situation to penny packets exists in today’s counter-
                                                
237 Air power’s inherent flexibility comes from its ability to respond across the depth and breadth of the 
theater of operations quickly, whereas ground forces are limited by geography and mobility. 
238 This issue is normally cast as one of local vs. global optimization, which is an appropriate view when 
the rate of change is such that we can optimize a system and make these kinds of choices.  But in a higher 
rate of change system, we must have flexibility to shift from a local to a global focus sometimes quickly. 
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insurgency campaign in Iraq, though modified by Air Force doctrine:  aircraft are 
assigned to work with specific ground units, but are centrally controlled by both air and a 
ground headquarters (instead of individual ground commanders, as was the case at 
Kasserine Pass).239  Major Robert Seifert, in a 2007 Joint Forces Quarterly article, 
describes the inflexibility of this command architecture for employment of AC-130 
gunships.  As employed, gunships are assigned to specific ground units for the duration 
of their mission, with multiple higher headquarters controlling reassignment to other 
ground units.  Gunships have robust sensor and communication capabilities, so can detect 
formative stages of insurgent activity across a wide area and can communicate with both 
tactical and theater level organizations.  If a gunship detects insurgent activity, but this 
activity is not actively threatening or engaging the ground force to which the gunship is 
assigned, it is difficult to change the mission or ground unit assignment.  The gunship 
must request permission from the AOC and the AOC must request permission from 
another operational level organization in order to change its mission assignment.  Lateral 
connections exist at the headquarters level, but are not allowed at the tactical level.  This 
has resulted in ground force casualties and escape of insurgents (Seifert 2007).  This is an 
example of how centralized control can be inefficient and inflexible at the tactical level.  
Information available to tactical level ground and air units cannot be acted upon in a time 
responsive way because of the need to obtain permission from operational level 
headquarters.  This situation is illustrated in (Figure 51).  Siefert argues that if the AC-
130 were allowed to collaborate with multiple ground units (lateral interactions), better 
effectiveness against insurgents would result. 
                                                
239 We distinguish here between the Major Combat Operations (MCO) phase of the Iraq War (March-May 
2003) and the ongoing Counter-Insurgency Operations (COIN), from which the following example is 
drawn. 
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Figure 51:  AC-130 air-ground operations without laterality 
This example provides an interesting picture of the mixing of doctrine aimed at 
correcting the problem of Kasserine Pass (centralized control of air power by a ground 
force commander) with the operational requirements of the modern battlefield (need for 
timely air support to ground forces).  In Iraq, air assets are relatively plentiful, and the 
need for theater-wide control in many cases is low.  Centralized control of air power is 
aimed at providing operational level flexibility, but this hampers tactical level flexibility, 
especially important in the counter insurgency campaign.  The result is that ground 
commanders are provided assigned air support, but have no ability (flexibility) to allow 
the aircraft to perform other missions—if an unforeseen need arises, the process for 
getting or transferring an air asset may be cumbersome.  Aircraft remain under 
operational control of the headquarters organization(s).  A lateral architecture, where 
aircraft are subject to multiple controlling authorities based on operational and tactical 
level circumstances, could provide both theater and tactical level flexibility.  In 
architectural language, this is Seifert’s proposal and is shown in Figure 52. 
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Figure 52:  AC-130 air-ground operations with laterality 
Air power doctrine says that control of air power at the strategic and operational 
level of war ensures efficient and flexible employment, whereas control at the tactical 
level is inflexible and inefficient (U. S. Air Force 2001).  On the other hand, a simple 
thought experiment can show us how assigning (apportioning) air assets to ground units 
can be efficient and flexible.  Whether in ground combat or air combat, a local 
commander generally has the best information on the situation and how best to employ 
the capabilities at hand.  Transmission of this knowledge and information to higher levels 
of command takes time and effort that often exceeds the rate of change in operational and 
tactical situations.  So assigning air assets to ground commanders can be efficient, there is 
no lost effort coordinating or negotiating with or between higher headquarters.  A local 
commander can directly command a change in air asset priorities to different targets or 
even reassign the air asset temporarily to another ground asset.  Two tactical level 
commanders could coordinate the exchange of an air asset between them in order to 
employ it against the most valuable mission.  Indeed, two entities at the battlefield level 
are more likely to be able to synchronize and agree than a battlefield entity and an 
operational level entity (Seifert 2007).  But at the operational level, issues are more 
219 
complex and time scales of interest are longer; more information must be integrated to 
develop effective decisions.  Allowing local commanders to control and reallocate assets 
in this case might reduce flexibility by impeding responsiveness to theater level priorities. 
The point is that a balance must be achieved between optimizing tactical level 
outcomes and operational and strategic level outcomes.240  Kometer articulated two solid 
recommendations for addressing the tension:  his general formula for command and 
control and the concept of depth of command.  One of these is a method, the other an 
enabling capability for achieving flexibility.241  From an architectural perspective, his 
methods enable the commander to craft an architecture that has many alternatives for 
action in response to uncertain operational demands.   
6.3.2 Lateral interactions—an enabler of flexibility 
How do we achieve this balance?  As we approach flexibility for enterprises, we 
can use information system flexibility to help understand the general nature of trade-offs 
in enterprises, which can be viewed as large information or resource processing systems 
(Galbraith 1974; Tushman and Nadler 1978).  Architecture has been a dominant 
consideration in information systems (especially software) for a long time, especially as it 
relates to flexibility and life-cycle concerns (Moses 1971; Parnas 1972; Gifford and 
Spector 1987a).  In particular, the tension between efficiency and flexibility has been an 
ongoing debate (Moses 1971).  If the architecture is well conceived, it is possible to have 
a flexible software system without a significant performance penalty.  This has been 
possible because of Moore’s Law (inefficiencies in processing are mitigated by gains in 
hardware performance) and because of the ability to change software relatively easily as 
learning takes place (Arrow 1962a; Moses 2006b).242  The relatively small cost penalty of 
flexibility in software can be seen as an analogy for organizations and enterprises.  The 
                                                
240 It is critical to remember that the indeterminacy of combat and war means that each level will have 
different “weights” in the overall outcomes and that these weights will change over time.  An excellent 
example is Vietnam, where tactical success was high, but the overall outcome was a strategic failure. 
241 In an email communication on this subject, LCol Kometer confirmed this assessment. 
242 As a more flexible software system is created, it is generally less efficient than others.  But as the 
processing power and memory capacity of computers increase and experience with the new system 
develops (learning), the loss of efficiency can be reduced (Moses 2006b).  A slightly different way to view 
this is that Moore’s law allows us to absorb inefficiencies in software—it provides excess resources at the 
level of technological performance.  This is not the same as using different levels of abstraction to gain 
flexibility, but has the same enabler. 
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initial “purchase” of flexibility in the form of multiple interactions (connections) among 
people and organizations that enable more alternatives can create confusion.  But this cost 
is gained back over time as learning occurs through exercises, training, trust building and 
other factors.243   
In information systems, layered structures enable flexibility (Moses 2003).244  In 
organizational practice, lateral connections within organizational layers also enable 
flexibility (Galbraith 1973; Chisholm 1989).  The design issue for enterprises, then, is 
how to design a multi-level architecture for flexibility.  This leads us to consider what 
types of interactions we need to design into enterprise architectures if we want to enable 
operational flexibility.  Intuitively, lateral interactions and layered architectures are less 
efficient than a pure tree structure (Moses 2006b).  Interactions are established that may 
only be used infrequently or that may be used at inappropriate times (especially in 
organizations); they may be redundant or may divert information or resources along a 
suboptimal path; they may create confusion over directives or by adding superfluous 
information.  But as uncertainty in the environment increases, the ability to predict 
precisely which path information or resources should take or who in the organization is 
best suited to use a given piece of information decreases.  It might also be the case that 
multiple people at the same level require the information and must interact with each 
other to accomplish useful work.  This places a premium on having multiple alternatives 
along which to pass information or to coordinate action.245 
Layered architectures are one way to provide these multiple alternatives.246  These 
types of connections become even more important when we consider that information can 
arrive anywhere in an organization.  Strategically important information can enter the 
system at the bottom of the hierarchy and tactically important information can arrive at 
                                                
243 This phenomenon is captured by the famous “J-curve” effect whenever any change is made to a system 
or process, where, initially efficiency or effectiveness drops when a change is made, but results in overall 
improvement in performance with time. 
244 It can also be argued that it enables efficiency as well, at least in programming (Abelson et al. 1996). 
245 It also makes a stronger argument for commonality in certain aspects of technical systems in addition to 
interoperability among them. 
246 As discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, a layered architecture is defined as an architecture where nodes at a 
given level can have more than one parent, can change parents easily.  A lateral architecture is where there 
are interactions among nodes at the same layer as well. 
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places in the hierarchy remote from the place where it is best used.  Having multiple 
pathways to move this information and multiple alternatives to accomplish action 
improves flexibility and, in general, overall effectiveness.  Lack of having these paths can 
also reduce effectiveness by preventing information from getting to where it is most 
needed; it is also a driving force for generation of the many ad hoc connections (Cohen 
1993; Leveson et al. 2003). 
6.3.3 Flexibility:  Advantages 
This section discusses advantages of flexibility; disadvantages are discussed in 
section 6.3.4.   
Flexibility in combat operations with air and ground forces provides several 
advantages: 
1. Air and ground forces can be employed in closer proximity to each other 
with either the same or lower risk levels; 
2. The total force can be more responsive to changing battle requirements; 
3. More force combinations are possible:  air and ground force mission 
assignments can be traded-off and complementary capabilities can be 
leveraged; 
4. Control modes can change:  attention management of leadership can be 
improved if flexibility is gained by lowering decision-making burden; 
5. Decision structure can be changed quickly in response to changing 
information, risk tolerance or mission focus (Kometer 2005). 
A core benefit of flexibility is the increased likelihood that the enterprise will be 
able to respond effectively to a wider range of unforeseen events or performance 
demands.247  In the military context, this is captured in a maxim of LGen. Horner during 
                                                
247 This does not imply that all types of unforeseen events are easy to deal with, nor does it imply that all 
unforeseen contingencies will be able to be handled by the flexibility enabled in the system.  What we are 
aiming for is a way to design flexibility explicitly and to avoid the inefficiencies and dangers when ad hoc 
flexibility must be relied upon. 
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operation Desert Storm:  “the enemy gets a vote.”248  His point to his staff and to the 
analysts conducting the Air Power Survey following the war is that the air power system 
must be able to respond effectively to unforeseen events—the enemy is not going to just 
sit there and let us beat him up.249 
Flexibility in a single service (the Air Force, for example) can provide a 
commander more options, confusing the enemy by providing multiple problems for him 
to solve or address.  In a multi-service context, flexibility among services (Army, Air 
Force, Navy, Marine Corps) further increases the enemy’s problem as well as providing 
our side more options, both offensively and defensively.  Employed properly, this can 
improve efficiency as well:  we can win the war faster and with less loss of life and other 
physical damage. 
In an uncertain and dynamic operational context, flexibility enables efficient 
application of air power.  As we have noted, this is the core argument of Air Force 
doctrine:  air power’s flexibility provides the force commander with a tool that can range 
over the depth and breadth of the battle space in response to the commander’s changing 
priorities.  Air power’s flexibility makes overall force application more efficient because 
resources are less likely to be either idle or used on low priority or low pay-off tasks.  But 
we should be cautious.  Air power doctrine focuses on the operational level of war, with 
secondary emphasis given to tactical level support of ground operations.250 
But again, flexibility has many advantages at the tactical level.  Closer interaction 
between ground and air forces can quickly identify new force employment options.  A 
flexible architecture can enable ground and air forces to operate in closer proximity to 
each other.  A way that this type of operation can be enabled is by faster opening and 
                                                
248 I do not know the origins of this truism, but it is pervasive in all types of defense writing, including in 
formal Air Force doctrine publications. 
249 Often this perspective is missing in commercial business.  Many times a commercial business will alter 
its strategy without regard to either subsequent moves by customers or competitors that change the calculus 
of the original move.  Such static thinking and analysis is giving way to more dynamic approaches, but 
there is much work to be done.  The “environment” is not a passive, static, bystander—it “gets a vote.”  
(Prof. Joseph Sussman highlighted this point). 
250 The explicit assumptions or air power theory is that strategic and operational level actions can win wars 
while minimizing physical destruction and inherent inefficiency of ground combat.  The adjustment of our 
enemies in Post-MCO Iraq is an example of the invalidity of these assumptions. 
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closing of “off limits” areas between services.  Both of these types of flexibility can 
reduce enemy sanctuary that is granted when longer planning times and larger margins of 
error are required to coordinate among friendly forces. 
It is also important to note that these types of flexibility advantages are 
complemented, enhanced or enabled by technical system improvements.  Information 
systems can lower the burden of information exchange and sharing on operators and 
staffs, thus lowering the cost of greater flexibility.  It can also improve the operational 
capability of lower level units.  A significant example is precision weaponry.  Increased 
precision in weapons makes it possible to employ them in closer proximity to friendly 
forces and makes it possible to change targets quickly in response to changing 
operational schemes.251 
Another benefit is the ability to address unforeseen contingencies.  With 
flexibility, a commander gains options for addressing uncertainty.  Depth of command 
aims to enable low-level decision-making, providing effective response against an 
adaptive enemy.  Moving decisions to a level that best matches the problem can be faster 
and possibly more accurate than hierarchical decision-making.  The ability to move 
decision-making locations up and down the hierarchy provides a commander with the 
ability to optimize the configuration of the enterprise in response to changing risk 
assessments or risk tolerances.  In addition, while there will always be interactions and 
combinations that are discovered in the course of operations—“discovered flexibility”—
by explicitly designing flexibility into an architecture we can increase overall 
effectiveness and avoid some of the trial and error involved with discovery, while 
simultaneously increasing higher level visibility to and awareness of system flexibility. 
6.3.4 Flexibility:  Disadvantages 
The previous section discussed advantages of flexibility; this section discusses 
disadvantages to flexibility: 
                                                
251 A good example is the development of the Precision Strike Suite-Special Operations Forces (PSS-SOF) 
targeting system, which enables three dimensional target mensuration by tactical forces in the field, 
lowering the time responsiveness of precision targeting from hours to minutes and moving it from an 
operational headquarters (the AOC) to tactical level ground units. 
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1. More coordination is required:  more effort must be expended before 
conflict (extending to peacetime exercises and career paths) on trust 
building, exercises, training; 
2. Loss of a traditional level of management control; acceptance of a 
degree of uncontrollability or potential error; 
3. Potential confusion or loss of efficiency due to:  
a. More decision alternatives at more levels of command; 
b. Conflicting preferences or decisions based on the same 
information; 
c. Bad decisions; 
d. Too much information; 
4. Increased arbitration of decision conflicts by higher echelons; 
5. Losses of some specialty skills or skill proficiency as operators learn to 
do more things. 
The reverse of the flexibility coin is that there is a potential loss of efficiency.  
Until recently, it was difficult for a central commander of air forces to manage the 
hundreds of aircraft flying missions.  If a pilot’s original mission was not achievable or if 
a pilot found himself ‘unemployed,’ he would use his radio to look for work.  Missions 
found in this way may not have been ‘optimal’ or even desirable from the theater 
commander’s perspective—from strategic level of the conflict.  While a mission found 
this way might not have been ‘efficient’ in terms of strategic execution, it was certainly 
of value to the ground force that employed it and, if successful, could be viewed as both 
efficient and effective at the tactical level or from the perspective of the ground 
campaign. 
Another cost of flexibility is that capabilities and technical systems must be 
purchased and maintained even though they are not used or are not used very often.  For 
example, Air Force doctrine places low priority on close air support missions.  
Additionally, learning the procedures for and maintaining proficiency at close air support 
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takes time and effort.252  But performing these missions enhances flexibility at the tactical 
level, which can also enable flexibility at the operational level that can, in turn, provide 
strategic flexibility.  In technical system architectures, flexibility has costs and benefits 
that can often be quantified.  For example, the F-16 aircraft has evolved from single 
mission air-ground support to a multi-mission aircraft over the course of three decades of 
operation and development.  Sometimes the maintenance of these flexibility options is 
costly, at least at first.  But increasingly, flexibility is achieved on the information side of 
systems, where we have noted that adding new capabilities is often less expensive than a 
more physically intensive system change. 
Flexibility, the availability of more alternatives to achieve an objective, can also 
incur costs in the form of mistakes.  A system or an organization that only does one thing 
can practice to minimize mistakes, continually refining and optimizing its performance 
(Arrow 1962a; Spear 2008).  It can become extremely efficient and possibly come to 
dominate its competition.  But, as options (alternatives) are introduced, inefficiency can 
arise and mistakes can be made.  Not all alternatives (paths) are of equal value in a given 
situation, even though there may be multiple alternatives to achieve the same objective.  
Also, people coordinating via lateral connections in an organization could choose an 
ineffective (incorrect) alternative.  Again, these effects can be mitigated with training, 
exercises and experience. 
Another cost is that lower level organizations sometimes do not have enough 
information or expertise to balance the multidimensional considerations for which higher-
level organizations are designed.  Creating the ability to make decisions based on 
multiple criteria or to have more options at the enterprise level creates “overhead.” 
Overhead arises in the form of both more systems to operate and more people with whom 
to interface.  All of these lower efficiency not just by potential dilution of attention but by 
potential human error and influence.  It takes time and effort to coordinate, collaborate 
                                                
252 U.S. Army Center for Operational Leadership’s oral history project contains an interview with a B-52 
pilot that documents some of the costs and benefits of flexibility in Operation Enduring Freedom.  B-52 
crews learned how to do close air support, a mission that provided high flexibility when combined with the 
large payload capacity of the aircraft.  (Government Printing Office: Transcript. Records of the Combat 
Arms Research Library;  Online version of March 1 2005) 
226 
and negotiate the myriad activities that go into achieving enterprise flexibility through 
lateral interactions.  In this sense, the general formula for command and control and depth 
of command are more “expensive” than a traditional planning and command and control 
method.  Implied in the general formula is more plan iteration, more vertical and lateral 
interactions among peers and between seniors and subordinates.253 
Other disadvantages of flexibility center on risk and control.  This is one of 
Kometer’s central themes and is central in Air Force doctrine as well.  Designing 
flexibility into enterprise architecture entails risk of dilution of the high-level intent or 
mission objective of the enterprise.254  Because we are dealing with fallible entities 
(people and systems designed by them), delegating decision authority means loss of a 
degree of control for senior leadership.  Loosening control coupled with fallibility of 
people can increase the chance of unforeseen outcomes.255  Flexibility in the form of 
numerous options or execution paths can also lead to overload of both individuals and 
organizations.  Choosing among alternatives takes time.  Having more alternatives in 
terms of system configurations, when coupled with differences in preference, perception 
and information access among people and organizations can cause disagreement over 
choice of alternatives, requiring arbitration by higher-level authorities.  This has the 
added disadvantage (aside from the increased time to choose an option) of deflecting 
senior management attention from other matters. 
By having many alternative configurations, some are likely to be longer 
sequences or more complex than others (we demonstrated this with a simple example in 
Chapter 4).  This implies added coordination and collaboration effort in execution.  
Though these disadvantages seem significant, building trust can mitigate their impact 
                                                
253 Refer to Chapter 2 for a detailed review of the general formula and depth of command. 
254 Designing flexibility into any architecture entails risk.  This is the focus of financial options, portfolio 
analysis, real options analysis and strategic engineering research in engineering systems, to name a few 
areas where this issue is relevant.  In most domains where flexibility has been researched, uncertainties are 
market-based, with stochasticity that can be estimated, if not measured.  In engineering systems analysis 
focused on flexibility, the analysis is grounded in physical models that are used to explore a large number 
of alternative system configurations, but relatively small numbers of them when compared to the possible 
configurations of a combat operations enterprise (or any enterprise, for that matter). 
255 We do not intent to imply that the senior level is omniscient.  Bad objectives can be chosen, poor 
policies (or even architectures) implemented.  Our perspective is that the enterprise must be flexible (at all 
levels) so that it can adjust to change while still maintaining focus on the desired outcome (defined by the 
top level of leadership). 
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and, as we noted earlier, training and exercises can minimize the chances of choosing 
inefficient alternatives.256  Of course, building trust is not costless either.  It takes time 
and effort, all of which can detract from an individual’s specialty skill set.  In the 
aggregate, building of trust as a driver of future enterprise architectures in the DoD is 
largely a moot point.  Legislative and policy directives have placed requirements on the 
Services for education, exercises, and training and in some cases system procurement, 
aimed to create trust relationships and interdependencies among the Services (Arrow 
1962a; Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986"  1986).  
In addition, though there may be some loss of specialty skill levels, some of these 
specialty skills may be automated, an additional layer can be added to the system to 
compensate for any system level loss of capability, or a cadre of specialists can be 
retained.257 
6.4 Operation Iraqi Freedom (Second Iraq War) Trade-off Analysis 
6.4.1 Strategic-operational level 
There were numerous constraints placed on Gen. Franks as he prepared his 
campaign plan for the Second Iraq War.  Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld placed 
constraints on the level of forces that General Franks could use to execute his assigned 
mission; President Bush placed constraints on the visibility of any force posture changes.  
Rumsfeld’s main concern appears to have been efficiency (Franks 2004a; Woodward 
2004).  The need to maintain strategic surprise also constrained both size as well as the 
process of moving and operating forces in the run-up to the war (Franks 2004a).  Late in 
the preparations, the loss of over-flight rights from Turkey made the 4th Infantry Division 
unavailable to the plan, adding an additional resource constraint and impacting the 
overall campaign plan (loss of a second attack front).  These constraints placed a 
premium on using flexibility to be effective with fewer resources, something emphasized 
by Gen. Franks to his component commanders (Franks 2004a).   
                                                
256 Of course, the other way that military organizations reduce these costs is a strong reliance on 
hierarchical rank structures, which can be applied across service boundaries in many (not all) 
circumstances. 
257 The retention of single skilled, single mission strategic nuclear forces is an example. 
228 
This example highlights the difficulty in analysis of efficiency-flexibility-
effectiveness trade-offs.  The initial resource constraint from Secretary Rumsfeld, based 
on not wanting to repeat the resource-excess (waste) of Desert Storm, drove the 
development of the campaign plan toward leveraging flexibility to cope with limited 
resources.  But Gen. Frank’s operational plan, based on his experience and lessons 
learned also influenced the plan’s evolution—his emphasis on strategic surprise, and thus 
less time to increase resources, was a key factor in the calculus as well as his emphasis on 
Joint Operations.  Franks thought flexibility would enhance his effectiveness, regardless 
of any resource constraints. 
6.4.2 Tactical level 
Kometer uses an air-ground battlefield example to illustrate his depth of 
command concept and its benefits.  I will review the example from the perspective of 
flexibility and how it can be developed at the tactical level of operations.258  The 
following example is taken from (Kometer), pages 139-140.  
During the first battle of Fallujah in April 2004 an AC-130 gunship was tasked to 
support a ground force of Marines.  In these cases of close air support, a formally trained 
air controller directs and grants permission for the aircraft to engage the enemy, with the 
aircraft supporting the ground (supported) unit.  In close air support, there are clear 
procedures and rules of engagement to be followed in order to ensure safety of friendly 
forces and non-combatants.  In this case, the Marines came under attack the AC-130 
gunship spotted a second, larger, group of insurgents preparing to attack.  The aircraft 
informed the Marines of the larger group and requested permission from the ground 
controller to engage.  The Marine controller could not see the assembling force, so did 
not think they had enough information to grant permission.259 
                                                
258 I have defined flexibility as the number of paths (alternatives) from input (sensing) to output (action) in 
a system.  When considering technical systems or alternative organizational arrangements, this is a fairly 
straightforward idea.  When considering simultaneous, or real-time interactions (in either a military or non-
military case), the implementation (or enactment) of a path is more difficult to explain.  This example will 
attempt to make this clear. 
259 The reasons the ground controller could not give clearance are unclear, but was likely due to either the 
rules of engagement or the requirements of the formal procedure for ground control in an urban 
environment. 
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The ground controller called up his chain of command to get permission to 
engage the insurgents, while at the same time preparing the gunship to engage by 
conducting the standard pre-attack briefing.  While the ground controller was conducting 
his attack briefing to the pilot and while waiting for permission to engage from higher 
headquarters, the ground force came under attack from the second insurgent group.  This 
prompted the ground controller to grant immediate permission for the gunship to engage.  
In the course of the engagement, the insurgents split into two groups.  The gunship, with 
multiple weapons and visibility on both groups, continued engaging both.  The ground 
controller, technically in charge of the engagement, could only see one group of 
insurgents and attempted to direct all gunship fires to them, unaware of the split.  A 
possible architectural solution to mitigate this confusion is to allow the ground controller 
and AC-130 gunship to collaborate and shift the location of control using a formal 
procedure, creating what I have defined as a lateral connection.   
A second example comes from recent counter-insurgency operations in Iraq, also 
with AC-130 Gunships.  In the 2nd Quarter Joint Forces Quarterly magazine, a 
professional publication of the National Defense University, Major Robert Seifert 
reviews the current employment of Gunships against the Iraqi insurgency (Seifert).   
Seifert reviews the current employment architecture for AC-130s.  They are 
assigned a mission, attached in direct support of a single ground unit.  Sometimes the 
ground units do not have ‘work’ for the Gunships.  They represent a flexible option for 
the ground commander should he need them.  The ”trouble” with this arrangement, as 
noted in my review of Kometer’s thesis and air power doctrine, is that the AC-130 is 
filled with sensors and radios.  It has the ability to see developing situations while it is in 
transit to its mission area, returning from a refueling stop, or simply by monitoring radio 
frequencies while on station.  Seifert describes situations he participated in where the 
AC-130 was underutilized by the ground force to which it was assigned, but was able to 
see attacks on other ground forces  (or pending attacks).   
In one specific case, Seifert describes the architecture:   
“Having worked with the Marines there (Najaf) previously, it took less than a 
minute to get their JTAC on the radio and inform him of the gunship crew’s 
230 
situational awareness and nearby location.  The JTAC confirmed that he had 
troops in contact and asked for immediate assistance.  Unfortunately, the aircraft 
commander had to notify him of his inability to assist due to assignment to 
another unit.  The aircraft commander told the JTAC to make a request 
immediately to the Air Support Operations Center (ASOC) and told him that he 
would also call to try and get released from his Al Hayy tasking.” 
Seifert describes the classic inability to gain or gather adequate situational 
awareness at higher levels, when he recounts the story of his AC-130 being denied 
permission to assist the ground force under attack.  A gunship 30 minutes away was re-
tasked to support the Marines that his gunship was asking to help.  His aircraft was 
directed to its original tasking.  Seifert’s punch line here is that his aircraft was eventually 
ordered home early due to lack of tasking and the last radio call heard from the Marines 
was for a medical evacuation.  A different operational architecture might have been a bit 
more inefficient or lead to some increases in errors or arguments about priorities, but 
might have been able to prevent casualties in the ground force. 
Architecturally, the basic rule at play here is:  assign one aircraft to one ground 
unit, request headquarters’ permission before deviating from this mission.  Structurally, 
this results in a tree structure with immobile connections at the lowest levels.  In addition, 
because of the unique capabilities and operational assignments of AC-130s, the 
hierarchical structure for changing their tasking is more difficult than for an A-10 or F-16 
close air support aircraft.260  We assess the flexibility in this structure as low.  According 
to Seifert the request chain for re-tasking the AC-130 was:  “…from the ASOC to the 
Combined Air Operations Center to the Special Operations Liaison Element to the Joint 
Special Operations Air Component and then the Air Force Special Operations 
Detachment.”  This represents a 5-step chain across at least two hierarchical levels of 
command.  Figure 53 shows a simplified depiction of this arrangement. 
                                                
260 AC-130s are under the operational control of the Special Operations Component Commander (SOCC).  
Because of this, the Air Operations Center (AOC) must work through the SOCC to get permission to retask 
these aircraft. 
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Figure 53:  AC-130 air-ground operations in Iraq 
Seifert’s proposed solution is a command and control arrangement similar to one 
used in Vietnam during the 1960s.  He calls this the “on-call” method.  In this method, 
AC-130s are assigned a mission rather than assigned to a ground unit.  They rove the 
battle space, serving as sensors for ground units and leveraging information passed from 
ground units.  By roving, they are within responsive range of any needy ground unit 
without having to request higher-level permission.  He combines this scheme with the use 
of sensor-equipped fighters controlled by higher-level controllers (ASOC).  These 
loitering fighters can respond quickly to requests for sensor coverage, lowering response 
time for ground units even farther. 
Architecturally, this is a distinctly different arrangement.  The basic rule is:  
assign AC-130s a mission tasking to search for and engage insurgents in collaboration 
with ground forces in the assigned area of operations.261  Structurally, this is a more 
lateral structure—AC-130s work with ground forces to figure out the best way to 
accomplish a particular mission, with ground forces collaborating on the sharing of the 
AC-130 air asset and higher headquarters monitoring and providing direction only when 
                                                
261 The military term for this idea is Auftragstaktik.  It is German for “mission order”, a method of 
command where a mission is given and the unit or person tasked is expected to find the most appropriate 
way to accomplish it.  Auftragstaktik developed in the German Army in the 19th and early 20th Centuries. 
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necessary.  There is also a distinct difference in the kind of decisions that are made at 
each level in this (Seifert’s) proposal.  The higher level headquarters can now make 
judgments about overall priorities and is not distracted by the minutiae of details involved 
in micro-scale coordination of aircraft and various arrival times.  The tactical level 
commanders are more involved in the use and employment of all elements of combat 
power, instead of awaiting decisions from above, or finding ways to increase their safety 
margin by gaming the aircraft allocation system.  Arguably, the proposed control scheme 
is more responsive to tactical level needs, with the potential for operational level 
headquarters to be more effective as well. 
A diagram depicting what this architecture might look like is in Figure 54.  In 
terms of the depth of command concept, this lowers decision authority to the level of the 
local ground commanders (battalion-level, probably) and the aircraft commander.  Risk is 
managed (per Kometer’s formula) by the procedures for air-ground coordination and by 
the low-yield (low explosive power) weapons of the gunship.  Information access is 
robust, because of ROVER and other sensor systems on the AC-130 as well as an  
 
Figure 54:  AC-130 air-ground operations supporting multiple ground units 
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extensive set of radios that enable the aircraft commander to monitor the battlespace for 
relevant information.262  
6.4.3 Summary: Second Iraq War 
The second Iraq War is an example of the use of flexibility to maintain (possibly 
increase) effectiveness with fewer resources.  This required increased complexity in the 
interfaces between air and ground forces at the V Corps-4th ASOC level (Hollis 2003; 
Kirkpatrick 2004).  Even further, the contrast between V Corps interaction with air power 
and the Marines’ integration of air and ground power demonstrates another level of 
complexity that comes with flexibility (Roberts 2006).   
Flexibility also enabled maintaining risk levels constant while increasing 
effectiveness—the most commonly cited example is the use of a kill box grid instead of a 
continuous line to maintain separation of air and ground targeting areas.  Grid boxes are 
easier to activate/deactivate than moving a line across the wider battlefield.  By creating 
more alternatives for separation of air and ground forces (lowering complexity), 
flexibility was increased.   
In Iraq-II, the number of levels of the US military that had lateral connections was 
the largest of our four cases.  This resulted in flexibility at the strategic, operational and 
tactical levels for the first time (with higher levels of flexibility at lower levels than 
earlier conflicts and higher strategic coherence than ever before). 
6.5 Summary: Trade-offs to flexibility  
This chapter examined complex military operations from Chapter 5 to highlight 
trade-offs among flexibility, effectiveness, complexity and efficiency.  Our main 
argument is that enterprises operating in dynamic and uncertain environments should 
have flexibility as a high priority goal and that traditional “either-or” trade-offs between 
flexibility and other properties are less important in uncertain and dynamic environments 
and can be mitigated by careful architecture choices.  We began by noting that a major 
challenge in enterprises is balancing many conflicting requirements at different 
hierarchical levels of operation, detailing some specific examples.  We also noted that 
                                                
262 ROVER is a dedicated air-ground two-way video link that allows ground forces to see the aircraft’s 
video and the aircraft to see the ground forces picture. 
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designing flexible architectures adds complexity, which can lower efficiency but also that 
learning and trust can mitigate these costs, especially in information-intensive systems. 
In most organizational design frameworks, the architecture choice is usually 
viewed as “either-or” with respect to efficiency and flexibility.  Architecture alternatives 
are cast as mechanistic (bureaucratic, hierarchical) vs. organic (market, collaborative, 
networked) and we must choose one or the other (Burns and Stalker 1961).  In addition, 
the effect of hierarchical structure on these architecture choices is rarely considered.  
Consequently, because managers and senior leaders of organizations live in a dynamic 
and ever-changing environment, they are presented with conflicting practical guidance on 
the value and benefits of flexibility vs. efficiency.  A third general option, discussed in 
Chapter 4, is the layered hierarchy, which is rarely explicitly considered outside of 
computer science but offers the potential to balance this dichotomy.263 
Our definition of effectiveness is the ability to impose control on the operational 
situation (environment, competitors, customers, etc.) (Wylie 1989).  In military 
operations, controlling the enemy is a goal of both the Army and the AF.  While AF likes 
to emphasize breaking structures deep inside enemy territory the Army emphasizes 
controlling by physical occupation of space.  We saw that in Operation Iraqi Freedom, 
the Air Force and Army worked more closely than ever before, each complementing the 
capabilities of the other.  While the architecture was more complex and there were 
inevitable inefficiencies, the overall warfighting system dominated the Iraqi Army using 
one third the number of ground combat forces as were used for Operation Desert Storm 
in 1991. 
We have defined operational flexibility as having alternative ways of delivering 
value on operationally relevant timelines, in response to changing requirements.  We 
defined efficiency as being effective with fewer resources (planes, bombs, people, 
money) or by increasing output (maintaining ability to deliver value) with the same 
resources.  Our analysis shows us two ways to use flexibility at the enterprise level: 
                                                
263 As we noted earlier, layered hierarchies can be found in numerous places such as law firms, the Catholic 
Church, Universities and in some aspects of the military (Moses 2006a). 
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1. Increase complexity of the opponent’s problem using the same level of 
resources.  This entails competing by creating or identifying new 
opportunities and/or making the opponent work harder (create 
confusion).  We have named this externally focused complexity. 
2. Maintain the same level of performance with fewer resources, 
competing efficiently by using structures that are more complex.  We 
call this internally focused complexity. 
Alternatively, a choice can be made to use a combination of excess resources and highly 
specialized and skilled (overwhelming) assets to dominate the competition. 
The fighting force in Iraq-II used flexibility in the face of strategically driven 
resource constraints to achieve success.  The long-term planning that restricted ground 
force size coupled with the last minute loss of the 4th Infantry Division caused Gen. 
Franks to force a tighter integration of his air and ground forces.264  This resulted in 
lateral interactions at multiple levels of hierarchy between the Air Force and Army, 
resulting in more effective ground and air operations against the Iraqi Army. 
Our main point in this chapter is that lateral interactions in a layered architecture 
can help balance the conflicting needs for flexibility in the face of uncertainty and the 
need to maintain efficiency for control and strategic focus.  In military operations, air 
power doctrine says that control of air power at the strategic and operational level of war 
ensures efficient and flexible employment, whereas control at the tactical level is 
inflexible and inefficient (U. S. Air Force 2001).  We saw that in some cases, centralized 
control of air power can provide operational level flexibility and efficient use of 
resources, but in other cases, where tactical level support must have primary 
consideration (counter insurgency operations) operational level efficiency must 
sometimes be sacrificed to gain more flexibility in order to enable or improve tactical 
level effectiveness.  In military contexts, flexibility in a single service (the Air Force, for 
example) can provide a commander more options, confusing the enemy by providing 
multiple problems for him to solve or address.  In a multi-service context, flexibility 
                                                
264 Recall also that, according to Franks, his operational philosophy was inherently Joint.  This meant that 
he was predisposed to achieving effective integration among his service components (what is colloquially 
termed “Jointness”).  This tells us that resource constraints were only one driving force for achieving 
flexibility (Franks 2004b).  Based on the statements of Gen. Wallace, the V Corps commander, resource 
constraints became a compelling force for increased laterality with his air support organization (Kirkpatrick 
2004). 
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among services (Army, Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps) further increases the enemy’s 
problem as well as providing our side more options, both offensively and defensively, 
even though the efficiency of each particular service branch may need to be lowered in 
search of effectiveness at the enterprise level.  
When considering architectural choices in an enterprise context, it is important to 
consider the multi-level nature of enterprise architectures and understand the flexibility-
efficiency trade-offs that result. 
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Chapter 7  
New England Patriots:  Balancing Efficiency, Effectiveness, Flexibility  
and Complexity at Multiple Levels of the Game 
7.0 Introduction 
In an era of salary capped football teams, the New England Patriots are an 
anomaly.  National Football League rules are aimed at making all teams relatively equal 
and avoiding the dominating teams of past decades such as Shula’s Miami Dolphins and 
Landry’s Dallas Cowboys.  But the New England Patriots and its head coach, Bill 
Belichick, have found a recipe for sustained success in this environment.  In a two 
volume work, James Lavin, an avid Patriots fan with no inside knowledge of the team but 
armed with an economics Ph.D. in high performance work organizations, we have a 
comprehensive look at the team and its system (Lavin 2005a; Lavin 2005b). These books 
were written because Lavin observed that the Patriots seemed to understand business 
strategy and organizations particularly well and he wanted to explain their system to the 
practicing business community. 
Our interest is in understanding one aspect of how the Patriots can be so 
successful in an environment explicitly designed to level the playing field:  player 
flexibility, its cost and its impact at multiple levels of the game.  My advisor, Joel Moses, 
has been interested in flexibility of the Patriots since my arrival at MIT.  In our quest to 
understand flexibility in socio-technical systems, we decided to look closely at how the 
Patriots do it.  There are certainly many ways to examine and interpret the Patriots 
success.  Some might say they cheat, given the 2007 season’s videotaping scandal.265  
Some might say they have simply identified a better strategy or that they work twice as 
hard as everyone else or that Coach Belichick is a better strategist, leader and team 
builder.  Still others might observe that the talent of quarterback Tom Brady carries the 
day.  All of this may be true or not.  In many ways, each is an interpretation based on 
value judgments or narrow views of the Patriots system.  Our interest is different.  There 
are certain aspects of the Patriots approach to the game of football that can serve as 
explanatory analogs to flexibility in warfare and that can help illuminate fundamental 
                                                
265 This was a comment made to me by more than one person when I mentioned this study in conversation. 
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trade-off issues and consequences of flexibility in enterprise architecture.  The integration 
of different specific position skills in football is analogous to integration of different 
military service capabilities in joint military operations. 
There are two key points.  First, recall that we are interested in operational 
architectures—systems and organizations in operation, executing complex missions and 
tasks on multiple time scales and at multiple levels of abstraction.  Second, recall that a 
core conceptual construct is that flexibility pays benefits in excess of its costs in most 
situations once an initial investment is made in a flexible architecture, especially in cases 
where switching costs among built-in alternatives are low.266  Certainly, in competitive 
situations where there is uncertainty about what might happen next, it is beneficial to 
have alternatives.  Alternative courses of action are enhanced in value and made more 
efficient to have if the things that provide those alternatives are flexible themselves.  
Flexible parts or versatile people make it easier to shift from one course of action 
(configuration) to another—they make the overall system more flexible than it would be 
otherwise.  This chapter aims to look closely at the role of multi-skilled players as a 
component of the Patriots’ strategy in order to explain better the value of flexibility in an 
enterprise context (extending our analysis of military operations in this case). 
7.1 Analog to military operations 
There is a parallel between strategic, operational and tactical concerns in military 
operations and different aspects of football.  In military operations, tactical concerns are 
                                                
266 This observation is made in Chapter 4, and is noted in a briefing titled “Strategic Engineering” by Prof. 
Oliver de Weck, dated Nov 7, 2006, available at http://strategic.mit.edu/content/view/38/86/. Switching 
costs are a discriminator between information intensive systems and matter-energy intensive systems when 
considering design of flexibility for operational purposes.  In matter-energy intensive systems high 
switching costs in terms of time, money and effort to change a system’s configuration are an important 
consideration in system design for uncertain environments.  This creates a need to think strategically 
(longer term) about system design as fiscal, demand, environmental and other constraints tighten.  As 
switching costs decrease, it becomes less necessary to consider long-term system design implications of 
changes to a system—many options can be designed into the system up front, making operational and 
tactical changes to system configuration more viable.  In this way, switching costs may help us discriminate 
between strategic, operational and tactical flexibility in operational situations.  In addition, system 
flexibility in operation is distinct from design flexibility; it is more challenging to design operational 
flexibility into matter-energy intensive systems than in information intensive systems.  It is more difficult, 
in general, to add options to an automobile than it is to add options to software or to redirect a person.  
Also, once written, software can become inflexible from a design standpoint, so even though software may 
have more operational flexibility to begin with, changing that flexibility can become as difficult as 
changing a matter-energy intensive system.  
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those centered on short term, direct engagements with the enemy.  In football, this 
equates to game play of each down.  The operational level in military operations concerns 
the larger scale support, coordination and exploitation of many, often dispersed, tactical 
level activities over a longer time scales in order to achieve strategic goals.  This level 
bridges tactics and strategy.  In football, this equates to a game plan—the overall scheme 
for managing a game against a certain opponent.  It considers issues related to exploiting 
game play successes to win the whole game.  In military contexts, strategy concerns the 
determination of the overall approach to the conflict or competition, and usually 
considers the longest time scales.  In football, strategic concerns are those related to how 
the team competes within the league—the overall approach to the game within the 
constraints of the rules determined by the league.  These levels are summarized in Table 
7 
Military level Football equivalent 
Strategic Season-to-season considerations; overall approach to the game, including hiring strategy:  general managers and staff 
Operational Individual game plans; integrating individual plays within a game to exploit success and mitigate errors:  coaches  
Tactical Individual plays within the game:  players 
Table 7:  Levels of abstraction for National Football League teams 
7.2 Flexibility in football 
Football is a relatively tightly constrained and symmetric competition.  Skills 
necessary on both sides are open and well known; the number of players allowed on the 
field and on the team roster is the same.  In this case, as discussed in Chapter 5, a 
strategic choice can be made to compete on overwhelming skill and specialization in 
certain areas, or to compete by using plays that are more complex, using flexibility 
against the other team and its game plan.  In football, flexibility in the offense can enable 
the quarterback to exploit weaknesses in and confuse the defense.  Likewise, flexibility in 
the defense can confuse the opposing quarterback as well as exploit weaknesses in the 
offense.  To build a model of flexibility in football, we need to state some observations 
up front: 
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1. Single position, exceptionally talented players command large salaries; 
2. The NFL imposes salary caps on teams. 
With these two observations, we can discuss the implications of multi-skilled (flexible) 
players on overall flexibility of the team and discuss the structure of this flexibility at the 
team level.  Some positions naturally require highly skilled, single position, players.  
Quarterback, kicker, cornerback and sometimes safety are these types of positions.  
Players with multiple skills can fill other positions.  Linebackers and defensive ends are 
examples of positions that the Patriots fill with multi-skilled players. 
An example of flexibility in offense is the option available to the quarterback to 
pass or throw.  Having multiple receivers and a running back/fullback makes the problem 
complex for the defense.  It gives the defense many possible problems to solve.  On the 
other side, if defensive players are versatile (can switch roles quickly), the quarterback 
has a difficult problem to solve as well; he has difficulty choosing a play that can exploit 
weaknesses in the defense.  These examples of flexibility, the benefits it creates and 
problems it causes are the equivalent of tactical level operations in a military context. 
Football teams can achieve flexibility in at least two ways that we will consider.  
The first, most conventional, way is to swap out players for different plays.  This has 
some drawbacks, such as giving the other side time to ‘read’ the play (if swapping on 
offense), interrupting the flow of the team’s overall game strategy or not having the right 
mix of players on the field (if swapping on defense) (Lavin 2005b).267  The second is to 
have multi-skilled players that can easily switch positions—altering the configuration of 
the team quickly and with relative ease. 
In manufacturing situations, economists have seen that multi-skilled workers 
enabling flexible manufacturing and production, enhancing regional or industrial 
competitiveness as well as providing robustness to external change (Piore and Sabel 
1984; Piore 1989).  In a similar vein, Coach Bill Belichick and his Vice President of 
Player Personnel, Scott Pioli, select certain players specifically for their potential to 
                                                
267 Many of these insights were developed by personal observation of the Patriots football games by 
(mostly) Dr. Joel Moses and me.  These insights are enriched and largely validated in the book by James 
Lavin, Management Secrets of the New England Patriots:  From Patsies to Triple Super Bowl Champs. 
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become multi-skilled players that can support the Patriots’ strategy of flexibility.  As 
Lavin notes:  “Belichick drafted strong safety Gus Scott...because "He's played both free 
and strong safety.  He's also played some nickel back.  I like him on all four downs.”(n. 
599)” (Lavin 2005b).  This gives Belichick’s coaches many more options for play 
sequencing and game strategy, the football equivalent to operational level of war. 
7.3 Multi-skilled Players 
Based on this discussion, there are two ‘meta-strategies’ in professional football.  
We will call these ‘superstar’ and ‘multi-skilled’.  The main approach—the one used by 
most teams, relies on a relatively small number of single-skilled superstar players.  These 
are highly skilled, dedicated role, players.  They command high salaries and are coveted 
by many teams and competing with this type of strategy creates a two-tiered team 
architecture.  There are a few highly paid superstars and many players paid close to the 
league minimums.  In this strategy, competitive advantage is gained by superlative skill, 
flawless execution and a well-crafted game strategy that leverages the high-priced talent, 
generally driven by coaches on the sidelines. 
As we noted earlier, the Patriots take the ‘multi-skilled’ approach, choosing multi-
skilled players for key positions.  There are a few superstars, such as Tom Brady, many 
mid-level salary multi-skilled players and a lower-tier of single-skilled or entry-level 
multi-skilled players.  The availability of multiple skills in a single player creates more 
options for coaches when building game strategies and more options in game execution 
when unforeseen events happen on the field.  In this strategy, competitive advantage is 
gained from the ability to adjust to opposing strategies and by changing configurations to 
confuse the opposition, using a game strategy that relies on a mix of control from the 
sidelines and direction on the field.  Using multi-skilled players combined with 
innovative play development and strategy, the Patriots have become a powerhouse 
football franchise.268  Looking to the Patriots as an example for flexibility may help us 
gain more general insights to flexibility in enterprises.   
7.3.1 Defensive flexibility and multi-skilled players 
                                                
268 Super Bowl Champions, 2003, 2005, 2006. 
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The Patriots differentiate themselves from other teams largely in the flexibility of 
the defense, especially in the linebacker position.  This is where we will focus our 
analysis.  The Patriots’ defensive tactic is to present many alternative and rapidly 
changing configurations to the offense.269  Because of the multiple positions that their 
linebackers can play, the Patriots’ defense can shift configurations in response to the 
offensive setup before the ball snap.  The aim is to try to confuse the opposing 
quarterback into making a mistake (Lavin 2005b; Lavin 2005a).  
On the defense, the main source of flexibility comes from the outside linebackers.  
The Patriots’ linebackers are specifically chosen for their balance of size and speed.  
Speed provides them with an ability to defend against the passing play and size enables 
them to move up and work on the defensive line.  They can also drop back to the safety 
position if necessary.  So there are three different positions that are filled by linebackers 
on the Patriots.  This contrasts with most league linebackers (and the origins of the 
linebacker position), where the run and short pass are their main focus.  Positions and the 
general mobility of players are shown in Figure 55. 
 
Figure 55:  Position flexibility on Patriots' defense 
A second source of flexibility on the Patriots is the Strong Safety, who can come 
up and play outside linebacker when necessary, filling two positions.  This brings the 
total number of configurations possible for the New England Patriots’ defense to 18.  
Flexibility by position is shown in the following table: 
                                                
269 Christopher Price notes in The Blueprint how the Patriots’ defense used many different defensive 
configurations to confuse Peyton Manning in the 2004 AFC Division playoff game (p. 238). 
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Position L1 L2 L3 OLB1 ILB1 ILB2 OLB2 FS1 SS1 CB1 CB2 
# Positions 
playable 1 1 1 3 1 1 3 1 2 1 1 
Table 8:  Position flexibility by position on Patriots’ defense 
In fact, the total number of possible defensive configurations can be counted as much 
higher if we consider that different linemen serve different functions (and that they are 
trained in multiple functions), that cornerbacks can shift sides of the field and that inside 
linebackers can also shift positions.270  Another source of strength and flexibility is the 
mutual support and collaboration between cornerbacks and safeties in the secondary.  In 
addition, some offensive players can shift sides to play defense if necessary, providing 
flexibility at the level of the whole team and at game level, not just defense. 
7.3.2 Analogy to military operations 
This kind of flexibility is equivalent to tactical level flexibility in military 
operations.  If different systems or units can serve multiple roles or functions, it is 
possible to respond with a more useful configuration in the face of enemy actions than 
would be possible if we simply had single role units.  For example, there are three main 
missions for attack aircraft in the employment of combat air power:  deep strike against 
enemy strategic targets, air interdiction against assets that are in direct support of an 
enemy’s army, and close air support, usually against forces in contact with our ground 
forces.  If an aircraft can fill more than one of these missions, the force is more flexible.  
Two specific examples are illustrative.  
In Operation Desert Storm F-111F aircraft were used to attack Iraqi Republican 
Guard tanks.  Designed to penetrate enemy air defenses and strike targets deep in enemy 
territory, the Air Force discovered that the F-111’s Forward Looking Infrared Radar 
(FLIR) could pick out warm Republican Guard tanks against the cool desert sand after 
dark (Gordon and Trainor 1995). Over ten years later, during Operation Enduring 
Freedom in Afghanistan, B-52 bombers demonstrated similar flexibility in use.  Designed 
                                                
270 A close analysis of Patriots player flexibility shows flexibility on offense and in other defensive 
positions as well.  For example, Safeties will shift to play Cornerback in some situations (Reiss 2008b).  I 
focus on the defense and linebackers because this is the most obvious source of additional flexibility and is 
it’s the area of largest payoff for the Patriots. 
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for Cold War strategic strike missions and modified over the years for other bombing 
missions, they were loaded with the Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM), a GPS guided 
precision weapon.  Flying from their base in Diego Garcia, they were used in the close air 
support role supporting ground forces in contact with the enemy.  Both examples 
illustrate flexibility in operation of platforms originally designed for a single type of 
mission.  This type of flexibility increases efficiency and effectiveness in two ways:271 
1. Assets that might not otherwise be suited to the task at hand become 
productive in the air war and, as a complementary effect, the air 
component of the overall force is more effective; 
2. Individual sorties are more efficient as well as effective, since fewer 
bombs are required to destroy a target and individual bombs are more 
likely to hit a target (more destroyed targets per sortie). 
Having multi-skilled players (multi-functional systems) can provide competitive 
advantage by increasing confusion on the opposing side and increase ability to 
respond to uncertainties. 
7.4 Flexibility at game level 
The previous discussion focused on flexibility on defense, enabled by multi-
skilled players, drawing a parallel to tactical missions in air combat.  This section 
discusses in more detail how the Patriots leverage multi-skilled players on defense as 
well as how they provide flexibility at the game level. 
7.4.1 Discussion of Defense configurations: 
There are two main defensive layouts in the National Football League:  3-4-2-2 
and 4-3-2-2.  These numbers represent the physical layout of the players on the field in 
the order:  linemen, linebackers, cornerbacks and safeties as shown in Figure 56.  
Viewing the layout this way enables us to see the structure of the defense and to visualize 
                                                
271 There is a key distinction between these examples and the examples of the Patriots.  The Patriots’ 
players have been specially chosen for versatility and trained for flexibility.  These two military examples 
show flexibility driven by operational necessity after the fact, once the systems were fielded.  This type of 
flexibility, driven by necessity, will always be a feature of complex systems and organizations, especially 
in combat.  A prime motivation for this research is to understand the benefits of the type of flexibility 
demonstrated by these two examples so that decisions about flexibility can be made, before the fact.  Many 
arguments over designing flexibility into systems center on cost effectiveness (efficiency) or inefficiency.  
As the information component of systems continues to increase and the performance attributes of 
ensembles of systems becomes of primary importance, it may become more operationally effective, and 
therefore cost effective, to design interoperability (flexibility) into these systems up front, rather than view 
flexibility as something that lowers overall performance of the system. 
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how the configuration can change as the players move between positions.  These two 
layouts are illustrated in Figure 56. 
 
Figure 56:  Defensive configurations 
 The 3-4-2-2 defense uses four linebackers and three linemen, while the 4-3-2-2 
uses four linemen and 3 linebackers.  The Patriots, by virtue of the ability of their 
linebackers to shift positions just before the snap of the ball can shift between these two 
configurations (and several others as well, for example a 3-3-2-3 or 3-2-2-4), making it 
difficult for the opposing quarterback to predict the weak points in the defense or to 
predict the timing or direction of blitzes (Price 2007) (Lavin 2005b).272  
Using this approach, we can think about how the play is analogous to an air 
campaign.  Knowledge of a lineup of players and their level of skill (intelligence) enables 
a team to craft an offensive game plan that exploits weaknesses in the defense.  Similarly, 
for the defense, it is possible to look at the opposing offense and figure out whether a 3-4-
2-2 or a 4-3-2-2 lineup is better.  This is similar to developing a military campaign plan—
allocating resources to missions with the objective of hitting the enemy at key places that 
give friendly forces an advantage. 
But generally it is difficult to account for all variations that an offense or defense 
can create, or to predict what an enemy might do during an attack.  So locking a game 
plan into a 3-4-2-2- or 4-3-2-2 defense may not be successful.  Most teams address this 
issue by shifting their defensive configurations in between plays.  The Patriots, with their 
multi-skilled players are able to increase the space of possible configurations beyond the 
                                                
272 Price (p. 116) in particular notes that realizing they could diffuse the blitz function throughout the 
defense (to the Linebackers) was a key factor in the Belichick-Pioli drive to begin acquiring multi-skilled 
linebackers. 
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two fundamental alignments and are able to switch among these alternatives quickly.  For 
example, if the defense must swap out players between plays to shift from one 
configuration to another some difficulties arise:   
1. The offense has time to recognize the defensive configuration and change 
their play; 
2. The offense can play a no-huddle strategy, eliminating the ability to swap 
players; 
3. The defensive coaches must predict the most likely approach an offense is 
going to take on the next play in order to swap out the “right” players. 
With the multi-skilled player approach of the Patriots, these difficulties are mitigated.  A 
shift in the defensive configuration can happen in real time—the linebackers can shift 
their position up until the last moment before the ball snaps.  This gives the offense less 
time to react, confuses the quarterback about his most viable course of action as he tries 
to start the play.  While the offense always retains the initiative (e.g., they choose when to 
start the play), flexibility gives the defense some initiative, always an advantage in 
competition.   
There are three potential paths (alternatives) for an outside linebacker to occupy a 
position.  Taking a geographical (spatial) view, we can see how the positions are laid out 
on the field and how players move between positions, increasing the possible 
combinations for  
 
Figure 57:  Defensive flexibility in action on Patriots' defense 
defense in Figure 57: 
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Since decisions to shift the defense can happen in real time, leveraging the multi-
skilled nature of the linebackers requires the coaches to give up a degree of play calling 
control to them.  This analogous to Kometer’s depth of command concept where, in order 
to respond effectively to unforeseen developments, decision-authority is delegated to 
lower echelons.  This is particularly relevant to air-ground operations, where a lot of real-
time adjustment must take place.  On the Patriots, linebackers can coordinate and 
collaborate directly with each other and change the configuration of the defense.  With 
depth of command, the air and ground forces can collaborate directly and change their 
configuration in response to emerging combat situations. 
We can also see an analogy to time-critical/sensitive targeting operations, where 
aircraft are sent aloft (into the game) without a specific target assignment.  When a time-
sensitive target is identified (key defensive decision needs to be made from the sidelines), 
the AOC transmits the information to the aircraft (the coaches signal the defense to 
change configuration without player substitution). 
7.4.2 Analogy to warfare 
Football is not combat.  It can be considered analogous to certain types of combat 
or warfare; by comparing certain aspects of the two, we hope to gain some insights to the 
implications of flexibility in complex operational contexts.  In both activities, there are 
two sides and, in analogy to high-end warfare, they are commanded by a single person 
with a support staff to coordinate different aspects of the operation.  Each side tries to 
out-maneuver, out-strategize and overwhelm the opponent.  Strategically, player scouts 
interact with the general management staff with information about potential new players.  
Operationally, during practices and game plan development, coaches collaborate to build 
an integrated plan.  In each case, either the general manager (Belichick), or the team 
coordinator (offensive, defensive) make final decisions.  At the tactical level, we have 
seen how defensive flexibility can complicate the offense’s problem.  On the football 
field, the offense tries to break holes in the defense and sustain them long enough to 
move forward.  On the offense, linemen and fullbacks break holes in the defensive line 
for the running back.  They are like the Army.  Wide receivers (WR) and tight ends (TE) 
also serve this function—they block, but they range farther into defensive territory than 
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linemen and fullbacks (FB).  So they are more like close air support in the AF when they 
fill this role. 
WRs and TEs also can range deep in defensive territory, looking for holes in the 
defensive structure to catch the ball.  These holes are often fleeting, because defensive 
players run to fill them when receivers arrive.  There is a difference between football and 
the Air Force in this example.  The receivers are not trying to create holes in the 
opposing structure, but rather to find and exploit them.  Similar to the Air Force, the holes 
in the defense are filled rather quickly relative to a running play.  Receivers are more like 
aircraft in another way:  persistence.  Many times, they will be tasked to block (like close 
air support, as noted above) but then will move on into a passing pattern.  They block, 
behaving like artillery or close air support, but then move on, acting like attack aircraft. 
7.5 Advantage and disadvantages of flexibility in football 
7.5.1 Advantages 
What becomes clear from an analysis of the Patriots’ strategy of recruiting and 
training multi-skilled players is that it creates advantage at multiple levels of the game.  
We have seen that at the tactical level, which we classify as play-to-play and within 
individual plays during a game, the ability to change defensive configurations in real or 
near-real time adds complexity that the opposing quarterback must process while trying 
to execute his play.273   
At the operational level, the level of the game plan and execution on a given day, 
multi-skilled players provide the ability to change the overall game plan by substituting 
players for different positions as the game unfolds and as the opposing game strategy and 
opposing team’s strengths and weaknesses become known.  Also, the ability to change 
players in response to injuries during a game and over the course of a season is 
operational level flexibility in the form of robustness to failure.  This type of robustness 
might not be possible if the team had less bench depth from multi-skilled players.  We 
                                                
273 It is also worth noting that similar flexibility exists on offense, but in a different form.  On offense, 
many different plays can be executed from the same configuration, so it is difficult for the opposing team to 
predict the upcoming play.  Lavin notes (quoting Tom Brady), that offensive flexibility has a different 
character than defense, mainly because on offense there is a need to have what I will call “scripted 
flexibility” during passing plays due to the relatively short time the quarterback has to assess the 
developing situation and make a decision. 
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could take the calculation made in Table 8 and apply it to assessments of bench depth as 
well.  NFL teams build rosters with multiple players at each position to support their 
overall competitive strategy, known physical vulnerabilities (potential for injury in a 
starting player) and other considerations.  Because of the ability to shift players among 
different positions, multi-skilled players increase bench depth more than can be seen by 
simple inspection of the team’s roster—it is a way to increase roster size “virtually”.274  
NFL rules on team size and player salaries are explicit constraints aimed at 
leveling team competitiveness.  This is different than in warfare, where the objective is to 
exert control over the enemy, usually with force.  Even though there is no league that 
levies constraints on resources in military competition, countries are nonetheless 
constrained in the resources they can devote to their militaries.  Constraints such as the 
amount a country is willing to spend on defense, technological capabilities to design and 
field systems, and political considerations on use of force exert a similar effect to team 
size and salary caps of the NFL—competition occurs at multiple levels and along 
different dimensions of performance.  Once constraints are established, the competitive 
problem becomes how to combine (design the structure of) the forces that are provided in 
order to gain competitive advantage.   
In the industrial age, competitive advantage was generally dependent upon size of 
a country’s military force and its ability to master the logistics of moving and supporting 
that force.  In the information age, the source of competitive advantage is shifting to the 
ability to form of novel and innovative arrangements of forces—architectures.275  Desert 
Storm was characterized by the use of overwhelming U.S. and coalition force against the 
Iraqi Army.  In Operation Iraqi Freedom, force size was much more constrained.  This, in 
combination with other factors, drove U.S. commanders to design their operations 
architecture differently than in Desert Storm—to use different organizational 
relationships and structures to gain advantage over the Iraqi army.  This relationship 
                                                
274 There is a parallel here with cross-service training and interoperability.  It implies that sterile counting of 
force structure (size) might not convey crucial information that senior leadership needs for strategic 
decision-making. 
275 It can be argued that the attacks of 9-11 are an example of the use of novel arrangements of systems to 
create devastating effects. 
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between constraints and the ultimate designed structure is analogous to system design 
where cost, schedule and performance must be balanced by making choices among 
competing arrangements of components, subsystems and systems. 
At the strategic level, the ability to maximize team level performance against a 
wide variety of opposing strategies from year to year derives in part from having multi-
skilled players.  Most other NFL teams choose to compete with a sizable number of 
“marquee” players, those who command very high salaries and starting bonuses.  The 
market for multi-skilled players has not been as “hot” as the market for superstars.276  
Although the Patriots have marquee players (e.g., Tom Brady), they can hire multi-skilled 
players cheaper on average.  Looking for multi-skilled players has two impacts: 
1. The Patriots have more opportunities for finding the right fit for their 
upcoming season because they consider a larger portion of the NFL talent 
pool; 
2. They look in segments of the talent market where there has been less 
competition from other teams.   
The Patriots’ emphasis on a “bundle of skills” in a player allows them to manage 
the team as a portfolio of skills against the NFL market (Lavin 2005b). 
These points emphasize, though Lavin does not, that flexibility through a multi-
skilled player acquisition strategy creates a cascading effect across multiple levels of the 
enterprise.  It provides management and coaching staff more game strategy options 
within the constraints of the league rules regarding salary caps—options that are not 
available to teams with more traditional “single-skill/superstar” strategies.277  
7.5.2 Disadvantages 
An examination of disadvantages is also revealing.  First, players have to work 
harder.  Learning more than one position takes more time and physical and intellectual 
                                                
276 Though the Patriots’ success may be altering the market as some teams try to imitate this strategy and as 
some of Belichick’s assistant coaches move on to head coaching jobs in the NFL (Price 2007 p. 260-3). 
277 The tradeoff between salary cap limitations and team size is complex and beyond the scope of this 
analysis.  The maximum playing roster size is 53; the salary cap rules are complex enough that teams can 
“game” the system by deferring some bonuses or shifting some incentive pays in ways that keep the salary 
computation below the cap, but still allow significant compensation to some players. Adjustments to rosters 
must always be made to comply with these constraints by the time the season starts.  Conceivably a multi-
dimensional optimization model could be crafted that compared this trade-off with the additional variables 
of single- vs. multi-skilled players.   
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effort than honing skill at a single position (Lavin 2005a; Price 2007).  Also, multi-skilled 
players are generally not as strong in their position as a traditional single skilled player—
so there are skill level deficiencies that must be compensated for by teamwork on the 
field and by management attention to training routines.278,279 To capitalize on the 
flexibility of their players, management must also work harder.  Teaching, training, 
keeping track of progress of players in multiple or new positions requires time and effort.  
Developing plays and strategies that capitalize on multi-skilled talent also requires deeper 
and more detailed planning.  It is a simple matter of numbers—there are more things to 
track. 
A second disadvantage comes in the area of errors.  As we noted above, to 
capitalize on the benefits of multi-skilled players and the investment in training that must 
be made with them, coaches must give up a degree of control over game play.  This is 
likely to result in mistakes, possibly more errors than if more plays were called from the 
sidelines.  The likelihood of these mistakes can be mitigated or lowered by training, 
learning, and team building (trust) and must be balanced with the probability of 
ineffective plays coming in from the sidelines because of time delays and inaccurate or 
incomplete assessments of the situation on the field. 
This last disadvantage and the means to mitigate it have a direct analog in military 
operations and specifically in Kometer’s depth of command.  If an investment is made in 
a flexible skill set, in order to reap the benefits of this investment, the skills (options) 
must be leveraged in appropriate situations.  Since it is impossible to forecast all possible 
situations and script responses in detail, if the multi-skilled talent set is to respond 
effectively to the opposition, decisions must be decentralized in some cases.280   
                                                
278 Lavin repeatedly notes the tough and challenging nature of Patriots’ practices and of the intellectual 
preparation for the season and for each game, citing multiple sources, from players to coaches. 
279 This trade-off may be more general.  In integral vs. modular technical systems, a similar trade-off exists.  
If a system is built from modules with the goal of making many different system configurations (product 
models) by substituting modules, you do not get the best results unless each module is over-designed so 
that it can match any combination of other modules.  Generally, an integral system can be designed to suit 
its requirements better than a modular one, but it is usually hard to modify. (This observation was made by 
Dr. Dan Whitney). 
280 There is an important distinction here between football and military operations.  The game in football is 
well understood, the skill sets well defined and the rules transparent to all participants.  The challenge is in 
choosing and applying the right mix of skills.  My observation in this paper is that advantage can be gained 
255 
7.6 New England Patriots:  Multi-skilled strategy drives salary structure 
The New England Patriots have used flexibility to achieve a higher payoff with a 
lower payroll per player skill compared with much of the rest of the NFL.  Though saving 
money is not an explicit goal, good stewardship and maximization of value per dollar 
spent is a goal.  The Patriots’ value function, based on sports reporting, is different than 
other teams.  By concentrating on “skill bundles” and primarily on player value in the 
context of the team instead of skill level at a single position (and the value of that 
position in isolation from the team) the average quality of the Patriots as a team is 
probably higher than league average—higher than the salary cap would allow otherwise 
(Lavin 2005b).  So we have a paradox:  team level (global) performance per dollar is 
enhanced by the acquiring ‘inefficient’, though talented, players (local).281 
This section continues our focus on structure, but from a different perspective.  
The salary strategy of the Patriots creates a three-tiered structure (based on salary) where 
many other teams, relying on superstar players, have a two-tier structure (some teams 
have only a single tier of salaries).  In an environment where salary resources are capped 
and a team focuses on hiring superstar, “marquee” talent, there is little room left to pay 
the “non-marquee” players.  In this situation, there are a handful of extremely highly paid 
players with most of the team getting paid relatively lower salaries.282  It is logical to 
argue that if a team relies less on superstar talent and more on multi-skilled players that 
the prevailing market does not value as highly it can pay more players more generous 
salaries.  Though there are a multitude of factors that go into team cohesiveness, a more 
“level” salary structure is likely to improve this intangible aspect of advantage.  The 
Patriots salary structure is empirical support for the stated and observed practice of 
Belichick and Pioli to choose moderately valued players. 
                                                                                                                                            
through the intelligent insertion of flexibility to the team.  In military operations, the skill set is much more 
varied and sometimes the appropriate skill or mix of skills for a given situation is unknown.  The recent 
need for counter-insurgency operations and the associated skill sets in Iraq is an example.  The natural 
uncertainty of military operations and the apparent increasing uncertainty as we move into the 21st Century 
only serves to highlight the need for flexibility in the Department of Defense.  My thanks go to Dr. Dan 
Whitney for pointing out the need highlight this distinction. 
 
282 It is important to note that the minimum starting salary for a rookie NFL player was $285,000 in 2007.  
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A look at the 2007 salary data for the Patriots is shown in Figure 58.283 Using a  
 
Figure 58:  Patriots' salary structure 
clustering algorithm embedded in Mathematica™, the tiered salary structure is shown 
along with a table of the salaries by player: 
 
PATRIOTS 2007 SALARIES 
Rank  Player Salary ($) Cluster Avg Salary ($) 
1 LB Adalius Thomas $13,006,720 
2 DL Ty Warren $8,080,640 
3 WR/TE Wes Welker $6,106,720 
4 QB Tom Brady $6,005,160 
5 WR/TE Kelley Washington $5,006,720 
6 RB Laurence Maroney $4,676,240 
$7,147,033 
7 OL Matt Light $3,505,160 
8 ?? Kyle Brady $3,306,720 
9 WR/TE Randy Moss $3,001,560 
10 RB Sammy Morris $2,956,720 
11 LB Mike Vrabel $2,550,840 
12 RB Kevin Faulk $2,506,720 
13 DB Fernando Bryant $2,253,360 
14 WR/TE Chad Jackson $2,014,420 
$2,198,127 
                                                
283 Salary data for 2007 was retrieved from the Fox Sports News website, 
http://msn.foxsports.com/nfl/teamSalary?categoryId=67054.  Note that the salaries listed here are single 
year figures that include bonuses and other annually paid performance related compensation, not 
comprehensive package totals, which for some players is much larger. 
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15 DL Jarvis Green $2,005,640 
16 OL Stephen Neal $1,806,720 
17 OL Oliver Ross $1,804,800 
18 LB Tedy Bruschi $1,706,120 
19 DB Brandon Meriweather $1,540,000 
20 DB Rodney Harrison $1,530,252 
21 DB Jason Webster $1,381,320 
22 DB Lewis Sanders $1,299,680 
 
23 ?? Chad Scott $1,236,720 
24 OL Dan Koppen $1,006,720 
25 LB  Junior Seau $1,000,840 
26 OL Billy Yates $866,720 
27 LB Larry Izzo $865,160 
28 WR/TE Marcus Pollard $863,360 
29 ?? Troy Brown $860,000 
30 RB Heath Evans $845,840 
31 ?? Mel Mitchell $731,720 
32 OL Lonie Paxton $725,640 
33 DL Richard Seymour $706,720 
34 WR/TE Sam Aiken $678,360 
35 DB Tank Williams $635,000 
36 OL Russ Hochstein $626,720 
37 WR/TE Jabar Gaffney $626,700 
38 DL Vince Wilfork $605,160 
39 K Chris Hanson $595,000 
40 LB Victor Hobson $595,000 
41 DB Benjamin Watson $566,120 
42 OL Gene Mruczkowski $535,000 
43 OL Logan Mankins $505,640 
44 LB Eric Alexander $441,720 
45 DB James Sanders $441,720 
46 QB Matt Cassel $440,640 
47 DL Mike Wright $440,640 
48 DB Ellis Hobbs $440,160 
49 OL Nick Kaczur $440,160 
50 ?? Marcellus Rivers $420,000 
51 WR/TE David Thomas $366,720 
52 LB Pierre Woods $366,120 
$559,305 
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53 OL Wesley Britt $365,640 
54 K Stephen Gostkowski $365,640 
55 DL Le Kevin Smith $365,640 
56 ?? Willie Andrews $365,160 
57 OL Ryan O'Callaghan $364,680 
58 QB Matt Gutierrez $295,000 
59 DL Steve Fifita $285,000 
60 DL Santonio Thomas $285,000 
61 DB Mike Richardson $276,000 
62 ?? Oscar Lua $253,000 
63 RB Kyle Eckel $234,706 
 
Table 9:  2007 Patriots salaries ranked and by cluster 
Clustering functions can give different results depending on the particular settings 
of the algorithm.  In order to avoid this dependency, the Mathematica™ FindClusters 
algorithm was run with a range of possible settings.  The clustering of three groups of 
salaries for the New England Patriots was the most consistently generated clustering 
arrangement.  It was also with the most reasonable settings on the algorithm (simplest 
distance calculation function).  In addition, the clustering algorithm was applied to the 
2007 salaries of the rest of the NFL.  Of these teams, only two rosters generated salary 
structures similar to the Patriots:  the Miami Dolphins and the Houston Texans.  These 
teams have structures with 3.48 and 3.9 levels, respectively, indicating a similar strategy 
to the Patriots.  
7.7 Is flexibility worth it? 
This is the grand question.  As controversial as the Patriots are, and as narrow and 
brief a look at them as we have taken, it appears, in the context of the National Football 
League rules, that multi-skilled players enable creation of a dense set of interdependent 
advantages that outweigh their seeming disadvantages.  There are myriad factors that 
contribute to the success of the Patriots: 
• Strategic ‘genius’ of Bill Belichick; 
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• Belichick and staff’s coaching style and team-building skills; 
• The competence of his staff; 
• The work ethic and work environment created by the combination of 
Belichick, his staff, the players they recruit and the team’s owners; 
• Mutual trust between players and coaches, especially between backup players 
and their position coaches 
• The intangible aspects of the team that create a commitment to it on the part 
of the players, even though they do not earn a salary level that some of them 
might earn elsewhere in the league.284 
The list can go on.  But overall, it appears that the strategic choice of creating options 
through flexibility is a central feature of the Patriots’ advantage, the cost is something 
that all participants are willing to bear and that flexibility is observable in the structure of 
the team along at least two dimensions (salary and defensive game play).  The payoff, 
according to many of the citations in Lavin’s account of the Patriots is, simply, winning 
football games.285 
As 2008’s Super Bowl results show, it is clear that flexibility is not a silver 
bullet.286  Flexibility alone cannot guarantee a win.  It is only one part of an integrated, 
strategically chosen, systematic, and multi-level approach toward the game of football.  
The main constraint is the League salary cap.287  In the face of a rule designed to prevent 
the emergence of ‘dynasty’ teams like the Dolphins, Cowboys and Steelers of the ‘70s or 
the ‘49ers and Cowboys of the ‘80s and ‘90s, Belichick has crafted a strategy, reflected in 
the structure of the team, which created sustained advantage.  Multi-skilled talent and 
flexible structures appear to be a key ingredient of this success.  
7.7.1 Efficiency considerations 
                                                
284 It is difficult for most entry-level players (rookies) to earn large starting salaries, except some of those 
chosen near the top of the first round of the draft. But once a player establishes a reputation and 
demonstrates longevity in the league, NFL rules give them bargaining power.  Also, NFL salary structures 
are complex, making comparisons difficult.  The observed phenomenon on the Patriots is that players who 
could demand (and receive) higher salaries elsewhere often choose to stay at New England. 
285 Again, this metric is very clean, clear and unambiguous. This is in stark contrast to warfare, where 
success metrics can be highly subjective. 
286 The 2009 season is another example.  However, it is not an indictment of flexibility; in their early 
season loss to Miami, the Patriots’ defense was not flexible enough, as inferred  by the following quote 
from Rodney Harrison:  “they caught us by surprise. We tried to make adjustments. We still didn't stop it. 
We tried to make more adjustments, and we still didn't stop it.” (Reiss 2008a) 
287 Free agency, the order of draft picks and balanced scheduling are also factors the League uses to level 
team capabilities and generate even competition. 
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We have reviewed the advantages, disadvantages, and structural implications of a 
multi-skilled approach.  But is it efficient?  During a football game, (tactical level) both 
sides have the same level of physical resources (11 players on the field, a maximum 
allowable team roster).  In addition, the NFL rules constrain team salary levels, so that all 
teams are equal in terms of the maximum amount of money they are allowed to spend on 
skills (playing talent).  The Patriots use this salary constraint to advantage by hiring 
players that are flexible—in effect increasing team-level efficiency under this resource 
constraint (having more skills per player or per dollar salary).  During game play, the 
Patriots’ defense uses this flexibility to confuse the opposing offense with many different 
possible configurations (complexity).   
On the face, multi-skilled players are inefficient—they are less effective at their 
position than single-skilled, “marquee” players.  But in a game strategy like the Patriots, 
they are highly efficient---there are more skills per dollar salary, they are effective against 
a wider array of opposing strategies and the team overall is more successful over time (at 
least, the Patriots are).  Adding a multi-skilled player, as noted earlier, increases the depth 
of the team’s roster without increasing its size.  From a skill maximization perspective, 
this is efficient—more possible output (number of available skills) for the same input 
(size of the team). 
A secondary issue regarding flexibility is the additional coaching and training 
burden required to leverage the talent of multi-skilled players.  At the level of the total 
team organization this seems inefficient.  The management and coordination required to 
leverage multi-skilled players is larger than for other strategies.  The Patriots’ coaches 
must work harder than other teams for the same or fewer salary dollars. 
This burden flows to the players as well.  The increased number of play 
configurations possible with multi-skilled players creates additional interdependencies 
within the overall team that must be managed and understood in depth, in addition to the 
larger number of plays that are likely to be developed.  For example, multi-skilled players 
must have a better understanding of the roles and responsibilities of other nearby 
positions, enabling them to understand what the other player might do in a new situation 
(Lavin 2005b).  
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There are two obvious benefits of the multi-skilled approach.  First, it makes 
multi-skilled player teams more robust to the loss of a player.  Second, the increased 
understanding by players of interdependencies among positions makes the team more 
robust to innovative strategies of other teams. 
7.8 The 2008 Super Bowl and 2008-2009 Season 
The basis for our analysis of the Patriots as an exemplar of the virtues of 
flexibility may be called into question, given their 2008 loss in the Super Bowl to the 
New York Giants and their failure to make the NFL Playoffs this year.  We must 
remember, flexibility is not a silver bullet—it is not assurance of success.  It is a tool to 
be used by management (in this case Belichick and his coaching staff) as a way to gain 
advantage in the highly competitive environment of the NFL.  The factors of chance still 
play a role in the game.  That said, the 2008 Super Bowl was not decided until the final 
seconds of the game—the Patriots almost won.288  This past season, despite the strategy 
to increase bench depth by having multi-skilled players, there were many injuries.  
Beyond a certain point, even the benefits of being flexible cannot overcome resource 
constraints.  It is also notable that, in the most important position on the team—
quarterback, the backup worked exceptionally well.  While this is not an example of 
flexibility via multi-skilled players that we have emphasized, it is an indication of an 
overall philosophy of ensuring that all players are ready to step in when needed.  In 
addition, it is also possible that teams have learned how to adjust to the Patriots’ overall 
strategy, thus lowering the potential advantage of it.  While this thesis requires more 
detailed investigation, the recent departure of Scoot Pioli, along with other Belichick 
protégés that have diffused throughout the NFL is indication that the multi-skilled player 
philosophy, and knowledge of how to counter it are not unique advantages anymore. 
7.9 Summary analysis 
There appears to be a fundamental strategic choice in the game of football, a 
competition characterized by largely symmetric resources in terms of quantity (roster size 
and salary levels) and with well-defined game rules.  Winning with a team composed of a 
                                                
288 It is also important to note the many times where the Patriots won very late in the game in both the 
2007-2008 season as well as others. 
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few single skilled, highly paid players that afford little flexibility toward unforeseen 
strategies and events, or winning with a team composed of a mixture of medium-salary 
multi-skilled players and a few exceptionally skilled and highly paid superstars.  Though 
arguments can be made in favor of either approach, the success of the New England 
Patriots using the second is compelling.  In an environment when the differences in skill 
level are marginal, and most game strategies based on leveraging these highly skilled 
players, the increased flexibility of a multi-skilled approach provides a competitive edge.  
It enables a higher likelihood of having a season-long ability to counter a wider variety of 
game strategies with the same team size and salary constraints as the ‘superstar’ strategy. 
This chapter has examined the architecture and the tradeoffs to flexibility we 
explored in Chapters 5 and 6 in an unrelated but analogous example, the New England 
Patriots football team.  While the analogy to combat and multiple levels of warfare are 
not perfect, the main purpose here is to examine the generalizability of the ideas in 
Chapters 5 and 6.  We found that, using a different abstraction than in Chapters 5 and 6, 
at the level of game play (tactical level), flexibility in players can be leveraged to gain 
advantage in a symmetrically constructed competitive situation. 
In this case, we focused mainly on flexibility in space and time.  For the Patriots, 
defensive linebackers can move across different depths (levels) in the field to confuse and 
respond to the offense.  Flexibility in the form of multi-skilled players in combination 
with strong teamwork and empowered action on the field provides temporal flexibility—
being able to shift function in the defense quickly.  Though we did not address this aspect 
of military operations in depth, having multi-role aircraft can provide a similar kind of 
flexibility.  An aircraft with appropriately flexible systems and crew can provide up close 
attack/defense, or can range successively deeper into the enemy’s battlespace.  Moving 
the location of decisions deeper in the command hierarchy (depth of command), coupled 
with better teamwork (lateral connections) can create spatial and temporal advantage 
similar to the one we explored with the Patriots. 
The trade-off analysis is also similar to military campaigns.  The Patriots have 
chosen to compete within the constraints of the National Football League’s salary cap 
and roster size by using multi-skilled players.  We find that this choice permeates to 
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almost every aspect of the team and provides benefits in the form of enterprise level 
competitive advantage.289  We also find that computing the cost of this advantage is 
difficult.  There are indications that the Patriots team and management work much harder 
than other teams.290  The teamwork necessary to leverage flexibility of multi-skilled 
players is high and mandates a lot of training, practice and study on the part of players—
indeed it requires a different team culture (Lavin 2005b).  Is this a sign of increased 
efficiency, or increased effectiveness?  It depends on our analytical perspective.  
A take-away from this chapter and from Chapters 5 and 6 is that flexible 
architectures cannot be examined using traditional frameworks that only consider output 
metrics in isolation from system level properties, the operational environment and the 
chosen competitive strategy.  Evaluation of the trade-offs is contingent on these factors 
and inclusion of them into the analysis provides insights to the costs and benefits of 
flexibility that are obscured by a traditional focus on efficiencies and outputs (rather than 
effectiveness and outcomes).291 
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Chapter 8  
Summary, Conclusions, Future Work 
8.0 Introduction 
This research has been exploratory.  We have considered an architectural model 
of flexibility in operational contexts.  It is easy, when focused so intently on a problem 
for so long to imagine that every other problem one sees is amenable to the newfound 
“hammer” that was developed in the process of research; that we have a “silver bullet”, 
an ultimate (and easy) solution to all problems (Brooks 1987). We are under no illusions 
in this regard.  We don’t think this framework is a universally applicable or all 
encompassing answer to enterprise architecture and to the operational design of 
enterprises.  We do, however, think it has relevance beyond the comparatively narrow 
scope in which we have applied it.  We think that the framework, model and insights 
gleaned in this study can be applied more generally to non-military operational contexts 
as well as to large-scale commercial or public sector development projects and defense 
acquisition programs. 
8.1 Summary and review 
This thesis has addressed an emerging and increasingly pressing problem:  design 
and operation of enterprises for operational environments that demand flexibility.  
Military operations have always been multi-organizational and there has always been a 
requirement for flexibility, even if throughout most of history flexibility took a back seat 
to massed forces.292  In the past, the number of communication channels, sources of 
information and control paths (or modes) in operations were relatively limited.  Our 
emerging problem is that these factors are all increasing, raising the complexity and 
number of organizational interactions in a military operation while at the same time the 
number of organizations that can influence or have a say in the operation is expanding 
beyond purely military and political ones.  We have taken a conceptual approach from 
computer science to address the analytical challenge of understanding of enterprises and 
                                                
292 The Roman phalanx was an effective, but not flexible, form.  The Romans eventually created the legion, 
which supplemented the phalanx with cavalry and light infantry in order to gain flexibility.  They continued 
using the phalanx as a tactic and as an organizational component of the legion. 
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their properties.  Specifically, we build our framework on the idea of layered hierarchical 
architectures.  This idea is grounded in the use of layers of abstraction to manage 
complexity in complex information processing systems.  We view enterprises as 
operating at multiple layers of hierarchy, where layers are defined by the nature of 
information and decisions made at a particular level of hierarchy—the abstraction at 
which activity occurs.  Higher levels of abstraction usually deal with more complex 
issues on longer time scales than lower levels; higher levels often contain personnel who 
are more senior in rank than lower levels as well (though this is not always the case).  
Many approaches to enterprise architecture take the time tested multiple-view approach, 
one derivative of the field of civil architecture, and used with great power in information 
systems design (Kruchten 1995; Zachman 1999; Board 2000).  This method looks at an 
enterprise through differently dimensioned lenses, aiming to make it amenable to systems 
engineering design methods—making the enterprise an engineering object.293  Multiple 
views help us understand detailed design and gain a comprehensive understanding of a 
complex system.  They do not tell us what to design.  We lack an understanding of how 
enterprise architecture relates to desired system level properties (such as flexibility).   
We have taken a different approach.  Our focus is on design of architectures as a 
distinct activity, separate from detailed system or organization design, as is often done in 
computer science (Amdahl and Blaauw 2000).  Specifically, consideration of the 
operational need for certain system properties, such as flexibility, in the design of an 
enterprise architecture can help us with design, operation and management of these 
complex systems.  In Chapter 4, we reviewed architecture concepts across different 
technical domains.  We found that descriptions of architectures, by necessity, take on a 
more abstract meaning as systems become more complex.  We also found that there is a 
distinct difference in the way that architectures are conceived for mechanical systems 
compared to information systems.  Information system design is characterized by a more 
frequent use of abstraction, with architecture acting as guidance for specific system 
design decisions and for longer range decisions that drive the evolution of an existing 
                                                
293 This is consistent with the approach taken in IEEE STD 1471-2000, IEEE Recommended Practice for 
Architectural Description of Software-Intensive Systems. 
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system.  The ability to use architecture as a guide for design of specific implementations 
of systems implies that we can design them to have specific properties.  Architectures 
need not be simply by-products of a design process that delivers systems with specified 
functionality or worse, the ad hoc, “emergent” result of unguided, undirected decisions 
made on a contingent basis without an overarching set of guidelines. 
We chose to examine this layered hierarchical approach by extending previous 
ESD research on combat air operations (Kometer 2005).  Kometer took a process 
approach to the implementation of policy.  We extended his work by examining a 
simplified version of his process through a hierarchical lens, viewing the overall system 
as an input-output device.  Our purpose was two-fold: 
1. to test the architecture analysis framework; 
2. to examine closely the relationship of architecture to enterprise level 
flexibility. 
We reviewed Kometer’s work and noted that, while providing highly practical guidance 
for planning and operating, it lacked an overall framework in which to design or evaluate 
enterprises architecturally, specifically with respect to flexibility.  Our review of four 
military campaigns using an architecture framework has highlighted the hierarchical 
structure of combat operations, and provided us insight into the relationship between 
structures and system level properties. 
8.2 Results and Contributions 
What have we learned?  Architectural analysis of four military campaigns from 
1991 to 2003 has shown us that hierarchical architectures with lateral interactions at 
multiple levels are more flexible than traditional tree-structured hierarchies.  In all of the 
campaigns, in order to gain the flexibility necessary to accomplish missions, lateral 
interactions at the tactical level either developed ad hoc or were created by command 
direction after the start of the conflict.  We also noted that without lateral connections at 
higher levels in the hierarchy, lower level interactions could contribute to loss of 
coherence.   
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We also noted that layer violations (e.g., micro-management of tactical issues 
from the strategic level) could result in unintended outcomes such as confusion and poor 
or unexpected responses from the system.  This is not new and unique; the costs of 
certain types of top-down intervention are well documented through both research and 
experience.  What we have learned is that there are natural reasons for this effect, which 
originate in differences in the level of abstraction at which different layers of an 
enterprise operate.  Because enterprises exhibit all of the characteristics of complex 
systems, such as non-linearity, unpredictability and resistance to classical forms of 
control, it is natural that we should see these types of problems with layer violations.  Our 
approach accepts enterprises as complex systems that exhibit these characteristics and 
views them as amenable to design if we take an architectural perspective.  Our research 
shows us that there are logical explanations for and interpretations of these consequences, 
which is a different view than explanations that rely on emergence and surprise.  We 
offer a framework that can increase appreciation for the costs and benefits of crossing 
many organizational layers in complex operations.294 
To achieve strategic alignment, we find that lateral interactions at higher layers of 
the enterprise are important to enabling strategic coherence.  In a manner similar to 
Alfred P. Sloan’s organization of General Motors, the addition of lateral connections 
among leaders of the enterprise (not just their staffs), improved enterprise level 
flexibility, particularly in Operation Iraqi Freedom.295  We also noted that where lateral 
interactions at higher layers failed, did not exist, or were by-passed, either operational 
problems developed or flexibility was inhibited as either the internal or external 
environment changed.  Examples are pervasive.  Operation Desert Storm, the first “Joint” 
military operation, lacked inter-service connections at multiple layers, but particularly at 
the senior leadership level.  This disconnected layer in the architecture inhibited 
                                                
294 It is important to note that not all operational instances of “layer violation” are negative.  There are 
important instances where violation of layers in an operational situation is necessary to manage risk levels 
or shorten timelines. 
295 There is a related issue here, which is the dynamic among key leaders in the enterprise and how this 
dynamic affects the overall architecture of the enterprise and its evolution.  This dynamic is evident in the 
reports and accounts of Operation Desert Storm and Kosovo but is in the background, not yet addressed 
analytically.  An examination of this subject and its implications for the Air Force as an institution can be 
found in Warden’s The Rise of the Fighter Generals:  The Problem of Air Force Leadership, 1945–1982 
(Worden 1998). 
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operational choices (flexibility) and affected the evolution of the overall operational 
architecture of the campaign (Atkinson 1993; Roberts 2006).296  In Afghanistan, the lack 
of fundamental alignment (interactions) among the senior leadership and their staffs late 
in the major operations part of that campaign contributed to operational difficulties 
encountered during Operation Anaconda in March 2002 (Davis 2004; Kometer 2005).   
We conclude that, in uncertain and/or fast moving operations, lateral interactions 
at all layers are a necessary ingredient for operational and tactical flexibility while 
maintaining overall strategic coherence (alignment).   
8.2.1 A new perspective on enterprise architecture 
Our framework provides a valuable new way of looking at the very challenging 
problem of enterprise architecture.  Many studies look at micro-scale interactions for 
precise causal relationships that impact specific system outputs.  These approaches 
rapidly succumb to overwhelming complexity in description, analytical intractability and 
conflicting recommendations for action.  We have taken a holistic view that examines 
fundamental properties of a system (in our case, flexibility) and their relation to 
architecture.  We have seen that an architectural framework that explicitly considers 
lateral and vertical aspects of interactions and their impact on performance provides a 
valuable analytical tool for understanding enterprise flexibility.  It also provides a useful 
supplement to traditional tools available to senior leadership when considering enterprise-
level management challenges.  While it is too early to implement a computer-driven 
simulation model to support design decisions, with further development, higher fidelity 
data and more operational case studies our framework may support development of a tool 
such as this for future enterprises.  A simulation tool, if developed might consider the 
following aspects of enterprise architecture: 
1. Length of action sequences, accounting for hierarchical differences; 
2. Variation in location of inputs and how they impact (1) as well as the number 
of potential action sequences (paths); 
                                                
296 There is an argument to be made that these relationships (or lack thereof) were the real driving forces of 
the overall enterprise architecture.  Delving into this issue is beyond the scope of this research and is left 
for future work. 
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3. Different levels of lateral vs. random shortcut interactions as a way to explore 
more comprehensively the potential benefits of explicit design over ad hoc 
actions; 
4. Information passage probabilities—how the architecture impacts the flow of 
information across distance parts of the enterprise, given a hierarchical 
structure and assumptions about difficulty of crossing both lateral and vertical 
boundaries. 
8.2.2 A principled approach to “Jointness” 
Since passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1986, the Department of Defense 
has been moving slowly toward higher degrees of inter-service cooperation, something 
colloquially termed “jointness.”  Though much ink has been spilled, a lot of effort 
expended and many claims of success heard, there are still many challenges to achieving 
truly joint operations and interoperable systems.  The difficulties of achieving flexible 
air-ground operations we discussed in Chapter 5 are only one example.  We have exposed 
one aspect of joint operations that may have some significance—lateral connections at 
multiple hierarchical levels.  Though some connections at high levels have been created 
in response to lessons learned (the Air Component Coordinating Element of Operation 
Iraqi Freedom), the architectural aspects of these connections have not been fully 
explored or appreciated.  Our architectural perspective provides a framework within 
which we can view numerous issues of relevance to jointness. 
8.2.3 Connection between strategy and structure 
The connection between strategy and structure is well known, as is its importance 
to competitiveness particularly in manufacturing contexts (Chandler 1990; Ulrich 1995).  
In defense settings, this idea seems underappreciated.297  Our research specifically 
addresses this issue by examining the overall strategic and operational approach of the 
                                                
297 There have been many recent criticisms of strategic thinking (or lack thereof) in the US military and 
national security establishment (Bacevich 2008; Watts 2008).  Our cases have shown that most military 
officers aim at the personnel level and may be more prone to letting the organizational structure organically 
evolve (Mandeles et al. 1996). 
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U.S. to various cases then examining the structure of the enterprise that executes the 
operation as an implementation of the strategy.   
8.3 Future work 
We have attempted to take a new approach to emerging system-level problems 
that have proven routinely challenging, often intractable and that usually demonstrate 
surprising or counter-intuitive behavior and outcomes.  Enterprises are a new form of 
organizing; taking an architecture design perspective to them is also new.  There are two 
areas of future work for this thesis.  First is to continue to develop and refine the 
framework and the enterprise architectural concepts of laterality and flexibility, with the 
goal of moving toward more concrete metrics that capture structure, flexibility and other 
properties.  Second is to explore the generalizability of the framework by studying 
architectures of other complex systems and enterprises in other operational contexts.   
8.3.1 Framework development 
The foundational thinking for the architectural framework used in this thesis—the 
idea of layered hierarchical architectures is a new approach outside of computer science.  
Though military operations have been viewed and conducted at multiple levels of 
abstraction for decades, explicit design of multiple organizations operating at multiple 
layers with the goal of attaining desired system level outcomes has not been a general 
practice.298  We conducted a first order test of the approach on a limited set of military 
operations and found support for the theory that lateral interactions at multiple 
hierarchical layers enable overall enterprise flexibility while retaining the ability to 
maintain strategic alignment.  More case study analysis is necessary to test the limits of 
this framework. 
8.3.2 Apply the framework with other methods 
8.3.2.1 Design Structure Matrix 
Other systems analysis methods and approaches might be enhanced or extended 
by this framework.  Design Structure Matrix (DSM) methods have been used to examine 
                                                
298 This idea of a general architecture, or theory, is the subject of RADM J. C. Wylie’s Military Strategy:  A 
General Theory of Power Control (Wylie 1989), discussed in Chapters 2 and 4.  Crafting architectures at 
the enterprise level is one method of moving toward true “Jointness” in military operations. 
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the efficiency of product development processes and management.  The major application 
focus of this method as been on efficiency—identifying iterative feedback loops with the 
objective of reducing or controlling them to improving design process performance.  
Some recent applications of the DSM approach identified management issues for 
efficiency of team interactions at two different levels (Yassine et al. 2003; Sosa et al. 
2004).  Sosa, et al. do not address organizational performance issues in their analysis, nor 
do they address more than a two level architecture.299  Applying the DSM method to 
more complex systems and enterprises, integrating it with our hierarchical perspective, 
and examining flexibility would be an interesting and valuable contribution to the product 
development literature on fast-moving industries (Iansiti 1995; Galunic and Eisenhardt 
2001; MacCormack et al. 2001).  Merging DSM methods with our hierarchical 
framework may also yield benefits to complex and innovative new product development 
projects such as the Boeing 787, where the business model involves technical design and 
development, finance and product services as aspects of the value delivery proposition. 
Related to DSM approaches, the work transformation matrix framework takes a 
dynamical systems perspective on product development and examines system 
convergence or divergence characteristics from development team interactions (Yassine 
et al. 2003; Huberman and Wilkinson 2005).  Again, these approaches usually aim to 
understand how development processes can be made more efficient or to identify critical 
interactions for management attention, not to design the enterprise ex ante to have 
specific property that enables delivery of a desired outcome.  Taking these approaches 
and applying them to larger scale systems and to enterprises with an eye toward 
flexibility may add a useful tool for the emerging class of large-scale projects and 
program enterprises. 
Examining the hierarchical structure of social networks in the context of 
enterprise architecture is another area that might benefit from the ideas in this thesis.  
There is some evidence in our research and in some emerging areas of social science that 
suggests certain classes of social interactions may be key to understanding how large 
enterprises operate and evolve.  Understanding how these interactions influence the 
                                                
299 Development teams and systems integration teams. 
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flexibility properties of the overall enterprise may provide insights for enterprise 
transformation and change practice and research efforts.300   
8.3.2.2 Multi-Disciplinary Optimization (MDO) 
Paths are a measure of flexibility, but the number of connections between nodes is 
a measure of complexity.  A hierarchical tree is relatively simple and usually grows 
exponentially as problems get larger, but has a low level of complexity compared to the 
number of its nodes.  Fully connected networks are complex, have short paths between 
nodes and have a high average degree.  The average number of edges per node (average 
degree) can be used as a measure of complexity and paths per node a measure of 
flexibility.  It may be possible to formulate the enterprise architecture problem using 
these simple metrics and explore the trade-off or optimization metric that could support 
an MDO design-oriented research approach to enterprise architecture. 
8.3.2.3 Real Options, Operational Options   
As we have defined flexibility, it is a measure of the capacity of an enterprise to 
adjust to changing requirements for its performance.  In general, high switching costs in 
many mechanical systems argue against high flexibility in these systems.  In these types 
of systems, cost of flexibility in the context of known or projected uncertainties define 
the key design challenge.  This is the motivating force for application of options analysis 
to physical systems (real options).  Designing enterprise architecture to be flexible is a 
form of option creation.  Enterprise flexibility that can be called upon when necessary 
represents an option for the senior leadership of an enterprise.  For example, in the New 
England Patriots, training players in multiple positions represents an option that is 
evaluated on an ongoing basis and exercised when needed (i.e., an injury to another 
player).   
The key challenge in real options analysis is valuing the option—creating a metric 
that can quantify both the cost of flexibility and a metric that can quantify the risk 
(usually very difficult, especially in operational combat situations).  Understanding how 
                                                
300 Applying this framework to some of the Inter-War years military innovation efforts, such as the 
development of carrier aviation or development of War Plan Orange might prove very instructive. 
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our framework can be mapped to real options analysis so that it can support enterprise 
architecting would be another valuable extension of this work.   
8.3.3 Developing enterprise design guidelines 
Our analysis has given us some initial clues as to some important issues for design 
of enterprise architecture.  We can start with an examination of how different layers of an 
enterprise interact with each other.  In developing computer systems, the articulation of 
the abstraction is an important part of the design process.  In designing enterprises, it 
might be helpful to articulate the abstraction.  For example, while military operations 
typically operate at three hierarchical levels (strategic, operational, tactical), they also are 
typically divided by operational medium (air, land, naval).  Other abstractions, such as 
functional ones (logistics, strike, maneuver) are not used, but it might be helpful to 
explore these types of breakdowns. 
Based on our findings, another design (and management) guideline is to pay 
particular attention to interactions instead of individual actions.  It may be more 
important for senior management to know who is interacting with whom than it is to 
examining the tangible work product of a process (Note:  we do not imply that work 
products from processes are not important or critical to enterprise performance). 
8.3.4 Generalizability to other systems and operations 
8.3.4.1 Other military operations 
A more robust and detailed examination of military operational architectures 
should be undertaken to explore the premises of this framework more fully and with 
richer, higher fidelity, data.  Deeper investigations of Operations Anaconda and Tora 
Bora in Afghanistan from an architectural perspective may shed more insight to 
consequences of architecture for performance of the overall system beyond the first order 
observation (in hindsight) of the need for cross-organizational communication.  If 
operational commanders had been able to view how well the organizations involved in 
these operations were connected (and which ones were not) operational difficulties may 
have been avoided or potential trouble spots identified for closer monitoring.   
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It is important to reiterate that the lateral interactions we have focused on will not 
obviate the need for attention to detail, leadership and plain good sense and initiative.  
We do not imply that our approach makes enterprise design and management easy.  Our 
point is that inadequate attention is paid to interactions within hierarchical layers.  
Correction of inadequacies in formal structures and processes are often left to chance and 
existing formal mechanisms are assumed dysfunctional or, as was the case in Operation 
Anaconda, they are assumed to be of such lesser importance as to be explicitly excised 
from the structure. 
Post-Major Combat Operations (MCO) architectures in Iraq, in particular the 
architecture of Surge operations implemented by Gen. Petraeus in 2007 would also be 
particularly informative for the generalizability of layered architectures to different 
operational contexts and to the applicability of our analytical framework.  Based on open 
source press reporting, part of the success of the Surge has been the development of 
lateral connections at lower tactical layers in the architecture as well as connections at 
multiple levels in the larger enterprise architecture of the Multi-National Force and Iraqi 
government organizations.  At the Battalion level and below, ground forces made 
connections to local governing officials and leaders and maintain operational bases in 
local areas.  This is in contrast to pre-Surge operations, where the general rule was to 
conduct operations into areas of insurgent strongholds from forward operating bases, then 
return to these bases.  The Petraeus method, dubbed “seize-hold-build” has proven 
successful.  An architectural perspective may help explain why and provide better 
insights for future operations. 
8.3.4.2 Defense acquisition programs  
The military acquisition system has proven remarkably resistant to change.  
McNamara’s systems analysis approach, institutionalized in the Planning Programming 
and Budgeting Systems (PPBS) casts a long shadow.301  This has created serious 
challenges as the complexity of defense systems has increased, the need for integration 
across service branches has grown and operational demands have become more diverse.  
                                                
301 Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution (PPBE) is the new term, but the mechanics and 
process are about the same, with the analytical approach essentially unchanged. 
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Major defense programs are now managed as enterprises (Murman 2002; Stanke 2006).  
They exhibit all of the hallmarks of complex systems—resistance to control, unexpected 
events and unpredictability.  Yet we continue to manage these organizations to traditional 
cost-schedule-risk performance metrics, they continually fail to meet them, and we are 
continually surprised when this happens.  Application of existing architectural 
frameworks has not appreciably improved this picture.   
Some defense programs have shown remarkable flexibility, but often must 
routinely battle for survival in the face of mainstream acquisition processes.  The Navy’s 
submarine sonar program has transformed a multi-billion dollar legacy integrated system 
into a commercially based, open-architecture system using a business model that captures 
state of the practice technology and fields it quickly and inexpensively.  A key factor in 
this success has been the technical architecture, which includes separation of hardware 
and software dependencies (a layering of the architecture) with a concurrent restructuring 
of the program organization.  We have little understanding of how this program actually 
functions or how it is actually structured.  Examination of the architecture of the multiple 
organizations that are responsible for the system (a) might provide explanatory power for 
the program’s advocates (b) may be able to shed light on the scalability of these types of 
business models to larger, more complex, defense programs and (c) help understand the 
limits or our framework and model.  
8.3.4.3 Commercial program development enterprises 
Large commercial product development enterprises, such as Boeing’s 787, may 
benefit from architectural analysis.  The reported difficulties in design and management 
of this new and innovative system and the intricate complexity of its supplier network 
warrant study.  Understanding the architecture of this project could be beneficial not only 
to Boeing but to national competitiveness.   
Beyond product development, an examination of how a complex technical system 
such as the 787 is integrated into a larger business model could be instructive.  For 
example, are their interactions among the service delivery segment and the marketing 
segment and the finance segment at multiple levels?  How do these interactions affect 
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system level performance?  At what level does integration or laterality become 
irrelevant?  These enterprise level questions can be examined using this framework. 
8.3.4.4 Disaster response, enterprise resilience 
The lack of coordination, collaboration and information flow in the federal, state 
and local response to Hurricane Katrina in 2005 offers another promising area for testing 
this framework and for further development of the model.  Disaster relief, disaster 
response and crisis response are all examples of hierarchical systems that are generally 
not addressed as such.  They are also different than other enterprise systems we have 
discussed.  In these enterprises, the output is not a physical system, but it is delivered 
services and flow of commodities (Burkle and Hayden 2001; Beunza and Stark 2003).  
Sheffi notes that collaboration is important when attempting to develop enterprise 
resilience against disruptions (Sheffi 2005).  Examination of the relationship between 
resilience and responsiveness to hierarchical aspects of enterprises is another way to test 
the limitations and generalizability of our findings. 
8.3.4.5 Architecture of large government institutions 
The architecture of the US Military and Defense Department is usually only 
addressed at a descriptive level.  Discussions of the long-term evolution of the 
Department occur within defense circles, with inferences drawn about driving forces and 
consequences for national security and military effectiveness.  An architectural 
perspective may be able to yield insight to both successes and failures of change efforts 
and may eventually yield to design methods.  A motivation for this kind of an analysis is 
the impact of the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 on the DoD and military services.  
Despite the Act’s goal of fixing persistent operational difficulties revealed in the late 
1970s and early 1980s, the DoD is still fundamentally non-Joint.302  Indeed, in the 
background of much of this research is the fundamental orientation of the military 
services toward each other as competitors, a dynamic that directly impacts operational 
                                                
302 “Joint” is a term used widely in the Department of Defense to convey that a system, operation, or 
organization is focused on integrating the military services, without the excessive parochialism and 
divisiveness that have historically marked U. S. military operations.  The two major events cited as 
prompting Goldwater-Nichols are the failed hostage rescue attempt in Iran (1979) and the Operation Urgent 
Fury (Grenada) in 1983. 
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architectures in practice.  Initial observations and accounts of Major Combat Operations 
in Iraqi Freedom are that service parochialism was much less of a problem, though there 
is anecdotal evidence of resurgence of inter-service rivalry since then.303 
8.3.4.6 Health Care Delivery 
There has also been a surge of effort to reform the national health care system as 
its costs grow seemingly without bound, inefficiency in certain operations becomes 
obvious and inflexibility in others causes difficulties.  Many efforts have focused on 
process improvement, few on architecture.  By applying an architecture framework, a 
new perspective can be brought to bear on this pressing problem and potentially yield 
large improvement (Moses 2009). 
8.3.4.7 Rise of Cross-Disciplinary Studies in Universities 
The proliferation of cross-disciplinary research on University campuses may be 
an emergent response to the need for flexibility and may represent a “new level” of 
abstraction in the architecture of universities.  MIT’s Engineering Systems Division 
(ESD) may be a pro-actively designed response or recognition of the need for increased 
flexibility in both teaching and research on today’s pressing problems.  An analysis of 
ESD and other similar programs in the context of the architecture of a University using 
an architecture framework may be instructive.  
8.4 Observation of recent events 
The Air Force is undergoing a round of institutional difficulties.  In the wake of 
some high profile operational failures and programmatic difficulties in responding to 
warfighting demands, the Secretary of Defense fired both the Secretary and the Chief of 
Staff of the Air Force.  Some think it is significant that he replaced the Chief of Staff with 
a career pilot from the transport and logistics community, not the fighter community.  A 
recent opinion editorial in the New York Times calls for disbanding the Air Force (Kane 
2009).  The Lexington Institute recently reported that the senior leadership of the Air 
Force expressed serious concern over recent programmatic decisions that impacted the F-
                                                
303 The author has heard numerous accounts of inter-service parochialism, in addition to many widely-
publicized successes of inter-service cooperation (“Jointness”).  The most public of these disagreements 
has been over the control and management of Unmanned Air Vehicles (UAVs) in theater, which has been 
widely reported in the defense press. 
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22, C-17 and other major Air Force systems (Thompson 2009).  While these may be 
short-term issues driven by transient political agendas, if they reflect substantial problems 
it may be worth considering how to address them. 
An hierarchical view of the Air Force architecture might provide some insights to 
solving some of these difficult issues.  We noted in Chapter 2 that Air Force doctrine 
emphasizes the strategic level of war at the expense of operational and tactical levels.  A 
more even emphasis across the levels of war hierarchy in Air Force thinking may help 
address some of the misalignments between the Air Force and the rest of the Department 
of Defense (whether these misalignments are real or perceived).   
As a simple thought experiment, we have observed that the Air Force 
deemphasizes as less critical the operational and tactical levels of war.  The claim of air 
power theory is that strategic targeting can bring down the enemy system, if it is done 
properly (Warden 1995; Douhet and Ferrari 1998).  However, despite the Air Force’s 
best efforts, the operational and tactical levels of war remain important.304  It also stands 
to reason that, in terms of impact, strategic targets are high, but in numbers are low.  The 
inverse holds true for tactical targets—they are numerous and, with rare exceptions, have 
a low impact at the system level.  A detailed analysis that examines re-balancing in this 
way may enable new solutions to be developed and possibly address some of the current 
criticisms of the Air Force. 
8.5 Fully embracing the “Information Age” 
To reiterate, our research has been highly exploratory.  We think that we have 
embarked on a fruitful path and developed a powerful framework.  While many 
approaches to complex enterprises embrace their complexity and attempt to unravel and 
understand it from either a sociological or a mechanical perspective, we have applied 
concepts from information systems and mathematics to the problem.  Since a large part of 
enterprise activity is information processing, itself closely coupled to mathematics, we 
think this approach is natural. 
                                                
304 Some protest that the Air Force has never been able to implement a campaign that allows a test of the 
theory.  This claim remains highly debatable.  A good review of this position is provided by (Cooper 2001). 
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Our approach has exposed a richer description and understanding of some well-
known enterprise pathologies and highlighted a more formal way to view Joint military 
operational design and to formally design properties that have typically been considered 
as only achievable via informal action.  We offer a way to make design of large-scale 
enterprises (specifically military and government ones) a serious design activity. 
Our research approaches enterprise architecture from an information perspective.  
The 20th century focus of organizations on efficiency and specialization of processes and 
tasks have become “infrastructure.”  By this we mean that the ability to design and 
manage an organization has become routine; excellence is the norm.305  Smooth running 
well designed processes and teams and individuals who are competent at specialized 
tasks are the price of entry to any competition.  Past measures of effectiveness were 
performance parameters of individual products and systems, efficiency of processes and 
quality and quantity of output.  Today, the interfaces with outside services, suppliers, 
customers and other stakeholders are the critical determinants of success.  Today value is 
derived from the overall architecture of the system and its ability to cover a wider array 
of demands—its flexibility.  The same is true in national defense.  Our systems, 
processes, training, education and people are superb.  Excellence is expected, demanded 
and delivered daily.  The keys to our sustained advantage and future security now lie in 
how well we are able to architect these precious assets—how well we can design strategic 
and operational architectures.  Understanding how to do this is not a trivial undertaking 
(Watts 2008). 
Today, relationships and inter-relationships are key—a core idea in information 
systems architecting.  We have addressed this issue directly by applying an information 
system concept to large information processing systems:  enterprises.  Combinations of 
systems and organizations are the source of competitive advantage.  Technical systems 
that can be configured to meet increasingly dynamic and uncertain demand have long-
term value.  Enterprise-level relationships are increasingly necessary for survival, let 
                                                
305 An interesting conceptual extension would be to apply Christensen’s disruptive technology theory to this 
problem. 
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alone success.  These trends places a premium on architecture design, specifically 
architecture designs that enable flexibility.  
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